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This thesis reveals the origin and significance of the Low-Rodgers
Expedition of 1871 in the evolution of a conscious foreign policy of thi
United States in East Asia. Entitled "The Low-Rodgers Expedition: A
Study in the Foundations of U.S. Policy in Korea," it deals with the
Low-Rodgers Expedition not as an isolated event, but as both an outcome
and antecedent of other closely interrelated events in an unbroken time
continuum. Concentrating on the fundamental regional issues of the
times and the national character and interests of the United States and
the Kingdom of Korea, this thesis:
1. Reveals, for the first time, the original 1871 diary of U.S.
Minister to China, Frederick Ferdinand Low, and the wealth of new
historical data therein: his misgivings and motivations; his plans and
failings; and his appreciation for the historical importance of the
mission which today bears his name.
2. Provides deeper analysis of the contemporary events bearing on
the Low-Rodgers Expedition and gives a deeper appreciation of the
obstacles which worked against its success from the very moment of its
inception.
3. Shows why misconceptions about the expedition and some
peripheral events have remained unchallenged for over a century.
4. Explains why Low's efforts to open Korea before the 1882
Shufeldt mission failed, yet still played a more important role in the
development of U.S. policy in Korea and the opening of Korea to tne
Western world than has been recognised.
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I. INTRODUCTION: STORMY BEGINNINGS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Today's relationship between Korea and the United States of America
represents one of the unique alliances among nations. Geographically,
historically and culturally, they are worlds apart. Yet few nations are
as close. America's modern commitment to the Koreans, combining both
the strategic and the moral, has been indispensable to South Korea's
very survival. CRef. 1] Just as important, the Koreans' response to the
American alliance has been equally beneficial to the Americans. The
South Koreans have built one of East Asia's most thriving and prosperous
economies. They have been a loyal ally. But relations between
Americans and Koreans have not always been so symbiotic.
In fact two unhappy events marked the early years of American-Korean
relations when they began over a century ago. The first was the
destruction of an American merchant ship, the General Sherman, in
the Taedong River and the murder of its crew near Pyongyang in 1866.
The second occurred in 1871 on Kanghwa Island, off modern day Inchon and
near the mouth of the Han River. There Korean and American troops
fought bloody encounters. Courage and commitment, misunderstanding and
misfortune permeated both events. Yet neither episode gave any
indication of the close relations that were to develop between the two
countries.
Unfortunately, disparate accounts of bath these early incidents
abound, beclouding our understanding of these events and their
significance. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, Korean soldiers and
civilians took part in the General Sherman incident "in revenge
for the crew's acts of plunder...." and that "In 1871 a United States
flotilla came to retaliate for the General Sherman but was beaten
back." [Ref. 2]
Another account said the General Sherman committed unprovoked
attacks on the Korean people, and the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871 was
punishment [of the Koreans] for the crew's murder. [Ref. 3] Still
another described the General Sherman as a "heavily armed
schooner," without any mention of such key bits of information as its
mission or why such a ship might visit Korea. [Ref. 4: p. 5]
One narrative pointed out the 1871 expedition was attacked by the
Koreans first and withdrew only "after waiting in vain for the proper
apologies" from the Koreans. [Ref. 5: p. 122] And a particularly bizarre
report said the General Sherman went to Korea to plunder royal
tombs and hold the remains for ransom. [Ref. 6: p. 230]
The historical debate over these events continues. In its
canonization of the entire Kim family, the North Korean propaganda
apparatus has capitalized on the General Sherman incident by
incorporating it into the alleged revolutionary accomplishments of the
Kim family. "Kim Eng-woo [Kim II Sung's grandfather] is said to have
been the leader of a group which, in 1866, sent the U.S. warship
General Sherman to the bottom of the Taedong River." [Ref. 7]
Such accounts do not provide an accurate understanding of what actually
happened.
This thesis aims to shed light on such questions as: What previous
circumstances and events, in time and place, may have influenced what
transpired with the General Sherman and the Low-Rodgers Expedition
of 1871? Why did the General Sherman go to Korea in the first
place, and under what auspices? What actually motivated the Koreans to
burn the General Sherman and kill her crew? Are present day North
Korean allegations the General Sherman was a "warship" true? Was
the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871 really retaliation for the murders of
the General Sherman's crew?
As for the Low-Rodgers mission, who made the decision to send the
1871 expedition to Korea? Who planned it? If it was a retaliatory
mission for the loss of the General Sherman, why did it take five
years for the Americans to respond? But if it was not intended to
avenge the General Sherman, why did the Americans send such a
heavily armed flotilla to what was then considered a "poor" country?
What happened during the five year interlude between both events that
may have impacted on the latter? What legacy did these incidents leave?
This thesis deals with the General Sherman and the Low-Rodgers
Expedition of 1871 not as isolated events, but rather as closely
interrelated outcomes in an unbroken time continuum. It seeks to add
new light to reasons why misunderstandings have arisen from the various
interpretations of these events by examining the East Asian setting that
made both events possible. It looks not only at the situation of the
Americans and Koreans involved, but also the influencing factors
throughout the entire region. It will consider versions of both the
General Sherman and Low-Rodgers Expedition in detail, as well as
the factors of influence. It analyzes historical literature of this
period showing that some accounts are simply wrong and others contain
blatant mistakes.
Might there be some plausible explanations for these events'
historical inaccuracies heretofore not considered? What revelations can
be found in the previously unknown diary of U.S. Minister to China,
Frederick F. Low? What does his personal diary reveal that the
"official record" too often leaves out?
On the basis of this and other new information, this thesis draws
some credible conclusions about these premature incidents involved in
the opening of Korea to the Western world, their implications at the
time, and what lessons they may offer us now in the context of the
continuing unfolding drama of relations between the United States and
Korea.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: THE EAST ASIAN ENVIRONMENT
By the time the General Sherman sailed into Korean waters,
Western experience in East Asia was already centuries old. The British,
French, Germans, Spanish, Dutch, and Russians all boasted a long
chronology of wars, treaties, territorial encroachments, and exploitive
commerce in East Asia. Missionary efforts to convert the "heathen" were
already well established, as was a profitable opium and ginseng trade.
The cultural conflict (perhaps "damage" would be a better word) was
already profound, recognized, and, to some extent, being dealt with by
Japan and China. Hunted in China, Christian missionaries had already
been banned from Japan and excluded from Korea. CRef. 8: p. 3983 Other
foreigners were also unwelcome there, and it was not unusual for them to
be jailed upon arrival. China, the traditional overlord of Korea, was
in a state of rapid dynastic decline and internal disarray after being
badly beaten by the Europeans in the uneven engagements of the Opium War
(1839-1842). [Ref. 8: p. 454] Foreign encroachment and internal strife
had gone beyond China's ability to control either.
Meanwhile, same Americans were profitably riding on the Europeans'
coattails. They found East Asia, particularly China, most alluring and
perfectly suited to American circumstances. For merchants and traders,
it held exceptional promise for fat profits. For those more interested
in saving souls, East Asia provided plenty of "heathens" to proselytize.
Furthermore, America " benefited from the trading concessions exacted
:rora the Chinese by the British in the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. [Ref.
8: p. 460] Two years later Caleb Cushing, the first American envoy to
China, concluded the Treaty of Vanghsia. These and other treaties gave
America numerous benefits at little or no cost, a sort of "beneficiarv
imperialism." [Ref. 91
But America's Asian outreach did not end with China. In 1854,
Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his "gunboat diplomacy" succeeded in
opening Japan and introducing a new era. [Ref. 10] With steam, America
could defy the winds. Suddenly the Far East was now the near west.
With America's growing self-confidence in the region came increasing
trade with and interests in both China and Japan. From there it was
only natural for U.S. interests to turn toward Korea. Our primary
interest in Korea, as in China and Japan, was expanded trade. However,
America's experience with Korea prior to 1866 consisted only of
shipwrecked sailors of the American sailing vessel Surprise, ' who were
treated kindly and returned safely to China after their vessel sank off
the coast of Whang-ha Province. [Ref. 4: pp. 4-5]
Although managing to evade the early exploitation that befell China,
for centuries Korea had been the target of Western interests. Europeans
visited there as early as 1593, when the Spanish Jesuit, Gregorio de
Cespedes came to minister to Japanese Christian warriors under the
'The Surprise was a schooner that sank off the eastern coast of
Korea on June 24, 1866. Korean authorities saw to the needs of the
crewmen, including food, housing, clothing, and medicine, for 24 days
before providing them safe escort to a town on the frontier with China.
There they were turned over to Chinese authorities and, with the help of
a French missionary, eventually came under the care of American
authorities. The captain and crew of the Surprise praised the
Koreans for the courteous treatment provided them and noted that it was
in stark contrast to their treatment at the hands of the Chinese.
invading General Konshi. [Ref. 5: p. 109] Korea's aversion to outsiders
was continually reinforced throughout history by unprovoked Chinese and
Japanese pirate raids, as well as invasions from land and sea. This all
prompted a policy of national seclusion that isolated the peninsula from
the rest of the world more effectively than similar policies of China or
Japan. [Ref. 11: p. 3]
Unlike today's divided peninsula, Korea at that time was a unified
country. But internally the government of the Yi dynasty in its capital
at Seoul (in theory an absolute monarchy) was experiencing severe
problems.
The repeated succession of minors to the throne and the domination of
government by relatives of the queen resulted in a progressive
weakening of royal power. Moreover, the efficient functioning of the
bureaucracy was... disrupted by favoritism and nepotism. [Ref. 12: p.
338]
The resulting corruption and inefficiencies caused serious financial
problems, factionalism, and the government's general loss of credibility
with its people.
Even worse, there was debilitating social unrest. "From about 1800
the peninsula was racked with revolts large and small in every corner of
the kingdom." [Ref. 13: p. 220] These revolts were distinguished by the
banding together of many different social classes and further
exacerbated by a series of epidemics, floods, and famines.
Add to this the increasing pressure on Korea from the outside. The
nineteenth century brought ever increasing trade to East Asia.
Consequently, sightings of foreign vessels off the Korean coasts became
more and more frequent. As occasional shipwrecked survivors told oi
their exploits in "the Hermit Kingdom," and the West's appetite tor
regional trade grew, attempts to open commercial trade with Korea were
inevitable. The first European vessel to attempt such dealings was
Britain's iord Amherst in 1832. CRef. 13: p. 229] But it was
unsuccessful; the Koreans simply ignored it.
As is frequent in times of social unrest, troubled governments often
seek something to blame for the people's discontent and divert public
attention from their shortcomings. The Yi government was no exception.
It found a convenient scapegoat in the menace of Catholic missionaries
and their converts.
Catholicism met all the government's scapegoat criteria. First,
because it was an alien religion, it was easily criticized based on its
association with foreigners. Korea's traditional distaste for
foreigners and its policy of relative isolationism was no cultural
accident or political whim. Korea had a long and bloody history of
invasions from all sides. Furthermore, Catholic teachings often ran
counter to many of Korean society's cultural and religious norms. The
traditional Korean worship of ancestors ran counter to the doctrine of
the Roman Catholic Church, and it was not at all unusual for the
government to exact harsh punishment, even death, on early Korean
Christians who defiantly burned their ancestral tablets, CRef. 14: p.
333 Many Christian teachings were thought to strike at the very heart
of Korea's Confucian family, society, and state values. Naturally, the
Korean establishment had no qualms about labeling the church a genuine
"threat.
"
As a result, Catholicism in Korea was officially banned in 1786.
[Ret. 12: p. 321] To that end, the government also took painstaking
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measures to cut off Catholic influences from coming in from the
outside. Among other things, it stopped the import of all books from
Peking, and envoys to the Chinese capital were warned against having any-
private contacts with Chinese. Visiting a Catholic Church was expressly-
forbidden. [Ref. 12: p. 321] Of course, that did not make the religion
disappear. In fact, the government's seeming disregard for the people
and their economic distress only served to make Catholicism more
attractive.
Unfortunately for the Koreans who sought refuge in that religion,
their action also legitimated and worsened the government's
persecution. To cope with it, Catholic connivery abounded. Korean
Catholics went so far as to secure positions as servants on the annual
envoy to China just so they could relay church letters to the bishop in
Peking — an action expressly forbidden by the government. They further
incensed the Korean government by appealing to the Christian nations of
Europe to invade and conquer Korea in their behalf (a government agent
intercepted one such communication). [Ref. 14: pp. 34-35]
These and other similar Christian actions could not have come at a
worse time. Early nineteenth century Korea was rife with social discord
and natural catastrophe. In 1812, there was a concerted uprising by a
native Korean named Hong Kyong-nae, which included rebel attacks on
government offices at Kasan, Pakch'on, and Kwaksan. Within six days of
those initial attacks eight towns were under rebel control. It took
government troops five months of bloody fighting to take them back.
The Hong Kyong-nae rebellion was hardly an isolated incident. In
1813, there was another uprising on Cheju Island. The social unrest was
further exaccerbated during the period from 1810 to 1832 when widespread
flooding, fires in populated areas, and even a cholera epidemic ravaged
the country — all this without any government relief or assistance.
Without government action to redress the people's grievances, more ana
more uprisings sprang up. They lasted almost continually, in one form
or another, until the spring of 1863 when the movement seemed to exhaust
itself. But still there were no reforms, and the situation remained
potentially explosive. CRef. 12:pp. 321-3361
Understandably, the results of all this turmoil were unpleasant for
both Christians and country. Thousands of Christians were scourged,
imprisoned, or killed. Discovered and captured priests were routinely
beheaded. In addition to the government's religious arguments against
the new faith on the grounds it blasphemed Confucian orthodoxy,
Christian intrique and doctrine provided the government with even
stronger anti-Christian political arguments. In the eyes of the Korean
government, Christian appeals to foreign states for help branded them
rebels, and thus enemies of the state. The government's severe
persecution of Korean Christians became a constant feature of Korean
life. The years of 1801, 1815, 1819, and 1827 were especially bad years
for Korean Christians.
Thus, it is not surprising that so many during this period sought
refuge in Catholicism and took such great risks in its behalf. It
offered them hope at a time when there was little or none. Likewise,
the government's hostile reaction to the organized religion is also
understandable. With discontent and rebellion everywhere, the
government could ill-afford another organized movement in the country,
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especially one with doctrines which attacked the government's very
foundation and could have such a strong hold on the people.
The year 1839 was particularly bad for Korean Catholics and what
happened as a result of the renewed Catholic persecutions that year
played a very significant role in "setting the stage" for what was about
to happen to the General Sherman and the Law-Rodgers Expedition of
1871. In the spring of 1839, after years of a somewhat conciliatory
policy toward Christianity, a staunch anti-Christian party took over in
Korea, setting off renewed persecution. All of the Church's foreign
hierarchy was arrested, tortured, and eventually killed, as well as many
of the laity (which some records indicate numbered about 9,000). Among
the French priests executed was one Father L.H. Joseph Imbert, who had
managed to send to the Bishop of Peking news of the executions of the
other French priests just before his own execution. His letter and news
of the situation in Korea kicked off a chain of events with a much more
profound impact on future Korean behavior than Westerners apparently
suspected.
First came the French response to news of the murdered priests. The
French were outraged. While problems at home and in Europe prevented
any immediate response, news of the 1839 persecutions did bring a French
squadron from China in 1846. The commander, Admiral Cecile, sent an
official letter to the Korean king demanding an explanation for the 1839
deaths of the French citizens in his country. However, not receiving an
answer to their inquiries, the French merely left with a promise to come
back. "Two French ships did indeed arrive off Choi la Province the
following year, but one of them was damaged by a rack on the coast and
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they Left without fulfilling their mission." [Ref. 13: p. 224]
The harsh French demands without punitive actions to back them up
must have made a profound impression an the Koreans. They were already
associating the expansion of this new Western religion with the ever
expanding encroachment of Western political influence in other East
Asian countries, notably China and Japan. China's loss of power,
prestige, and "face" as a result of its defeat by Great Britain in the
Opium War of 1839-42, as well as the United States' gunboat opening of
Japan in 1853, were lessons not lost on the Koreans. When Russia later
annexed the Chinese maritime province east of Amur, making a common
border between Russia and Korea, the Koreans felt they had good cause to
worry.
The Korean government watched these developments in China and Japan
with growing trepidation, and each new encroachment of the Westerners
hardend their determination to allow no foreigners on Korean soil.
[Ref. 12: pp. 352-353]
By 1866, the year the General Sherman was lost, the Koreans
were quite ready to communicate their foreign policy positions by
actions rather than discussions, and there was a man in power in Seoul
determined to do just that — the Taewon'gun (Prince of the Great
Court), father of the boy king, Yi Myong-bok, who ascended to the Korean
throne when King Ch'olchong died in 1864 leaving no male heir. The
boy's father was to act as regent, or de facto ruler, until the youth
was old enough to assume his royal responsibilities. As it turned out,
the new Taewon'gun took his job quite seriously. By January 1866, he
was in complete control of the Korean government.
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The Taewon' gun's ascension to power was another key factor in the
eventual loss of the General Sherman and the failure of the
Low-Rodgers Expedition. A dedicated Confucian, he was anti-Christian,
uncompromising, resistant to change, and refused to face any realities
which conflicted with his personal beliefs.
It was the tragic irony of his [the Taewon' gun' s] life that he came
to power at a time when the ideals in which he sincerely believed had
become outmoded. Only a dynamic society with rapidly expanding
commerce and industry could successfully appose the mounting pressure
from the Vest, as the example Japan clearly showed. The Taewon 1 gun
could not see this. His only answer to Western pressure was to
attempt to isolate Korea completely from the outside world, refusing
all foreign contact and violently repressing all foreign ideas at
home. [Ref. 12: p. 3623
The Russians were the first to find this out. In January, 1866, a
Russian warship sailed into Wonsan, on Korea's northeastern coast. The
Russian commander boldy demanded the liberty of trade and residence for
Russian merchants. In his letter to the court at Seoul, he said that if
his demand was not granted, Russian troops would cross the border to
enforce it. [Ref. 14: p. 393 The Taewon' gun's response to this Russian
audacity was what appears, in retrospect, to be typically Korean. He
waited.
Meanwhile, certain Korean Christians sought to take advantage of
this new Russian threat. One of them, Kim Ke Ho, invited a French
bishop in Korea, Berneux, to aid the Korean government in dealing with
the Russians. Berneux welcomed the opportunity. No doubt he thought
the Church's assistance in the matter would put it in the Confucian
Taewon' gun's favor. "Kim immediately wrote a letter to the regent
suggesting that the most effective measure for resisting Russian
aggression would be found in farming an anti-Russian alliance with
13
France and England, and that such an alliance could easily be negotiated
through the French bishop resident in Korea." [Ref. 14: p. 40]
Although the Taewon* gun initially entertained the idea of conferring
with the bishop, when Berneux arrived for an audience, the regent
refused to see him. There were then new developments which destined the
Catholic's new strategy to failure. The Taewon' gun's delay tactics
toward the Russian warship at Wonsan worked. The Russians simply gave
up and sailed away without incident. The regent must have considered it
a victory for his anti-foreign policy. If he did not, he probably
thought his policy needed such a victory. Because meanwhile word came
from China (later revealed to be false) that the Chinese were killing
all the Europeans in the empire. Furthermore, the Taewon' gun's
Confucian advisors were strongly advising him against seeing the bishop
and vehemently advocating that the country's standing laws against the
Christians be enforced. [Ref. 14: p. 413
For the Taewon' gun, the new circumstances dictated his forthcoming
actions. Because the Russians were now no longer an immediate threat,
the alliances proposed by the Catholics were unnecessary. Furthermore,
to the Catholics' great misfortune, their alliance proposal seems to
have brought home two deadly paints to the Confucian regent. First,
they must be sizable in number and strong in influence just to have
reached his ear with their proposal. Second, if such a strong minority
had foreign ties sufficiently strong enough to assist the court against
a threatening foreign power, then that minority itself posed a
potentially dangerous threat to the Korean government. After all, was
it not true that Korean converts had in the past played the part of
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traitors on the advice of their Catholic teachers? Had they not been
known to deceive officers of their government and to violate the law of
the land? Might they not do so again in the future? The Taewan'gun
apparently agreed with his advisors that it was time the anti-Christian
laws be enforced.
The French considered the resulting situation intolerable. Word had
come to Henri De Bellonet, the French Charg6 d' Affaires in Peking, that
nine of the twelve French priests in Korea had been tortured and
executed by the Taewon'gun. Furthermore, the Taewon'gun launched a
great nation-wide search and persecution against all the other Catholics
in the kingdom. Thousands were either imprisoned or lost their lives.
"News of the persecution of Catholics and the execution of the French
priests had reached Peking through the escape of Father Ridel." CRef.
12: p. 365] Bellonet called for immediate retaliation against the
Koreans and thus informed the Chinese government. Calling the Korean
executions "a horrible outrage" and "savage act of barbarity," by formal
letter he complained to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs:
The government of his Majesty t the French king] cannot permit so
bloody an outrage to be unpunished. The same day on which the King
of Corea laid his hands upon by unhappy countrymen was the last of
his reign; he himself proclaimed its end, which I in my turn solemnly
declare to-day. In a few days our military farces are to march to
the conquest of Corea and the Emperor, my august sovereign, alone,
has now the right and the power to dispose according to his good
pleasure, of the country and the vacant throne.
The Chinese government has declared to me many times that it has
no authority or power over Corea; and it refused on this pretext to
apply the treaties of Tientsin to that country and give to our
missionaries the passports which we have asked from it. We have
taken note of these declarations, and we declare, now, that we do not
recognise any authority whatever of the Chinese government over the
kingdom of Corea. [Ref. 15:p. 420]
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Prince Kung's reply was a credit to Chinese diplomacy. As one might
expect, he disavowed knowledge or responsibility of the act. At the
same time, he was also supportive of Korea, suggesting it was in
France's best interests to take its time in responding in hopes of
confirming the validity of the report Bellonet addressed. Prince Kung
also implied China's distaste regarding the use of force in this
situation, but conceded he understood the French had already made up
their minds on the issue. At the same time, Kung made it clear the
Chinese would not intercede on behalf of the Koreans, despite Korea's
request for Chinese aid. [Ref. 15: p. 421]
The French wasted no time in preparing what was to become,
unwittingly, the start of the long series of events related to the
General Sherman and the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871. Admiral
Rose, the commander-in-chief of the French fleet in the Far East, had
already begun piecing his land and naval forces together for an
expedition to Korea before the Bellonet-Kung exchange took place. The
French admiral at Chefoo also had already dispatched at least one
gunboat to Korea to survey the coasts and channels leading to Seoul. So
determined was he that he let it be known to the American legation in
Peking that he would go as far as Saigon, if necessary, to muster the
necessary forces. [Ref. 16: p. 536-537]
The French infuriation produced two missions against Korea. The
first, composed at but three ships, did little more than reconnoiter the
area. One of these vessels seriously damaged itself off Kangwha Island.
[Ref. 12: p. 365]
L6
But it was the second French mission against Korea that had the
greatest influence on later American action. Departing Chefoo on
October 11, 1866, Admiral Rose and his fleet proceeded to the mouth of
the Han River, then an to Kangwha, then a city of about 20,000 people.
His attack commenced on October 14th, and by the 16th the French had
captured the city without a single loss among their own men. While the
Koreans had made great preparations to engage the French all along the
Han River, the French arrived before thc^e preparations could be
completed. Consequently, the Koreans abandoned their fortifications
without any real struggle when the French reappeared.
However, within days the Koreans had prepared a course of action
against the French. By October 27th, the Koreans had amassed a
formidable force and two limited engagements had already killed five
Frenchmen and wounded another 57. Admiral Rose decided nothing could be
done with his limited force and opted to leave Korea, return to China,
and amass yet another, larger retaliatory force in hopes of exacting
more revenge the following spring or summer. [Ref. 15: pp. 425-426]
While France's seven ships and 600 man force failed to accomplish
any discernible French abjective, [Ref. 11: p. 13] it did alarm the
Americans by bringing back word of the fate of the General Sherman
and its crew. It also may have influenced the eventual outcome of the
as yet uncontemplated Low-Rodgers Expedition by hardening Korea's
already aggravated anti-Western and anti-Christian attitudes and
bolstering the Korean government's official isolationist policy. The
Korean government's attitude was quite clear even before the French
mission: "The barbarians from beyond the seas have violated our borders
17
and invaded our land. If we do not fight we must make treaties with
them. Those who favor making a treaty sell their country." CRef. 5: pp.
114-115]
Along with other nearby foreign ship sightings, Korean preparations
for the French return in 1866 set the stage for further developments in
the evolution of U.S. policy toward Korea. A new ship was about to
enter Korean waters: the General Sherman. Unfortunately, Korea's
traditional aversion to foreigners, its policy of isolationism,
anti-Catholicism and the expected French foray all made for less than a
cardial reception.
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HI. IHS GENERAL SHERMAN INCIDENT
The General Sherman was an unwitting participant in the
unfolding grand design. William H. Seward, U.S. Secretary of State from
March 5, 1861, to March 4, 1869, considered the Far East important from
the very beginning of his tenure, entirely aware that Korea was a part
of China.
Seward was willing to enter heartily into agreements with other
treaty powers for co-operation in a common policy [in the Far East].
He approved an understanding by which the powers would protect the
treaty ports, give China moral support, but no military aid, against
the Tai-Ping rebels, and man with foreigners the war steamers
recently purchased to put down piracy along the Chinese coasts.
Equal opportunities, the preservation of the territorial integrity of
China, and co-operation in protecting foreigners, were the elements
of his policy. [Ref. 17: p. 112]
Thus, any ship destined for Korea would have accomplished at least
two of Seward's three policy objectives opportunity and protection.
British, Russian, German, and American vessels were already frequently
skirting Korean waters in the conduct of the China-Japan trade.
America, pleased with the benefits from the opening of China and its
"first" by Perry's opening of Japan, was ready for more opportunity. A
naval approach in which the U.S. was identified was a chance to gain the
competitive edge in Korea. But it is important to note that the
General Sherman was not sponsored by the U.S. government, nor did
the U.S. government have foreknowledge of its sailing to Korea. It was
a purely private entrepreneurial undertaking.
The General Sherman was an American centerboard trading
schooner of eighty tons, with two large masts and a smaller sail on the
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foremast. For protection, she had two 12-pounder guns mounted
broadside. Owned by an American named W. B. Preston, she was frequently
chartered by the British shipping house of Meadows and Company, based at
Tientsin. CRef. 17: p. 96] Curiously, owner Preston decided to accompany
the General Sherman on its voyage to Korea for the sake of his
health. CRef. 15: p. 428] He, Mr. Page, the ship's captain, and Mr.
Wilson, the Chief Mate, were the only Americans on board. The
off icer-in-charge of commercial concerns during the voyage was Mr.
George Hogarth, a British subject. [Ref. 18: p. 100]
Also on board the General Sherman was a Scottish missionary by
the name of Robert Jermain Thomas. Mr. Thomas had been to Korea once
before, and quite recently. At great personal risk (would he have taken
such risk had his wife not died the year before?), he had gone to Korea
in September, 1865, as an agent of the National Bible Society of
Scotland to distribute a large stock of Chinese Bibles among the Korean
Christians rumored being persecuted there. During the two and a half
months Thomas was in Korea, he acquired some knowledge of the Korean
language and is known to have distributed the Bibles. By land and sea,
he managed to return to Peking in January, 1866, just as the Taewon'gun
began the latest Catholic persecutions. [Ref . 14: pp. 47-49]
In its later request for American help in determining the fate of
the General Sherman, Meadows and Company said Mr. Thomas was on
board only as a passenger "to visit Corea again, in order to extend his
knowledge of the Corean language...." [Ref. 15:p. 428]. No doubt that
explanation contains some truth. Thomas was known to have been studying
the Korean language ever since his return to China in January.
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Apparently he had been doing so with the aid of refugee Koreans in
Chefoo who no doubt ensured the Reverend Thomas appreciated the
Taewon' gun's terrible Catholic persecutions in Korea. [Ref. 19: p. vi
However, it is doubtful the Korean language was Mr. Thomas' only
interest. France's Admiral Rose, incensed by the Koreans' murder of
French priests and planning retaliation for the deed, also sought
Thomas' assistance due to his knowledge of the coast and the language.
Apparently Thomas' friendly reception by the people during his first
trip to Korea was already well known in the foreign community at Chefoo
and Peking. Likewise, Thomas must have already made good progress with
the Korean language for his linguistic talents to command the attention
of a foreign admiral. It has also been recorded that Thomas agreed to
accompany the admiral but grew impatient with the expedition's delays
and embarked upon the General Sherman. [Ref. 14: p. 50]
The fact is, Thomas was the ship's interpreter — and more. All
communication between the General Sherman and the Koreans was
through him. British subjects in these two key positions could explain
the later Korean assertion they destroyed a British, not American, ship.
The precise number of the remaining crew is still uncertain.
Accounts of its composition vary anywhere from two Malays and six
Chinese to 15-20 Malays and Chinese. Whichever count is adhered to,
among them were a Chinese pilot and a Cantonese shroff, or money
changer. [Ref. 15: p. 428]
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A. THE GENERAL SHERMAN'S VOYAGE TO KOREA
The General Sherman sailed from Tientsin, Meadows and
Company's homeport, for Chefoo on July 29, 1866. At Chefoo, it took on
most of its cargo and a few more crewmen, including both the
Englishmen. Meadows & Company, the charterer of the General
Sherman claimed the vessel sailed to Korea with a cargo of foreign
merchandise for the sole purpose of trade. Its cargo was said to
consist of cotton goods, glass, tin plates and other assorted
merchandise, merchandise specifically presumed to be attractive to the
Koreans. [Ref. 15: p. 427] The owner, Preston, also came to an agreement
with Meadows and Company that the ship should try to return with a cargo
of Korean merchandise. All this was quite in keeping with its stated
purpose of possibly opening Korea to commercial intercourse. [Ref. 19: p.
81
The General Sherman left Chefoo on August 9th. Its attempted
stopover at White Wing Island, one of the Sir James Hall group, was a
precursor that the voyage to Korea was to be ill-fated. No sooner had
the General Sherman anchored there than, for some unknown reason,
the Mandarin in charge of the island ordered his garrison to attack it.
[Ref. 19: p. 9] But nothing came from that incident. The vessel
continued on to the northeastern coast of Korea toward the mouth of the
Taedong River. Its first anchorage near the Korean coast was at Totchom
where, curiously, Mr. Thomas was met by a Chinese sailor named Yu Wen
Tai in another prepositioned vessel. Apparently they knew each other
quite well; Yu Wen Tai was the same Chinese sailor who brought Thomas
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and his Bibles to Korea the previous year. 2 Thomas' initial
request of Yu to guide the General Sherman up the Taedong River to
Pyongyang was accepted. But upon reaching Moon U-Koo, Yu was forced, or
so he claimed, to decline going further. His crew wanted no part of a
voyage into the "Hermit Kingdom." Consequently, Yu Wen Tai refused to
proceed and returned to Chefoo. [Ref. 19: p. 10]
Interestingly enough, however, no one approached to help in
determining the General Sherman's fate — the British, the
Americans, the Chinese, or the Japanese — disputed or even questioned
that the ship's mission was simply one of trade. Curiously, no American
diplomatic correspondence related to the General Sherman ever
addressed what flag the vessel sailed under. Nor did such
correspondence from the American legation make mention of anyone
approaching the legation to procure American sponsorship or
authorization of the General Sherman. In fact, it was somewhat
American policy not to allow the American flag on such unofficial,
uncondoned business. That was considered improper or unlawful use of
the U.S. flag. When, in October 1866, a Mr. White approached the
legation to use the U.S. flag in the conveyance of Chinese goods on a
Chinese ship, his request drew heated criticism from U.S. Secretary of
State, William H. Seward, who made his stand on the issue quite clear.
^Yu Wen Tai is one of those interesting and mysterious
characters in history who appear to play a pivotal role in certain
events, but about whom history provides only cursory mention. Yu was
obviously a key factor in the original General Sherman plan, then
later showed up as an influencing personality in Shufeldt's later
fact-finding mission to Korea. To what true extent his influence playe
in the failure of both missions may never be known.
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It is not deemed advisable that the discussion with the Chinese
authorities of the affair of the boat for which a United States flag
was furnished by a Mr. White should be continued. This government
should not in any way countenance the improper or unlawful use of
that flag. If we connive at its abuse by Chinese for covering their
property in their own country, and thereby evading obligations, we
must expect to be regarded as derogating from our duty as a just and
friendly power. CRef. 16: p. 563]
Nevertheless, the Koreans had good reason to question the true
nature of the General Sherman' s mission. For one thing, its heavy
guns caused Korean doubts about the mission's peaceful intent. [Ref.
4: p. 5] In fact, "there were credible reports that [the ship's] real
purpose was to plunder the tombs of the Korean kings at Ping An
[ Pyong-an] , take the gold and jewels which they contained, and hold the
royal remains for ransom." [Ref. 6: p. 230] Where these "credible
reports" came from is uncertain. But with the Westerners' liberal use
of Chinese crewman, pilots, and money changers, it certainly would not
be difficult for rumors to get started and find their way to Korea.
Likewise, with the long history of Chinese pirate raids on the coast of
Korea, the mere presence of men who looked like pirates on board
probably raised Korean suspicions of their intent to commit piracy.
B. THE GENERAL SHERMAN IN KOREA
Rumors notwithstanding, most previous Western historical accounts
have embraced one basic rendition of what happened during that fateful
voyage.
Early in September the sailing vessel General Sherman entered
the mouth of the Ta-dong River... The governor of P'yung-an Province
sent, demanding the cause of her coming and the answer was that they
desired to open up trade with Korea. Though told that this was
impossible, the foreign vessel not only did not leave but, on the
contrary, pushed up the river until she reached a point opposite
Yang-jak Island not tar from the city of P'yung-yang I sic'] . It
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was only the heavy rains in the interior and an exceptionally high
tide that allowed her to get across the [sand] bar, and soon she was
stuck in the mud, and all hopes of ever saving her were gone. This
rash move astonished the Koreans above measure. Something desperate
must be the intentions of men who would drive a ship thus to certain
destruction. After a time word came from the Regent to attack her if
she did not leave at once. CRef. 20: p. 207]
At precisely this point things got out of control. In desperation,
the Americans provoked the Koreans by kidnapping a local official.
Then the fight began, but without effect on either side until the
Koreans succeeded in setting fire to the General Sherman with
fire-rafts. The officers and crew then were forced to drop into the
water, where many of them were drowned. Those that reached the shore
were immediately hewn down by the frenzied populace. [Ref. 20: p. 207]
It was further rumored that those crewmembers who did survive the fire
and water were then decapitated by the angry mob that fell on them.
[Ref. 21]
However, some records deny that the General Sherman's crewmen
simply were peaceful, good- intent ioned, aspiring merchantmen who were
forced into a desperate criminal act when frightened by an irrational
and frenzied populace. Some doutbts have been raised by unanswered
questions. For example, why did Mr. R.J. Thomas grow so impatient with
the slow preparations for the French punitive expedition of Admiral Rose
and book passage on the General Sherman? What motivated the
ship's owner, Mr. Preston, and Meadows & Company to seek to open trade
with the Kingdom of Korea at a time when that country's growing
anti-foreign and anti-Christian sentiments were at an all time high?
Were Thomas' motivations for returning to Korea purely missionary?
If Thomas was returning to Korea simply to spread the Gospel among
the oppressed heathens, then it could have been that "he came to Korea
neither as a pilot nor as a mere student oi the language. He came to
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perfect his knowledge in order to preach the Gospel and establish a
Protestant Mission in this land." CRef. 19: p. 9]
However, from this point on, as E.M. Cable so astutely points out in
his study of the period, there were no General Sherman survivors.
Therefore, there were no first-person accounts to refer to and compare
with what we do have — Korean Yi Dynasty Annals. Cable's translations
and study of these reports is the only real source available regarding
the movements of the General Sherman in its progress up the river
and the crew's fate near Pyongyang. Despite some obvious shortcomings,
their remarkable detail provides insight into the circumstances and
people of the ill-fated vessel.
The Yi Dynasty Annals allow us to understand much of the root causes
of the tragedies that befell both the General Sherman and the
subsequent Low-Rodgers Expedition. They also make the people involved
in both incidents very real. The Reverend R.J. Thomas, for example,
turns out to be a much more important personage on the General
Sherman than other sources have suggested. In fact, from the Korean
perspective, Thomas was most significant personality. From the onset,
it is important to remember that the Korean Annals do not challenge
previous assertions about him that he wanted to improve his Korean
language ability or spread the Gospel. They do, however, show that he
was the key figure in General Sherman events that transpired from
the moment the vessel reached the coast of Korea. His actions, as
recorded by the Koreans, also suggest that he bear a high proportion of
responsibility for the tragic outcome.
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Initial contacts between the General Sherman's crew and the
Koreans involved both officials and commoners. A significant contact
between the General Sherman' s crew and the Koreans came on August
15, 1866. By this time the vessel's crewmen had already conducted some
coastal surveys and visited some smaller villages in the area of
Yonggang-hyan, near the mouth of the Taedong River. Yi Yongsang, a high
ranking military officer sent by the Governor of Pyongyang, was
commissioned to investigate the arrival of the foreign vessel. He, in
turn, ordered a local man familiar with the river and its currents to
help him establish contact with the foreigners. It was this local
commoner who first stepped foot on the General Sherman. [Ref.
19:p. 121
As might be expected from visitors seeking a new and profitable
relationship, this first Korean to visit the ship was treated quite
well. The crew leaders introduced him around and gave him some fine
drink from Peking. He liked it, too. Furthermore, they were quite open
with him about where they wished to go. "They told me that the ship was
anchoring there for only a short time and that they intended to go to
Pyengyang." [Ref. 19: p. 13] However, the initial cordiality by both
sides faded quickly.
Mr. Thomas, calling himself Mr. Ch'oe Nanhyon and taking control of
all intercourse between the crew and the Korean, started asking
questions that made the Korean become defensive. When asked about the
character of the country around Pyongyang and how much wealth tnere was
in the country, the Korean replied to his questions in the Chinese
language to avoid any misunderstandings possible due to Thomas' lack of
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proficiency in Korean. "My city is strongly fortified but the country
does not possess any very great wealth." [Ref. 19: p. 13] Thomas' reply
did nothing to put the Korean at ease. In a threatening and arrogant
tone, he asked "Is it possible for seven of our people to be murdered by
your countrymen? Some of our vessels have gone to the South river
Han-gang near Seoul, but we are going to Pyengyang. " [Ref. 19: p. 13] At
the same time, he showed the Korean the crew's complete set of Korean
maps, including topographical reliefs.
This one exchange between Thomas and his first Korean contact may
have been the start of irreversible mutual suspicions which doomed the
General Sherman never to leave Korea. At a time when French
warships were already surveying Korean waters near Kangwha Island and
the Han-gang River for an impending retaliation for the Korean
government's murder of the French priests, here was yet another vessel
on what, to the Korean eye, appeared to be a similiar offensive
mission. Furthermore, real or imagined, there may have been a tinge of
foreigner arrogance in Thomas' words. Was he threatening that any harm
to come to the crew of the General Sherman would also be met with
vengeful retaliation? Or was Thomas himself becoming defensive and
fearing for his life?
The answers to these questions may be found in Thomas' subseqent
exchanges with the Korean. Perhaps aware that the Korean would be
filing some kind of report of what he saw with the authorities, Thomas
took him to the vessel's upper deck. There he showed the Korean some of
the ship's arsenal of handguns, emphasizing the guns' accuracy. The
Korean left the ship and filed his report.
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By the time the Korean military governor read his emissary's report,
the General Sherman had already entered the forbidden water gate,
which was approximately two days sailing from the city of Pyongyang.
That in itself alarmed the Koreans, but when they finished reading the
initial report their concern was so great that they immediately
forwarded word of what was transpiring to high civil authorities in
Pyongyang.
The Governor of Pyongyang, however, was already aware of the
vessel's presence and was taking precautionary action. Sunday, August
16th, he dispatched some troops to investigate and report on its purpose
and movements. It was not until two days later that the commissioned
military officer, Sin Yonghan, and the two other Korean officials
accompanying him were able to set foot aboard the offending vessel.
Their subseqent report was most revealing.
Ve delivered the Governor's message inquiring the reason of the
presence of the vessel. They replied to our communications in
Chinese characters, saying 'Come and see.' On approaching the vessel
we observed that there were twenty or thirty men who came out on the
deck with guns and swords in their hands to resist us if necessary.
Ve were finally allowed to go on board. . . Ve asked them in writing
from what country they had come and the object of their visit. They
also replied in writing, 'The members of our crew are from several
countries. Among those sitting here are Ch' oe Nanhyon [Mr. Thomas]
and Hogarth who are Englishmen; Mr. Preston there is from America,
and Mr. Page is from Denmark...' Mr. Ch'oe Nanhyon not only spoke
Chinese but also some of our language. He seemed to be in charge of
the ship. . . Ve next inquired the name of the vessel and were
informed that that was none of our concern. Ve next asked them from
what place they had sailed and they told us from the Vest. . . [Mr.
Ch'oe said] 'Our vessel has the appearance of a man-of-war but really
it is only a trading vessel and we have come to Korea to exchange our
cloth, iron, and machinery for Korean paper, rice, gold, ginseng, and
tiger skins. Ve have no intention of doing harm to anyone and when we
have completed our mission at Pyengyang we will return at once.
'
LRef. 19: p. 16]
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Up to this point the exchange between the two sides retained an
element of cordiality. But from here on there was a decided shift in
attitude that began with the Koreans' resentment of Thomas' arrogant
observation that even the nature of the vessel was none of their
concern. Here it is obvious the Koreans perceived Thomas to be one with
whom they were to conduct their business. However, the fact that Thomas
evaded answering some of their questions did nothing but reinforce the
Korear. misgivings about what followed. First, Thomas started chiding
the Koreans about their persecution of Catholics and asked them if they
did not know that the Catholics were a branch of the Christian Church
engaged in the propagation of the Gospel. In fact, he bluntly demanded
to know precisely why the Koreans had killed the French bishop and
priests.
On this subject, the Koreans were willing to ignore what they
considered his seeming arrogance and lack of manners during this initial
meeting. But they met Thomas' bluntness with more of the same.
"According to the laws of our country, foreigners who dress in different
clothes and travel through the country deceiving our people and
treacherously plotting are to be punished with death, and, as for taking
the lives of our people, that is no concern of yours." tRef. 19: p. 29]
However, when they informed Thomas that it was alright for the ship
to anchor off the coast, but that Korean law forbid any foreign vessels
from entering the inland waterways, Thomas' reply brought obvious
frictions and the sowing of suspicions:
'Who can prevent us from going to Pyengyang and we intend to sail as
soon as a favorable west wind comes up. ' We then asked them if any
other vessel had accompanied them to which they replied, ' It is not
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of your business, that is a question only for the government to ask,
'
and refused to make any further statements. CRef. 19: p. 16]
Given the isolationist tradition of Korea and the entrepreneurial
determination of Mr. Preston and Meadows & Company, some frictions
during initial contact might be expected. If they were expected, it is
curious Mr. Thomas handled them so maladroitly. Already considered a
man of experience in dealing with orientals, Thomas should have known
that, like the Chinese, the Koreans would probably subordinate
essentials to questions of form and ceremony. As Minister Frederick Low
later pointed out, if ceremony and etiquette are disregarded, it can
severely hinder the pursuit of practical results. [Ref. 22: p. 129]
Disregarding, or at best not adhering to, the wisdom in Low's 1872
observation may have had profound consequences for Thomas and the crew
of the General Sherman.
The unanswered or evaded questions only made Korean suspicions
grow. Their mounting suspicions, in turn, may have been a factor in
their misinterpretation of some of what they saw. For example, the
Koreans described all the occidentals on the General Sherman as
military officers. What may have been the basis for that description?
They seem to base their presumptions on only two basic criteria. First,
all the men wore pistols and swards on their black leather belts, and,
secondly, Mr. Thomas refused to answer questions they regarded
unanswerable only if dubious intentions might be revealed. [Ref.
19:p. 17]
The clash of interests between the General Sherman and Korean
officialdom grew more serious as the days passed. Within a week the
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General Sherman situation was thought serious enough to command
the fulltime personal attention of not only Sin Taejong, the Governor of
Pyongyang, and lesser officials but the topmost regional military
commander, a Lieutenant General, as well. 3y August 22nd, they were an
the scene at the vessel's most recent anchorage and had much the same
audience with Thomas as the previous party. The results were equally
fruitless. As the senior officer departed the vessel without incident,
the only additional information the Koreans came away with was that the
General Sherman would sail for Pyongyang in just two days.
The Koreans were reaching the end of their patience. To date, they
had extended the foreigners every courtesy, informing them of their
country's laws and restrictions with regard to what the foreigners
proposed to do. The Koreans had even met the General Sherman'
s
repeated requests for food supplies on three separate occassions with
ample rice and meat. [Ref. 19: p. 29] Were the foreigners taking
advantage of Koreans' hospitality? Did they simply not understand that
the Koreans were telling them to retreat? The Koreans were now becoming
inwardly outraged.
Two more days came and went without incident, and still the
General Sherman remained at anchor. Perhaps the weather was
inclement. Perhaps the winds necessary to sail against the Taedong's
current never materialized. Perhaps Thomas and the others were still
waiting for some positive response from the Koreans before proceeding.
Or uerhaps the General Sherman' s river surveys had not yet
convinced the captain that the river was navigable. Might they be
having second thoughts about going to Pyongyang? Did they pernaps
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devise some scheme to ensure their success or safety and were waiting
for the right opportunity? Whatever the reason the ship remained, the
Koreans patiently sat and watched.
Then late in the afternoon of Monday, August 31st, an incident
occurred which brought a frenzied public reaction. Six General
Sherman crewmen got into one of the small survey boats to start up
the river. Observing this, a Korean military officer and two companions
followed them in their own small boat. According to a Korean account,
all three were kidnapped by the foreigners:
All of a sudden the foreigners turned round, seized the boat,
arrested the official [Colonel Yi Hyonik] , and took him [and the
others] on board the foreign vessel. Hearing of this, Sin Taejong
[the Governor of Pyongyang] got into a small boat and went out to
where the foreign vessel was, and remained all night, begging that
the foreigners return the official but without avail. [Ref. 19: p. 18]
The General Sherman's refusal to return the Koreans to the
governor suggests the kidnapping was not a spontaneous but a
premeditated act. Within hours after an all-night parley between the
governor and the kidnappers, the General Sherman set sail up the
river, its guns firing randomly, apparently trying to intimidate the
Koreans into staying clear of the ship. It was becoming quite clear the
kidnapping of the Korean officer was meant to be some sort of insurance
for the General Sherman' s safe passage. Instead, it was another
fatal mistake. How in the world could a vessel ostensibly on a peaceful
mission have anticipated any respect after acting in a apparently
arrogant manner?
Word of the kidnapping spread quickly, and the local populace became
infuriated. From the riverbanks crowds of Koreans followed the
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General Sherman far a couple of miles until it again anchored. By
this time the ship was far past the Watergate and already in the shadow
of Pyongyang city. As soon as another survey boat embarked to gauge the
river, people from the nearest suburban village gathered on shore
shouting "Give us back our Colonel!" [Ref. 19: p. 19] When that drew no
response from the General Sherman' s crew, the demonstrators threw
stones at the survey party. Part of the hate group broke off and
returned to the village demanding action from the military officials
there. Others enlisted the help of locals skilled in archery to shoot
arrows at the surveyors. Still others fired guns. Recognizing the
mounting frenzy, the survey party hastily returned to the ship,
abandoning their little survey boat, and the General Sherman
retreated to what it considered a safer location in the river.
The dichotomy of anti-foreigner action evolving among the commoners
could also be seen in Korean officialdom. Some Pyongyang officials
became impatient and disgusted with what they felt was their
government's inadequate response to the General Sherman crew's
antics. A government planned and sponsored rescue attempt the day after
the kidnapping was botched badly. Thirteen Korean soldiers died in the
fiasco. All the surviving rescuers managed to return with was a
General Sherman ultimatum — "If you will give us 1,000 bags of
rice, gold and silver, together with a number of Koreans as hostages, we
will deliver to you your Colonel." [Ref. 19: p 303 The people and local
government were becoming totally outraged.
Unfortunately, some of that outrage was quietly turning on the
government and its inability to quickly deal with the foreigners. One
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Pyongyang underling, Pak Ch' iyong, had already resigned his post in
protest. Apparently he had decided he had had enough of this
intolerable situation, and his resignation was his idea of the honorable
way of legally showing his frustration and taking the matter into his
own hands. The afternoon of September 1st, enlisting the help of some
city officials who had worked with him, as well as some military
officials who had served under the kidnapped colonel, Pak Ch' iyong
somehow managed to sneak out to the General Sherman and rescue the
colonel. In the process, they discovered that the two other Koreans
with him at the time of the kidnapping were not kept on the ship.
Whether they were killed on the ship or thrown into the water, no one
ever saw them again.
This courageous rescue incited the populace even more than the
original kidnapping. The General Sherman crew was now facing a
mass of people indignantly enraged by the apparent murders of two of
their countrymen, disgusted with their government's inaction, and
inspired by the bold rescue of the colonel. Worse yet, for the
General Sherman, it no longer had its "insurance." With Colonel
Yi Hyonik safely back and the people emboldened, the governor of
Pyongyang felt things were coming dangerously close to getting out of
hand. In his solicitation for help from Seoul, he explained that his
delay in acting was in the hope that the General Sherman crew
would recognize the futility of its proclaimed mission, respect Korean
law, and withdraw quietly. In his judgment, at this point his sole
remaining recourse was to get Seoul involved.
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With the governor's reports in hand, the Korean Ministers of State
met on Friday, September 4th, 1866. Their deliberations concerned not
only the ongoing General Sherman incident, but the arrival of
other foreign vessels [French] at Kangwha Island as well. After
considerable debate, the Ministers felt the ships off Kangwha were of
little concern. After all, they came and they left without great
incident. Of course, had they known at the time those that those French
vessels being considered were not the main fleet but only a preliminary
survey party reconnoitering for the imminent arrival of Admiral Rose and
the French fleet, then the Koreans might have rearranged their immediate
priorities and not have lost Kangwha to the French the following month.
But with the information they had at the time, the Korean Ministers
viewed the General Sherman anchored near Pyongyang a much graver
situation.
While the Koreans never questioned the right of foreign vessels to
navigate the seas around Korea, the were appalled by the General
Sherman because of the precedent it set. The General Sherman'
s
voyage up the Taedong River was considered the first time a foreign
vessel had ever entered Korea's inland waters. Furthermore, it was
doing so in blatant disregard for Korean laws and warnings not to
proceed. To some of the Ministers, the General Sherman situation
represented a clear threat to the foundation and perpetuity of the
Korean nation. Others simply looked at the crisis in terms of the
administration of existing Korean law. Although they would judiciously
take a couple of days to discuss the issue's particulars, the outcome
was predictable enough. Expressing his feeling that "we have dealt with
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them too generously," the Korean King made his judgment in the matter:
"In order to preserve the honor and dignity of the Orient, we must
aestrov the trepassing foreigners." CRef. 19: p. 20] Of course, it is
imocrtant to note that this judgment, ostensibly articulated by tne
king, was in reality a pronouncement by the Taewon'gun.
But even as the Ministers of State debated, the General
Sherman crisis was already out of control. September 2nd and 3rd,
the ship's crew replenished its depleting supplies by plundering Korean
ships that sailed too near. By September 4th, the Governor of Pyongyang
found himself forced to inform Seoul that the Korean civilian toll at
the hands of the General Sherman was already up to seven dead and
five wounded. Obviously frustrated with Seoul's seeming lack of action,
the governor explained that the people were unable to tolerate any mare
delay in dealing with the threat. He was very careful in rationalizing
his action.
Since they had come from a far country, we preferred to speak to them
kindly, and have them depart with a sense of gratitude, rather than
to force them to go by the means of applying the law so we treated
them generously many times with food but they did not go and finally
acted in a barbarous way, capturing and imprisoning our Colonel.
They also discharged their guns killing and wounding not less than
twelve of our people, so that nothing remained for us to do but to
destroy the vessel. CRef. 19: p. 22]
C. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GENERAL SHERMAN
How incredibly presumptuous for the General Sherman to resort
to such displays of force; the Koreans were bound to reciprocate in
kind. First, they attempted to destroy the vessel with cannon fire and
fire-rafts. Unsuccessful, they admired the foreigners' great strategy
in thwarting them. Seeing their plan take form from a distance , the
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General Sherman' s crew positioned the ship beyond range of their
guns, then placed wire and netting around the ship so that the
fire-rafts were simply deflected with the current. Next the Koreans
attempted to sail out to the ship in force, board it, and subdue the
crew. Here again they were unsuccessful; it was very difficult to scale
the much higher ship, especially since the foreigners' weaponry was
superior to that of the Koreans. By the end of the first day's assault,
not even one Korean had made it aboard the General Sherman
t and
the Koreans were able to credit themselves with only one foreigner
killed. The governor's report attributed the Koreans' lack of success
that first day to the foreigners' very clever maneuvering and use of
dangerous weapons, but assured Seoul that the populace was very angry
and only waited an opportunity to destroy the entire crew.
But the fate of the General Sherman was sealed. The next day,
September 5th, the Koreans discovered that the fighting of the previous
day had exhausted the ship's supply of ammunition. Its powerful cannon
and modern rifles were now useless against the Koreans. Neither could
the vessel sail away to save itself. Unfamiliar with the Taedong River,
the crew had managed to ground the ship on a sandy shoal. The Koreans
now had the opportunity they were waiting for. The foreigners, who had
ignored their courteous warnings, plundered their boats, and killed so
many of their people, now could only sit helplessly by while small
Korean boats approached to dislodge the protective netting surrounding
the General Sherman.
By the time the orders of the Korean Ministers of State to destroy
the General Sherman arrived at Pyongyang on Saturday, September
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6th, they were immaterial. The military stationed in the area had
already joined in with the populace and civilian officials in the effort
to destroy the ship and its crew, and the Koreans had succeeded in
getting their fire-rafts through the General Sherman's make-shift
safety netting. Once it became evident the ship was going to be lost,
many of the vessel's crewmen had jumped into the water to escape the
flames. First among them was Ch'oe Nanhyon [Thomas] and one of the
Chinese crewmen. Both begged for their lives. But the begging did
little good. Seized and bound, the moment Thomas and the Chinese were
brought to shore an angry mob of military and civilians immediately beat
them to death. The man who first struck Ch'oe was said to be the
brother of one of the Colonel's missing attendants. In the frenzy, the
mob proceeded to kill the remaining crewmembers. Not until all the
foreigners were dead did the excitement subside and the mob disband. At
that point, the General Sherman was only a memory.
By September 17th, the Governor of Pyongyang had sent to Seoul a
full accounting of all that remained from the burned vessel: three
cannon, the anchor, and chains. Other loads of miscellaneous metal
salvaged would require reworking. In keeping with centuries old
protocol, this accounting was also sent to the Chinese government.
While the burning of the General Sherman and the death of its
crew appeared to bring a sad end to any promising relationship between
the United States and Korea, the idea did not die. In fact, the
General Sherman episode would inspire further U.S. efforts and
lead to a few inconsequential attempts and one well- intended effort to
open Korea and bring the "Hermit Kingdom" the advantages 01 intercourse
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with the world. Unwittingly, the General Sherman began the
urocess of an evolving U.S. policy towards Korea.
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• THE r'juiw't ivEA i'IAT'.iL\Ii<G
A. THE AFTERMATH: WORRY AND RAGE
In keeping with established protocol, the Koreans insured their
comprehensive report of the General Sheraan affair was sent to
Peking within a couple of weeks. It was simply part of their
traditional policy to keep the "proper authorities" informed.
However, the first news of the burning and massacre to reach
American authorities in China did not come until early October 1866 —
and then via the French, not the Chinese. Upon his return from the
French fleet's survey mission in early October, French Admiral Pierre
Gustav Rose, commander-in-chief of the French fleet in northeast Asia,
provided Mr. E.T. Sandford, the United States Consul in Chefoo, an exact
copy of Reverend Ridel's note to Admiral Rose. For the Americans, the
contents were quite disheartening.
On the 30th of September we were at anchor near Woody island, on the
coast of Corea. During the night a Corean boat, with two natives on
board, approached the Deroulede. Having recognized in one of
them one of the sailors who had accompanied me in the spring on the
voyage from Corea to Chefoo, I succeeded in inducing them to come on
board. Among other information, they told me that about the middle
of the 7th moon, (about the end of the month of August, ) a small
vessel from the country of the West had appeared on the coast of
Corea, in the province of Phienganso, which is in the extreme
northwest of the kingdom. She was endeavoring to ascend the river,
and to reach the city of Phieng-iang [Pyongyang], capital of this
province, and had already arrived almost off this city, when she
grounded on a sand-bank. The governor at once sent to the King's
father [Taewon'gunJ for instructions, whether he should put to death
those on board, or should burn them and the vessel together. The
King's father replied, to burn the vessel and all on board. This
barbarous order was executed. [Ref. 15: p. 4271
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Sandfard had also procured some collaborating information from other
sources in Chefoo confirming the nature of the General Sherman
mission, its relevant dates and point of destination, its cargo and the
personnel on board.
News of this alleged atrocity spread among the foreign community in
China very quickly. Meadows & Company, the sponsoring firm, took
immediate advantage of the General Sherman's multinational crew
and wasted no time in simultaneously pleading for American and British
assistance. The same day the company started its pleas for help, the
two French missionaries who had been separated from Reverend Ridel in
Korea finally made their way to Chefoo and shared their version of the
story. These men related that there had been considerable fighting
between the crew of the schooner and the natives, and the natives
eventually succeeded in drawing the men off the ship, surrounding them,
tying them up and decapitating them. CRef. 15: p. 427]
Alarming as all this information was, it was still hearsay, at least
thirdhand. Perhaps aware of the potential ior distortion, and certainly
appreciative of the gravity of the situation and possible U.S. response,
Anson Burlingame, the U.S. Minister to China, asked the Chinese for help
in determining the French story's validity. "The Korean government
replied belligerently but vaguely that it had been an English merchant
ship and that they were ready to repel any attack by Westerners." [Ref.
12: p. 367]
Even though he felt he did not quite have all the relevant
information about the incident, Burlingame dispatched an informative
package to Secretary oi State Seward on December 15, 1866. In addition
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to all the correspondence he had collected related to the incident to
date, Burlingame also proffered what Seward must have considered an
unexpected analysis and recommendation. He laid forth the premise that
the murder of the General Sherman' 3 crew was likely the result of
an unfortunate misunderstanding on the part of the Koreans. Burlingame
aased his argument on the fact that th° General Sherman was
heavily armed and arrived soon after the murder of the French
missionaries. He defended his argument based on the utmost kindness
received by Captain McCaslin and the survivors of the U.S.S.
Surprise earlier that year, Given those circumstances, Burlingame
suggested that the United States would be wise to restrain rather than
promote any subsequent aggression against Korea. Apparently, he thought
such action might only complicate things.
Initially, Burlingame* s advice fell on deaf ears. When the French
story reached Washington in early 1867, Secretary of State William H.
Seward was outraged. Seward went straight to the French and proposed a
joint U.S. -French "punitive expedition to Korea to collect indemnities
for the murder of French missionaries and the killing of the crew and
the burning of the American steamer [ Genera 11 Sherman."
[Ref. Ref. 17: p. 1123 Much to his disappointment, no such expedition
materialized, primarily because the French had already responded
unilaterally on October 16, 1866, with a heavy attack on Kangwha Island
[Ref. 5: p. 1151, and they considered that sufficient punishment on the
Koreans.
Seward's initial rage was based on the assumption that an American
ship was destroyed and American lives were lost. At the time he also
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had no information on why the Koreans acted as they did. Of course, had
he known of the cultural provocations, there would likely have been less
cause for anger. Nevertheless, Secretary of State Seward backed away
from his original proposition to consider either a joint or unilateral
American response.
But the issue of the General Sherman did not go away. Despite
the French action, the U.S. Secretary of State remained very interested
in related developments in China, including Korea. Via a routine
dispatch he ordered the U.S. Embassy in Peking to keep him "well
advised." [Ref. 16: p. 563] While Seward was an intense man, profoundly
interested in protecting U.S. interests in all parts of the globe, the
fact he had a close nephew, George Seward, stationed as Consul in
Shanghai, may also have played a part in propping up his interests in
China and Korea.
At almost the same time Seward was receiving information about the
fate of the General Sherman in Washington, D.C, Prince Kung,
China's chief secretary for foreign affairs, was in detailed
communication with U.S. Minister Anson Burlingams about the Koreans,
their attack on the French missionaries, the French retaliations, and
the fate of the General Sherman. From the text of his communica-
tions, Kung's motivations in approaching Burlingame were quite clear.
He wished to dissipate French charges of Chinese collaboration with the
Koreans against the French missionaries and expeditions, as well as
avoid similar American conclusions regarding the General Sherman
incident. [Ref. 15:p. 420]
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It is unknown whether Burlingame actually believed the Chinese or
simply wished to use their explanation for his own convenience.
Whatever the case, Burlingame took a very deliberate and prudent course
of action. Vhile he did use Prince Kung' s denials to divorce himself
from getting into any sort of confrontation over Korea with the Chinese,
he also thought it wise to seek some answers. On November 27, 1866, he
sent Henry Haywood Bell, the Acting Rear-Admiral commanding the U.S.
Asiatic Squadron, a cautiously worded letter removing himself from the
Korean dilemma while at the same time suggesting a possible course of
action.
Sir, I find that the Chinese government disavows any responsibility
for that of Corea and all jurisdiction over its people.
Consequently the occurences there relating to the General
Sherman are beyond my jurisdiction. It may, however, strengthen
your hands to receive a suggestion from me, that if consistent with
your instructions, it may be well to send a vessel of war to inquire
into the facts of the case, to the end that they may be reported to
the government for its instructions. Having great confidence in your
discretion, I leave the matter in your hands, where it properly
belongs... CRef. 15: p. 428]
In 1867, a year after the massacre, perhaps worried the United States
might take revenge like the French, Korean officials purportedly turned
up in Shanghai.
It was reported to the American consul there that they had come to
inquire if a Korean [diplomatic] mission to the United States would
be well received, if it came to explain the circumstances of the
destruction of the General Sherman and to make reparations for
it, and also to make a commercial treaty which would open Korea.
[Ref. 6: p. 230-231]
This was immediately reported to Washington, and Seward welcomed it.
Apparently he had mellowed since his initial outrage over the
General Sherman affair. Sidetracking the normal routing for such
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tasking, he gave these instructions to his nephew George F. Seward, the
American Consul in Shanghai:
Proceed to Korea to secure a treaty. .
.
, stating that your mission is
to be a friendly one. . . You will however give notice to the Korean
Government, if you find it expedient, that this government cannot
condone the outrage committed in the case of the General
Sherman to remain indefinitely without receiving proper guaranty
of adequate and ample redress. [Ref. 23: p. 10]
It was odd that the Secretary should coordinate with a consul
officer, even thought it was his nephew, on such a prime dimplomatic
matter which would ordinarily have been handled by the American
Minister. But again, the Secretary of State was disappointed. In
Seward's mind the fate of the General Sherman was secondary.
What came first was the opportunity to open Korea. Whatever the case
— whether he thought the Koreans crazy or simply unrealistic — his
nephew took no action. [Ref. 23: p. 10]
The U.S. interest in the General Sherman incident was not
limited to diplomatic queries and unexecuted instructions. Rear
Admiral Bell, following up on Burlingame's earlier advice, requested
Burlingame authorize "a mission backed with 1,500 to 2,000 troops" to
capture Seoul and humble the Korean king. [Ref. 5: p. 120] Perhaps
eager to keep his good standing with the Chinese, Burlingame felt it
beyond his authority to grant such a mission, especially since the
Chinese disavowed any responsibility for Korea. Instead, Burlingame
and Bell were in pursuit of other courses of action in dealing with
Korea.
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B. THE SHUFELDT MISSION
Early in 1867, just about the same time Secretary of State Seward
received his first reports of the General Sherman's fate, and in
following up on the Burlingame letter of November 27, 1866, Admiral
Bell for his part ordered Commander Robert V. Shufeldt "to investigate
the news of her loss on the west coast of Korea." CRef. 18: p. 97]
Shufeldt, captain of the Vachusett, was the logical choice for
such a mission. One of his primary duties in the American Asiatic
Squadron was to use the Vachusett as a flying vessel between
different ports to protect American commerce against pirate raids. The
General Sherman fit into that category nicely. As an added
justification, Admiral Bell cited that numerous rumors of survivors
needed to be checked out.
It is important to note that these "rumors" of survivors from the
General Sherman were not merely American fabrications to justify
launching warship inquiries. On the contrary, news of other Americans
in Korea was emerging with increasing frequency, and the U.S. legation
in China was becoming more and more hopeful the stories of American
survivors were true.
Shufeldt was ordered to demand from the Korean authorities "the
delivery. .
.
on deck of the Vachusett of any survivors of the
schooner [General Sherman] ... ." CRef. 18:p. 100] Perhaps still
harboring hopes of a march toward Seoul as a means of opening Korea,
Bell also ordered him to "ascertain [Korea's] defenses, approaches,
depth of water, and rise and fall of tides." [Ref. 18: p. 100]
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Shufeldt had very little information on which to base his mission.
Other than the names of the American and British citizens thought to be
on board the General Sherman, all he had was what was thought to
be the latitude of the "Ping Yang" river on the northwest side of
Korea. That locational data was provided by the Chinese junk pilot, Yu
Wen Tai, who had known Reverend Thomas, rendezvoused with him off the
Korean coast, then had refused to proceed with him into the interior.
[Ref. 18:p. 100]
But Shufeldt had no desire to go Korea completely ignorant about
the country and the General Sherman's circumstances. Obviously a
very meticulous man, he first proceeded to Shanghai to conduct a series
of interviews with people he thought might have information helpful to
his mission. He talked to Captain Bochet of HIMS Prlnoquet, who
had been with Admiral Rose on the French expedition, and Captain
Haswell of HMS Pelonis, who had firsthand knowledge of the
Chinese junk pilot who provided the General Sherman locational
information. [Ref. 18: p. 1001 From them he obtained valuable
information about the country, the Korean people, and the reliability
of the information about the General Sherman at his disposal.
Shufeldt also found other sources of information. From Francis P.
Knight, the U.S. consul in Newchang, who just happened to be visiting
Shanghai while Shufeldt was there, he learned that Meadows & Company
was exploring the possibility of sailing up the Yalu River, the border
between China and Korea. As entrepreneurs, Meadows & Company were
proving to be quite active.
4 a
He also talked to another man apparently on the lookout for money
to be made in Korea — Ernest Oppert. Oppert would later play a
surprising, if not critical, role in both the saga of the General
Sherman and the Low-Rodgers Expedition. Apparently Oppert was
thought to have important information about dealing with the Koreans;
he was on a British steamer, Emperor, when it sailed to the
"Hermit Kingdom" to attempt trading with the Koreans in the early
1860's. From Father Ridel, the French priest who brought back the
original story of the crew of the General Sherman, Shufeldt
learned what to expect from the common folk he might approach. No
doubt his discussions with Captain McCaslin of the schooner
Surprise contributed to his hopes that the General
Sherman's crew was already on its way to China even as he sailed.
CRef. 18: p. 1013 Given his admirable detective work and other
extensive preparations for his mission to Korea, Shufeldt was clearly
an officer of ingenuity and perseverance, especially in light of his
relatively junior grade.
Unfortunately, the conversations with all these men did not
necessarily make Shufeldt more confident of his eventual success in
Korea. On the contrary, he often found their information
contradictory, and it is difficult to know whom he believed and whom he
disregarded. However, he did make one very interesting judgment about
all the stories he heard. In considering serious discrepancies in the
testimonies given him by the Chinese pilot and Father Ridel, Shufeldt
believed the Chinese. He reasoned that the priest's assertion that the
General Sherman' s crew was ordered captured and beheaded by the
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Taewon'gun was precisely what one smuggled out of Korea to avoid the
Taewon' gun's persecution might say.
However, despite all the contradictions given him by those he
interviewed, Shufeldt was still able to ascertain a great deal — the
character of the ship and crew, the fact that the ship proceeded toward
Pyongyang in direct defiance of the warnings it received, general
Korean attitudes toward foreigners, past Korean treatment of
shipwrecked sailors, and the like. With all that information now in
Shufeldt' s possession, the Chinese pilot's statement that the
General Sherman' s fate was the result of spontaneous mob violence
appeared more credible. [Ref. 18: p. 102]
Nevertheless, Shufeldt was now able to depart for Korea with a more
realistic sense of mission and the difficulties to be expected there.
He understood that the French incursion of 1866 at Kangwha might cause
the Koreans to react negatively to the appearance of his warship in
their waters, and in no way did he wish the Koreans to identify the
U.S. with the French. As an experienced seaman, on one point he must
have left trusting everyone's assessment that the coast of Korea was an
unknown and must be sailed with caution.
The Wachusett set sail for Korea from Shanghai on Monday,
January 21, 1867. The obvious constraints it sets on the mission's
chances for success makes the timing of Shufeldt' s departure curious.
Sailing in the middle of winter automatically made things more
difficult and certainly must have limited his mobility near the Korean
coast and the time he might be able to remain there. To what extent
the timing may have been negatively influenced by budgetary
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constraints, the admiral's impatience, or other obscure factors may
never be known. What we do know, however, is that Shufeldt seemingly
did everything within his power to facilitate his chances of success.
He even secured the services of two civilians — the Chinese pilot, who
had provided him so much information about the General Sherman,
and the Reverend Hunter Corbett, 3 an American missionary based at
Chefoo, who went along as an interpreter of the Chinese language. [Ref.
18: p. 102] Here again is evidence of the unbelievably vital diplomatic
role that missionaries played due to their linguistic competence.
Despite these added precautions, the mission experienced serious
unanticipated problems from the moment Korea came in sight. Perhaps
due to vague charts and inclement weather, the Vachusett anchored
at the mouth of the wrong river. In fact, they were far from the
intended spot and later found out the Taedong River, which they wanted,
was at least fifty miles to the north. As a result, Shufeldt
corresponded with the wrong Korean officials. There he was doing
business with officials of Hwanghae Province when he should have been
talking to men from P'yongan Province [Ref. 18:p. 103].
When Shufeldt discovered the errors, there was little he could do.
By this time, the Chinese pilot in whom Shufeldt had placed so much
trust declined to go near the Taedong River. But the pilot's
turnaround made little difference. In winter, it was still impossible
3Hunter Corbett, a veteran American Presbyterian missionary in
China, is another example of the profound role Christian missionaries
played in the unfolding drama of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia. No
record is available on the missionary work that Dr. Corbett might have
done during the Vachusett 's stay off the coast of Korea.
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to sail up what Shufeldt learned to be a frozen Taedong. Shufeldt was
also faced with other hard realities. There were no other major cities
or towns on the coast where he might do business with resident
government officials. Furthermore, any attempt to reach Pyongyang
overland with an entourage of armed men only invited more Korean
suspicions and disaster. This comedy of errors left Shufeldt
hopelessly frustrated.
But he was not a man to give up easily. Even at the wrong
anchorage, Shufeldt asked the locals for any information they might
have concerning the General Sherman. He probably reasoned that,
since foreigners come here so infrequently and are to be avoided when
they do show up, there must surely be second or third-hand reports that
would either confirm or deny information he already had. Although
fifty miles from the scene of the disaster, both the locals and the
headmen from two nearby villages all told the same story — the crew of
the General Sherman were killed by villagers, not by the
government. CRef. 18: p. 103]
Three days out of Shanghai and still at the wrong port, on January
24, Shufeldt made a written appeal directly to the King of Korea
through the presiding officer of the district of Chang Yuen Heen in
Huen Yu province. While awaiting a reply, he continued his contacts
with the locals. They provided him with even more information that
seemed to confirm his growing suspicions about the General
Sherman. From the local fishermen Shufeldt learned that among the
ship's crew were Cantonese, "a people hated for their habit of coming
to the Korean coast to rob and plunder." [Ret. 18: p. 105] By now
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Shufeldt had already decided that it was the Korean people who were
responsible for the fate of the General Sherman, and not the
government.
After five more days, on the morning of January 29 the
Wachusett was approached by an official named Le Ke Yung from the
province of Hwanghae. The official simply claimed ignorance of the
General Sherman and its crew and appealed to the Americans to
leave Korea. Shufeldt made no progress with this official, at all.
After some verbal sparring, he just gave up, calling the Korean "the
most perfect type of vindictive savage." tRef. 18: p. 106] There is no
record of the Korean's opinion of Shufeldt. The Vachusett
finally returned to Shanghai on February 5, the whole mission taking
only two weeks.
In the end, Shufeldt was unable to get anything out of the Korean
authorities. The only relevant information about the General
Sherman came from the locals, who confirmed the killings were
committed by a local mob fed up with the crew' s thievery and reckless
behavior. By the time he left Korea, Shufeldt was convinced the crew
had all been killed, believing they probably deserved their fate. [Ref.
18: p. 105]
After the Vachusett expedition, the rumors of General
Sherman survivors and their circumstances in Korea continued. By
early March 1868, new reports had reached the American consulate in
Chefoo that four of the General Sherman's crew were still alive.
Yu Wen Tai, the same Chinese pilot who had been involved with both
Reverend Thomas and Commander Shufeldt, had returned from Korea again
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where he claimed to have seen the General Sherman' s crippled hulk
in the middle of a river. He also said he had met a Korean, Kim
Tsz'ping, a native of Sparrow Island, who told him that last March Kim
:•- two foreigners and two Chinese at the magistrate's office at
the chief city of the district of Piyang C sicl . Furthermore, Kim
had related to him that the rest of the foreigners had been killed by
the farmers and people of the country, and not by the Korean
authorities or soldiers. Kim said he had seen these two foreigners
walking in the streets without any instruments of torture upon them,
fallowed by policemen to see that they did not get away. [Ref. 24: pp.
545-546]
This latest report concerning the General Sherman put the
Americans in somewhat of a dilemma. The Americans had trusted Yu Ven
Tai before during the Shufeldt mission, and he had greatly disappointed
them. How was it that the man who refused to proceed up the Taedong
River for both the General Sherman and the Vachusett was
now able to render a firsthand account of the scene of the General
Sherman disaster. Then again, how could the Americans dismiss such
a new detailed account?
Deciding this latest report believeable, the Americans took it
immediately to Prince Kung in an attempt to enlist his help in
ascertaining its truth. S. Wells Williams, at the time the U.S.
interim Charge d' Affaires, asked the Chinese to approach Korea on the
matter and. if true, ask them to deliver the two foreigners and two
Chinese to Chinese authorities.
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From the tone and language of Williams' letter to Prince Kung, it
was quite obvious the United States was not interested in any sort of
revenge against the Koreans. In fact, he specifically stated that it
was the U.S. position there must have been some cause for the way the
Koreans treated the American crew. All the Americans wished was a full
and truthful investigation of all the circumstances. [Ref. 24: p.
545-546] With all his experience in China and Japan, S. Wells Williams
was known to have been long interested in the opening of Korea as a
forward step in the protection of American interests in East Asia. But
his good intentions, diplomatic demeanor, and reputation did not do much
good in this case.
While feeling similar pressure from the British regarding the
welfare of the British subjects on board the General Sherman, the
Chinese diplomatically replied they preferred not to approach the
Koreans directly. Instead, Prince Kung assured Williams that he would
have Chinese agents in Manchuria simply try "to learn all they
conveniently can upon this matter." [Ref. 24: p. 546]
The Americans were not satisfied with Prince Kung's response. Based
on what they considered a believeable second-hand report of a sighting
of survivors, the Americans were unwilling merely to accept Prince
Kung's promise to be alert to any further evidence. Instead, the
Americans decided it was time to seize the opportunity and follow up an
the Shufeldt mission.
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C. THE FEBIGER MISSION
The next step in the unfolding of U.S. policy was the Febiger
mission, an officially sanctioned American interlude mission which
sailed to Korea in response to those latest rumors oi General
Sherman survivors. Commander John C. Febiger on the U.S.S.
Shenandoah left Chefoo on March 18, 1868, on much the same
information gathering mission as Shufeldt. Gone for over two months,
Febiger had discussions with numerous Korean government officers at
various points along Korea's west coast. None of the Korean officials
whom he contacted, however, corroborated the recent reports from sources
in China that some of the crew of the General Sherman were still
living.
While the results of that visit by Commander John C. Febiger and the
U.S.S. Shenandoah' yielded no substantial new information, it
did produce something Shufeldt could not — a formal Korean government
version of events concerning the General Sherman. The
government's theme was the same as that of the locals'. The General
Sherman' s destruction and the crew's murder were directly due to the
aggressive and irresponsible actions of the crew. [Ref. 18: p. 107] The
Korean officials also sent Febiger home with a firm understanding that
Korea had no intention of opening to western states. [Ref. 25: p. 337]
"Like the previous General Sherman and the Vachusett, the
U.S.S. Shenandoah also depended on a clergyman for linguistic
support. Dr. Calvin W. Mateer, another veteran Presbyterian missionary
from Shantung Mission, may have hindered the Febiger mission as much as
he helped it. While awaiting official Korean government responses, Dr.
Mateer visited coastal villages, distributed the Bible in Chinese and
otherwise proselytized the natives.
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When he returned to Chefoo on May 25th, Febiger was confident he
accomplished his mission and now had all the facts. CRef. 18: p. 107]
D. FREDERICK JEM I US AND THE OPPERT CONNECTION
While at the time what Febiger brought back seemed to be no
surprise, his information was destined to play heavily into a General
Sherman-related embarrassment for the American government that was
unfolding even as the United States steamer Shenandoah sailed to
the east coast of Korea. On April 24, 1868, over a month since Febiger
and the Shenandoah had sailed for Korea, there was yet a new
development that perked American interest. Frederick Jenkins, a United
States citizen who had formerly worked as an interpreter for the
American Consulate at Shanghai, brought forth new information about the
General Sherman.
According to Jenkins, there were at that time in Shanghai four
Koreans and a Roman Catholic bishop for Korea who had been sent there by
the Korean government. Their alleged purpose was to make inquiries
about western attitudes toward Korea regarding the 1866 murders of the
French priests and crew of the American schooner General Sherman.
Depending on what the Western response might be, they might, in turn, be
willing to send Korean representatives to Europe and the United States
to explain those occurrences and make desired treaties of amity and
commerce. CRef. 25: pp. 336-337]
Jenkins said he was told by the Koreans that the priests were
executed in punishment for their "schemes" (not further explained) at
the Korean monarch's court. He went into considerably more detail about
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the General Sherman. His story was thus: at a point in the
interior of a river, the name of which he did not know, several of the
General Sherman' s crew went ashore and got into trouble with local
Korean authorities as a result of their wrongful treatment of some
Korean women. They were arrested. Subsequently, a force was then sent
from the General Sherman, rescued the incarcerated men, and
returned them to the ship, along with two Korean officers whom the
"master" (not further identified) intended to nold as hostages. This
action excited the people, and they attacked the vessel, killing eight
persons and capturing the others, who were still being held. CRef.
25: pp. 336-337]
If Jenkins* story was true, depending on reports of crew
composition, there were at least seven and possibly as many as nineteen
of the General Sherman' s crew still alive. But the Americans had
already plenty of rumors about General Sherman survivors. They
had already sent two missions to Korea to determine rumor validity and
seek possible survivors. The first, Shufeldt's, was unsuccessful; he
couldn't even get the Korean authorites to talk to him. The second,
Febiger's, was still in progress.
Naturally, the Americans took a somewhat cautious approach and had
many questions about what the Jenkins yarn brought them. Why did the
Koreans now approach the Americans and not the British? Had Anson
Burlingame, the U.S. Minister at our embassy in Peking, not already
received word through the Chinese that the Koreans thought the
General Sherman was a British vessel? What made the Korean
government employ an Catholic bishop to help conduct its diplomacy?
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Were the Catholics not hated by Korean officialdom? Why did the Koreans
decide to deviate from their past practice of communicating with
westerners directly instead of through their Chinese mediaries? Why did
they come to Shanghai instead of Chefoo and Peking? Why did they choose
Jenkins as their contact? Indeed, there were many questions.
Jenkins seemed to have credible answers for most of these
questions. He said that he was approached because the Korean government
believed it would be more favorably received by the Americans than by
the Europeans. He also emphasized the fact that it made sense for the
Koreans to contact him, since he was familiar with the Chinese language,
which was also the written language of Korea. As to why and how the
Korean government was suddenly employing a Roman Catholic bishop, a
member of a class they have treated so severely, Jenkins had no
explanation. Most critically, he could not produce the Korean
emissaries for face-to-face discussions with Seward at the U.S.
Consulate General in Shanghai. At the very least, he should have been
able to bring the Koreans forward in person.
Why did Seward not tear the Jenkins story apart? Perhaps Seward was
inclined to accept at least the gist of Jenkins' story since he had a
certain amount of trust in Jenkins bearing on Jenkins' previous
employment at the consulate. Nevertheless, Jenkins did say he expected
to bring back with him those of the crew of the General Sherman
who were still alive. In fact, he had already made arrangements to
charter a steamer to proceed to Korea, and declared he would return in
about a month.
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It was in his April 24th reporting of the Jenkins undertaking to his
uncle in Washington, D.C., that George F. Seward first planted the seed
for the eventual true purpose of the Low-Rodgers Expedition to Korea.
In his dispatcii number 282 that same day, the younger Seward expressed
his opinion that this latest information relayed to him by Jenkins made
the use of force against Korea, for any reason, unnecessary. Following
Commodore Perry's precedent in Japan, it was George Seward's feeling
that the interests of American shipping in northeast Asia dictated that
the United States attempt some treaty with the Koreans to provide for
the kind treatment of any shipwrecked sailors. He also stated that if
the Koreans were prepared to open up their country to American
merchants, then America should not lose such an opportunity. While he
lent passible support to his recommended courses of action by describing
the Koreans as peaceful and industrious people, rather than recluse
isolationists, the younger Seward still requested his uncle authorize
him two "vessels of war" with which he might proceed to Korea for his
own "official explanation of the Sherman affair" and to negotiate
the necessary treaties. [Ref. 25: pp. 336-37] To Seward's uncle, the
U.S. Secretary of State, Jenkins' story may well have sounded credible
and his nephew's on-site recommendations sound.
But Febiger and Jenkins' return from Korea at about the same time
provided George Seward an excellent opportunity to compare reports and
stories of the two men and their crews. Suddenly, Jenkins information
and claims became quite suspect in the face of Febiger' s official Korean
confirmation of the General Sherman, its crew's fate, and the
intentions and attitudes of the Korean government toward tne West. No
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sooner had Jenkins returned than the younger Seward found out that the
group of which Jenkins was a part attempted to rob the graves of Korean
sovereigns and intended to hold their remains for ransom. He was duped,
double-crossed, and outraged.
George Seward immediately realized the passible damage the Jenkins
undertaking could have on Sino- American, as well as any future
Korean-American relations. Furthermore, his quick and optimistic
reporting of the Jenkins endeavor at the time of its organization had
raised high expectations in Washington. His uncle, the U.S. Secretary
of State, had been following the General Sherman situation and had
been looking for an opportunity to open Korea for years. To ensure his
next report was correct, the younger Seward began an investigation.
This time he left no stone unturned. George Seward soon found himself
faced with the unavoidable task of telling his high ranking uncle what
the Jenkins mission was really all about. Totally embarrassed, he was
obsessed with bringing Jenkins to trial.
On July 3, 1868, George Seward reported to the U.S. Secretary of
State:
I... entered upon an investigation of the facts with a view to
determine the nature of Mr. Jenkins's C sic] connection with the
expedition, and whether I ought to prosecute him. I regret to inform
you that the information gathered by me has convinced me that it is
my duty to do so. . . The trial will proceed in a few days, and I
shall transmit to you a full copy of the minutes. The consuls of
other powers concerned await the result of my action before
determining whether to proceed against their nationals. [Ref. 25: p.
337]
By the middle of July, the aftershocks from the Jenkins adventure
were already taking shape. The Americans were worried of the severe
impact Jenkins' involvement in the suspected grave robbing scheme might
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have on their credibility in China. At the same time, the Chinese were
returning with information from Korea about the General Sherman
that further cast the Americans in a poor light. On July 11, 1868,
Prince Kung surprised the Americans with a formal note that revealed he
had not only been accomodating their requests for information all along,
but that he might also be growing a bit annoyed with what he may have
considered their seeming obsession with rumors. This implied annoyance
was most evident in the style of Chinese language and format of their
correspondence. The General Sherman was no longer referred to as
a "vessel" or "ship." Now apparently siding with the Koreans, they
preferred to label it a "man-of-war," and regarded American charges that
the Koreans may be detaining some of the vessel' ssurvivors without
foundation. The previous Chinese tone of diplomatic neutrality on the
issue was now being replaced with one that communicated prejudiced
boredom, and Prince Kung saw fit to add the names of his top advisors to
his note to convey to the Americans that he was not simply expressing
his own opinion. [Ref. 24: p. 547]
But aside from his diplomatic bantering, Prince Kung's efforts did
produce something that confirmed from the highest level of Korea's
government everything Shufeldt and Febiger's missions brought back: a
direct statement from the King of Korea about the fate of the General
Sherman and Korean policy toward foreigners, It read:
A two-masted foreign vessel went ashore in the Ping-jang river, but
this government had no hand whatever in the disasters which happened
to her and her crew; nor has any envoy from the United States been
here to inquire respecting them. If you have any means of
communicating this to him, you can no doubt fully inform him of this
fact. It is a fixed rule of this country, moreover, that when
unfortunate men are cast ashore they must be rescued and treated
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kindly, so that if there were at this time any such pitiable cases
here of persons who had drifted down upon us, how could we detain
them against their will? This rumor of two foreigners and two
Chinese being kept here has no foundation; and it is a point, too,
which can easily be ascertained. I shall be obliged if the officers
of the board of rites will make these explanations on my behalf to
these who may wish them. [Ref. 24: p. 547]
The Korean king's official statement was totally consistent with
both Shufeldt's report about the account conveyed to him by the common
people in Korea and Febiger's report about the version presented to him
by the various Korean officials he met with. Almost two years after the
actual incident took place, did this latest Korean response make the
General Sherman a dead issue?
From the Korean perspective, the answer was yes. The Koreans felt
they had gone to great lengths to accomodate the Americans' demands for
information. They allowed Shufeldt to interact with the common folk
without interference; they provided a formal government response
directly to Febiger when he arrived in 1868; they even tolerated the
"rumor mill" and troubled their King with responses through the
Chinese. The Koreans felt they had provided the Americans with
everything requested. What more could the Americans possibly want to
put the General Sherman to rest?
From the American perspective, however, the General Sherman
legacy still lingered. Jenkins' use of the ill-fated General
Sherman to fradulently receive implied American consent to rob graves
kept the General Sherman very much a live issue.
The heated and controversial trial of the United States versus
F.H.B. Jenkins not only showed what a legacy the General Sherman
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had already become, but may well have portended the failure of the
Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871.
The indictment charged the defendant in eight counts with having, in
concert with others, prepared an unlawful and scandalous expedition,
having for its object the exhuming of the remains of a dead
sovereign, or of some other person or persons in the Corea. [Ref.
24: p. 549]
Previous histories have been neither kind nor perceptive in their
treatment of the Jenkins affair. To knowledgeable historians what
actually took place has come to be known as the insane scheme of a
Shanghai-based German merchant named Ernest Oppert. But other
historians, not always as thorough or abjective as they should be, have
failed to grasp the full significance of an important moment in American
policy in East Asia.
The United States' case against Jenkins centered on three primary
points. First, Jenkins played a principal role in the financing and
organizing of the expedition. Secondly, Jenkins was physically on board
the expedition's primary vessel and was aware of and able to freely
observe expedition developments as they transpired. Finally, at no time
during the expedition did Jenkins question or challenge the activities
going on around him. The prosecution felt that the supporting evidence
for each of these points of contention amply demonstrated his
participation in the expedition and knowledge of its intended purpose.
[Ref. 24: pp. 549-550]
The trial took place at the American Consulate in Shanghai under the
authority of the Court of the United States Consulate General. A
cursory consideration of its presiding judge and witnesses suggest a
fair trial would be impassible. Far one thing, on the bench sat
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American Consul George F. Seward. He was the one Jenkins duped into
providing passive consent far the adventure in connection with the
General Sherman incident. It was on Jenkins' implied promises of
positive results and assurances of a favorable political climate in
Korea that Seward had then gone to his uncle and requested the
authorization and material support necessary tc open Korea,
Furthermore, it was Seward who was embarrassed and outraged wnen the
truth of the Jenkins adventure became known, Seward who conducted ^he
preliminary investigation calling for Jenkins' indictment, and Seward
who saw his personal hopes for being the American to open Korea smashed
by the Jenkins affair.
Nor would consideration of the principal witnesses in Jenkins' trial
encourage one to view it a fair trial — regardless of one's leanings or
perspectives. All of the witnesses called were either on the actual
voyage or helped finance it. Because none of them were American
citizens, Seward and his court had no jurisdiction over them and could
not hold them accountable. This must have made the U.S. prosecutor, Mr.
Eames, very uncomfortable. What would keep the witnesses from lying to
protect Jenkins?
By the same token, the mission's principal planner and schemer,
Ernest Oppert, came into the trial as a principal witness who owed
Jenkins, a financier and cosigner of other loans for the fruitless
voyage, a tremendous amount of money (more than 5,000 taels). With his
testimony, would Oppert aspire to protect Jenkins as a co-conspirator,
or would he seek to rid himself of an unwanted creditor?
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Furthermore, other foreign ambassadors and consuls, as well as
Chinese authorities, were waiting on the outcome of the American actions
against Jenkins before taking possible legal or otherwise punitive
action against any of their own nationals who participated in the
Jenkins affair. Such circumstances could well have motivated Oppert and
the other witnesses to be less than honest in their testimony. There
was certainly nothing to constrain their perjury. There was simply too
much money and personal freedom at stake. All this information was
presumably known to everyone involved in the trial. An objective
observer would probably be forced to deduce Jenkins had no chance of a
fair trial and that he was convicted before any testimony was
presented. But was that the case?
As the trial progressed, a fairly complete picture of the
Jenkins-Oppert expedition had emerged. On numerous paints of fact,
there appeared no contention. The steamer China and a smaller
vessel were chartered and fitted in Shanghai in April 1868. The
China was a fairly large vessel of 648 tons, whereas the
accompanying vessel was a 60 tons steam tender. They left Shanghai on
April 30th under the command of H. A. K. Mtiller, a Prussian citizen, and
flying the North German flag. Thus, the vessel was legally Prussian
territory. All on board understood the expedition's eventual
destination to be Korea by way of Nagasaki, Japan. In addition to
Moller and his European crew, personnel on board accompanying the
expedition included Jenkins, Mr. Oppert, and a French priest named
Father Feron. It is both interesting and significant to note that Father
Feron was one of the three French priests who, along with Fathers
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Ridel and Calais, escaped the Taewon' gun's murderous persecution of
Catholics in 1866. [Ref. 12: p. 364] He also eventually made his way to
China to help incite the French to undertake their fruitless revenge in
the fall of that 3a:-~ year. The remainder of the crew accompanying the
expedition were 21 "Maniliamen" and between 100-120 Chinese.
Altogether, 150 were on beard the two vessels. [Ref. 24: p. 551]
From Shanghai, the expedition proceeded to Nagasaki, where it
remained for two days. There the two vessels took on additional
supplies for the voyage to Korea. These "supplies" consisted of coal,
four shovels and ten "cases," only two of which Captain Mailer conceded
contained muskets. [Ref. 24: pp. 351-352]
According to the testimony at Jenkins' trial, the expedition reached
Korea at 10:00 p.m. on May 8th, passing through Prince Imperial gulf and
the Prince Jerome gulf (Asan Bay in Ch'ungch'ong Province), and finally
anchoring near the mouth of a small, otherwise unnamed river. At
midnight the following night, Mr. Oppert, Father Feron and about 40
Chinese and Maniliamen took the small steamer up the river approximately
60 li (20 miles). [Ref. 24:p. 551]
Throughout the trial, everyone questioned maintained that Jenkins
never departed the China, although he did have free run of the
vessel and observed all preparations for the inland excursion, from the
distribution of guns to the packing of the shovels. After beaching the
small steamer up river, the landing party, supervised by Mr. Oppert,
trekked overland another 12 li (four miles) until they came to what was
apparently a predesignated spot, some sort of mound with a stone slab on
each side. All the witnesses carefully avoided any further description
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of the "spot" or their purpose for being there. Using the expedition's
only four shovels, the men took turns digging. The excavation continued
until heavy stone was hit, at which time the shovels proved virtually
useless against the subterranean stone. This caused Oppert to abandon
the operation and order the men back to the small steamer and,
subsequently, the China. By the time the party returned to the
China, it had been inland for a total of 58 hours. The entire
Jenkins-Oppert mission only took approximately two weeks. CRef. 24: pp.
551-556]
However, on other than these few facts, the testimony of the trial
witnesses was riddled with inaccuracies, contradictions, divergent
stories and questionable intentions. This was quite obvious in the
prosecutor's feeble attempts to get at the true purpose of the
expedition. Pointing out that it was his signature on the charter-party
document, Ernest Oppert, a German citizen, knew the court could not hold
him accountable for anything that happened during the expedition.
Oppert took full credit for all the expedition's arrangements and
vehemently maintained that "the purpose of the expedition was to
conclude treaties and possibly obtain an embassy." [Ref. 24: p. 551] His
failure to mention which country had authorized him to attempt such an
undertaking seemed almost intentional.
Strangely, other key members of the expedition maintained they were
ignorant of both its purpose and what was taking place around them.
Captain Mtiller, for example, testified, "I heard nothing of the objects
of the expedition." [Ref. 24: p. 551] Furthermore, he maintained ne did
not know the nature or number of cases oi the supplies taken onboard at
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Nagasaki. Nor did he know the purpose of the landing party's inland
excursion. W. Winter, the first mate, professed similar ignorance,
despite the fact he admitted he piloted the small steamer upstream and
stayed with it while the landing party marched inland. The four Chinese
who testified claimed a similar lack of knowledge, even though they were
directly involved in recruiting more than a hundred of their countrymen
for the expedition to Korea.
But nowhere were the contradictions, divergent testimony, and claims
of ignorance more obvious than in the case of the defendant, Jenkins.
For example, there was the question of Jenkins' financial role in the
expedition. One of the witnesses, a banker, simply refused to state the
circumstances of Jenkins' furnishing of funds for the affair unless
farced to do so. The court was powerless to effect such compulsion, and
the banker did not testify. Oppert testified Jenkins had nothing to do
with organizing the expedition. He claimed Jenkins merely lent him some
money (5,000 taels) as a private loan in Shanghai and sold him some guns
in Nagasaki, ludicrously maintaining neither action had anything to do
with the expedition. If that was true, however, how did Oppert justify
Jenkins' presence on the expedition?
[Jenkins] wanted a trip. My object was to have some one on board who
could read Chinese. He went merely as a passenger. He had no
interest in the expedition. . . Jenkins knew nothing whatever of the
arrangements as to how the treaty was to be made before leaving. .
.
Jenkins did not go on shore, or participate in anything done there,
and it was not till after we left Nagasaki that he knew any details
of the expedition. [Ref. 24: p. 551]
Others on the expedition seemed to purposely paint a similar picture
of Jenkins as an unwitting participant. Captain Mailer stated Jenkins
neither discussed nor challenged anyone on board about the expedition's
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details. He also confirmed Jenkins never went ashore or participated in
any way. R. Heinssen, the German national who took care of the
China's chartering arrangements, testified that someone was with
Mr. Oppert in the office when the 5,000 taels for the vessel changed
hands, but he claimed he could not positively identify that other person
was Jenkins.
The closest thing to potentially damaging testimony about Jenkins
came from Mr. Winter, the first mate, and two Chinese on the expedition
named Sun-Kee, and Yeh-Su-Dong. Winter stated that Jenkins had been on
board and observed the guns being distributed without so much as asking
a question about the operation. Jenkins' calm silence during the
handing out of guns during a voyage he allegedly knew nothing about
seemed irregular enough to warrant mentioning.
Sun-Kee had similar thoughts, testifying that "I saw Jenkins on
board the steamer when we were going ashore. He did not advise us to
abstain from doing so, nor did he interfere in any way." CRef. 24: p.
5533 Yeh-Su-Dong was perplexed. Jenkins had hired Yeh-Su-Dong to
accompany him on the expedition, and Yeh-Su-Dong dutifully stayed with
Jenkins throughout the whole affair. However, Yeh-Su-Dong admitted he
could not understand why Jenkins took him along. Jenkins gave him no
work whatsoever to do, nor did he do any. He simply confirmed that
Jenkins watched what transpired on the expedition but did not go ashore
and did not talk to anyone. A third Chinese, Chang-Man- Yuen, thought by
the prosecution to have crucial evidence, had mysteriously disappeared.
Mr. Eames, representing the U.S. government, felt at the beginning
of the trial that Chang-Man- Yuen' s evidence would be important to his
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case. But at that time, his absence did not really concerned him. Mr.
Eames believed some well phrased questions asked of the right witnesses
would still allow him to prove the corpus delicti.
However, as the trial progressed, Eames apparently started thinking
otherwise. After all the witnesses had been called and cross-examined,
Eames suggested the court adjourn so that a reasonable effort could be
made to find Chang-Man- Yuen. In view of the fact finding this witness
might take days, the court decided not to allow the adjournment, and
Eames was forced to make his final arguments for the government.
He summed up his case like this:
The exhuming of the body could not be regarded otherwise than as a
gross outrage, if not on the laws at least upon the feelings of the
Coreans. The only point of doubt was the connection of the accused
with the expedition; with regard to which it was to be borne in mind
that he was on the steamer from the first, and that he had lent a sum
of money to Mr. Oppert. It was beyond doubt, therefore, that he was
on the expedition and furnished funds. . . It was scarcely to be
supposed that he was ignorant of the terms of the charter-party,
which showed completely that something extraordinary was
contemplated. It was not likely he would lend the money to Mr.
Oppert unless he expected some return of which nobody knew anything;
it would certainly not be a compliment to the accused to suppose he
did not know how the matter lay; and his being in the expedition, his
lending the money, and his sale of the arms at Nagasaki, were strong
prima facie evidence that Jenkins was equally concerned with
Oppert, though the latter was the leader. One fact was very
noticeable, and it seemed to be an instance of those cases where very
shrewd people are at times a little too adroit. He made no
interference [with the expedition], when to all reason he ought. It
would certainly seem natural, when he saw arms being distributed to
the 130 coolies, that he would make some objection. Moreover, he was
perhaps a little over-doing the matter with respect to the passage
ticket. Mr. Oppert seemed to be the stalking horse. He came in and
gave just sufficient evidence to screen the defendant and then shut
his mouth. It could not really be supposed that the object of the
expedition was innocent. . . If the court could believe that Jenkins
had been imposed upon; that he lent Mr. Oppert the 5,000 taels and
trusted him with the 10 cases of arms without security, and was not
concerned and interested in the expedition, then it was their duty to
acquit him; but if he had aided and abetted in the preparation of an
expedition having for its object the carrying out of an act against
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good morals, the fact that the act was committed beyond the
jurisdiction of the court had nothing to do with the question, the
act itself being proved only to show the intent with which the
preparations and preliminaries were entered into. [Ref. 24: p. 554]
By this time, Mr. Hannen, the defense attorney, must have been
feeling quite confident. Despite all the factors which might have gone
against his client, few materialized. The government's principal
witness had fled, and the court did not wish to delay. Furthermore, the
testifying witnesses had sustained his defense strategy — Jenkins'
ignorance. Consequently, his defense summation was short and to the
point. The testimony and verifiable facts failed to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, any real complicity on the part of Jenkins. The only
evidence was circumstantial. Regardless how the presiding judge, Mr.
Seward, personally felt, rules of evidence were rules of evidence, and
the law was the law. After a short time, the following verdict was
returned by Mr. Seward: "I acquit the accused." [Ref. 24: p. 556]
It was to Seward's credit that he had the integrity to adhere to the
rules of evidence and letter of the law. In his judmental essay, Seward
focused not only on the trial evidence but also his personal misgivings
about the entire affair. He pointed out that the evidence before the
court failed to disclose the real motives of the chief actors in the
enterprise, and the public remained at a loss to account for such a
considerable yet risky investment. Conceding that rumors about Korea
and its desires for trade and relations had been rampant for years,
Seward also admitted the evidence in this case made it possible to
embrace or reject virtually any hypothesis. "As a matter of law, no
other decision could have been arrived at." [Ref. 24: p. 556]
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But in his reading of the judgment, Seward's misgivings were clear:
If it is true that the leaders of the expedition intended and did
attempt to interfere with the graves, no one would have regretted
their getting handsomely thrashed for their pains. But because it is
wrong to do such an act as that alleged to have been contemplated,
and because it was also wrong, to use a legal term, to conspire
together for such a purpose, it is no reason that a tribunal is to
strain the law beyond its true intent and meaning. The chances also
of an indictment being framed next time better calculated to hold
water will, we think, prevent any one from being insane enough to try
the experiment again. . . we are especially anxious to impress upon
the minds of enterprising pioneers in that line of country that it by
no means follows, because on one indictment a verdict of not guilty
is found, on another indictment, a little more artistically drawn,
and on evidence a little more carefully sifted, a very different
conclusion may possibly be come to. CRef. 24: p. 557]
E. THE JEMINS-OPPERT LEGACY
By the time the trial was concluded and Jenkins was a free man, the
damage was already done. It had been more of a circus than a trial.
The nations of the other nationals on the expedition watched the United
States' fall foolish prey to the schemes of shrewd men. No other legal
action was taken against any of them by the other countries. As far as
they were all concerned, the Jenkins-Oppert affair was a dead issue.
That was not the case for the others involved. Quite likely feeling
totally manipulated, Seward was livid. He had been taken advantage of
and lied to, embarrassed before his famous uncle and the diplomatic
community in China, and even mistakenly set himself up in a position
from which he could do nothing to capitalize on the information he had
obtained. On July 13, 1868, two days after the Jenkins trial, George
Seward sent a full report of the trial to S. Wells Williams, the
American Chargi d' Affaires in Peking [Ref. 24:pp. 548-5491.
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Contrary to his trial verdict and judgmental essay contained in the
trial manuscript, Seward told Wells precisely what he really believed
went on during the Jenkins-Oppert expedition to Korea. He took what
seemed to be great pains to point out that Jenkins had told him the
expedition was going to Korea at the request of the Korean government
specifically to open negotiations and explain the treatment of the
French missionaries and the crew of the General Sherman in 1866.
Personally, however, Seward was convinced the expedition was
undertaken purely to exhume the dead Korean sovereign's remains for
profit. Upon returning from the expedition, Jenkins had related the
entire scheme to him during his preliminary investigations. Seward was
quite upset he could not use that important disclosure in the trial; as
the Consul General and presiding judicial authority, his position made
that impossible.
Likewise, Seward was quite sensitive to the potential impact the
Jenkins-Oppert expedition could have on the future of Sino-American and
Korean-American relations. In light of their common ideas concerning
the sanctity of burial grounds, Seward felt the Jenkins-Oppert
expedition flatly insulted the Chinese and Koreans. Furthermore, he was
sure the Chinese would view Jenkins* acquittal a travesty of true
justice. No doubt he was convinced the expedition and trial's outcome
represented a significant setback in Sino-American relations.
Even worse, however, he viewed the damage done to any future
Korean-American relations as almost irreparable. If the attempt to
exhume the sacred bones was not enough of an insult to the Koreans, the
trial lurther revealed that, during the course of their escapades, the
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hopeful grave robbers had also stolen two Korean sanpans and fired their
weapons at the Koreans on two separate occasions. Not only did Seward
feel such an incident would grievously interfere with U.S. efforts to
open relations with Korea, but he strongly suggested the U.S. enact
legislation to preclude any reoccurences.
Thus, the Jenkins-Oppert expedition played an important, heretofore
unappreciated role in the legacy of the General Sherman and the
Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871. Its connection with the General
Sherman in the beginning helped first bring it to the attention of
and later make it an emotional issue with the American authorities.
What actually took place during the Jenkins-Oppert expedition and how it
was dealt with by the Westerners surely hardened Korean attitudes toward
foreigners even more, ensuring certain disaster for the Low-Rodgers
Expedition. In the words of Korean historian Han Voo-keun:
A greater offense than this against a rigidly orthodox Confucian like
the Taewon'gun could hardly be imagined. Fears of Western political
domination were now reinforced by a hearty detestation of Westerners
and all their ways. Oppert [and Jenkins] could have done nothing
more calculated to intensify the persecution of Catholics and
guarantee the exclusion of foreigners from Korea. [Ref. 12: p. 367]
While the Jenkins trial pretty much laid to rest rumors and hopes
about surviving crewmembers of the General Sherman, the issues
connected with that disaster still remained very much in the minds of
the American diplomatic community. In an interesting turn of events
from the past two years, however, now it was the Koreans who were
volunteering more direct information. In late July 1868, S. Wells
Williams, the U.S. Charge d' Affaires in Peking, had the rare opportunity
to meet face-to-face with a member of the visiting Korean diplomatic
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mission to China. The information conveyed to Williams during their
meeting confirmed precisely what Captain Febiger and the Shenandoah had
brought back a few months before. The official American position was
now that there was no longer any doubt everyone on board the General
Sherman had been killed in September 1866, and all available evidence
upheld the presumption the crew invoked its sad fate by some rash or
violent acts toward the Koreans. [Ref. 24: pp. 544-545]
F. GEORGE F. SEWARD AID HIS "VISION"
Still, while the United States government was willing to admit the
General Sherman' s crew was dead, the General Sherman issue
itself was destined to remain very much alive. George Seward saw to
that. After allowing the disappointment of the Shenandoah mission
and the embarrassment of the Jenkins-Oppert expedition fade, on October
14, 1868, Seward resurrected his April 24th proposal of sending a
diplomatic mission to Korea. As was often his habit for such ideas, he
corresponded directly to his uncle, the Secretary of State, without any
evidence of discussing the matter with the Charge d' Affaires in Peking.
It was also obvious from his new recommendation that Seward had no
intention of repeating his previous embarrassment due to his superficial
analysis and naivete in dealing with the Jenkins affair. This
time, Seward had consulted fully with other foreign consuls in Shanghai,
as well as Admiral Rowan, Bell's successor as Commander of the American
Asiatic Squadron. He had also carefully dissected the benefits and
disadvantages of Korean mission in terms of specific U.S. objectives,
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the realities of Korean isolationism and European imperialism, and the
probabilities of eventual success and the necessity to use force.
Seward envisioned the mission to Korea having two primary
objectives. First, the mission could procure information of the
General Sherman's loss or destruction and, if necessary, some
appropriate indemnity. Secondly, the mission could obtain a treaty with
Korea. [Ref. 25: p. 337]
The first abjective, like Seward's verdict in the Jenkins trial, may
tell us a great deal about Seward, the man. Despite the two previous
fact finding missions to Korea, all the confirming information about the
General Sherman through other Chinese and Korean channels, and
Seward's personal embarrassment from the Jenkins-Oppert affair, Seward
still wished to use the General Sherman as the rationale for
undertaking a mission to Korea. Seward openly expressed his
dissatisfaction, if not disbelief, with Korean explanations of the
events surrounding the schooner's loss. But his personal pride and
abhorrence of what transpired during the Jenkins-Oppert affair may have
also been at play. In this new modified proposal, he asserted:
Ve cannot be indifferent to the propriety of offering to Corea an
explanation of our views and conduct in regard to the recent
expedition of an armed force for the purpose of exhuming and holding
for ransom the remains of one or more sovereigns of that country, in
which one of our citizens has been charged as a leader. It is
satisfactory to know that we have only to ask from Corea proof that
she has dealt as honorably with us in the Sherman cases as we
have with her in the latter matter. [Ref. 25: p. 338]
Was Seward feeling responsible far the repulsive Jenkins-Oppert
endeavor or was he simply seeking a more honorable a means by which to
redeem himself? While Seward's rationale for the first objective of his
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proposal seems superficial, if not flimsy and clouded by personal
motives, the second abjective appeared much more pragmatic. He cited
the active and ever growing commercial trade between China and Japan,
the Korean peninsula's convenient positioning between the two, Korea's
close proximity to expanding Russia, and the possible stakes and chances
of the other competing European powers to succeed with Korea. Seward
was clearly of the opinion Korea could not possibly exclude foreigners
much longer. Perhaps thinking Korea's rulers held a similar view, he
stated that obtaining a treaty with Korea should not prove very
difficult, especially if it simply concerned the safety of seamen
wrecked on the Korean coast. But Seward was careful to temper his
optimism with pragmatism, admitting "a considerable show of force would
probably be needed to secure a general [commercial] treaty." [Ref. 25: p.
3381
Seward's preference to use force to open Korea was rooted in two
things. First, he had a firm appreciation for the processes and
upheaval that had been transpiring in East Asia, not to mention the
contribution to both made by the introduction of foreigners. Surely, he
reasoned, the association of radical changes with foreigners was not
lost on the Koreans. But if Korea did not possess insightful leaders
able to see the inevitable trends of the future and to adapt
accordingly, then that was still no reason to delay U.S. action. "Japan
accepted Commodore Perry's peaceful but formidable mission without great
opposition...." [Ref. 25: p. 339]
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While it may never be known whether George Seward was indeed a man
of farreaching "vision," or whether he was simply recommending something
more immediate and tailored to serve his own career, ultimately Seward
proceeded to plant the seeds of the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871. His
proposed mission was for a joint diplomatic-naval expedition under the
names of both Seward and Admiral Rowan. While the proposal did not
recommend a specific number of vessels to be used for the mission,
Seward professed a belief that the greater the number the greater the
chances for success.
George Seward's latest proposal did not reach Washington, D.C.,
until December 7, 1868. The almost two months transit time may have
spared him the further personal embarrassment of a failure in Korea. By
the time his proposal for the joint diplomatic-naval expedition arrived
at the State Department, his uncle William had more important crises to
deal with than his nephew's speculative correspondence about a country
few knew or cared anything about.
With the inauguration of a new president fast approaching, and thus
his tenure as Secretary of State drawing to a close, William Seward was
immersed trying to cope with one of the frequent civil wars of Santo
Domingo (now the Dominican Republic). The government of that fledgling
republic asked that it be taken under American protection. This meshed
well with the older Seward's plan to acquire a naval outpost in the West
Indies. With the start of 1869, the U.S. Secretary of State was working
frantically to make U.S. annexation of Santo Domingo a reality. Along
with that, William Seward was also desperately trying to get the Senate
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to ratify a treaty he had successfully negotiated to transfer the Danish
West Indies to the United States. [Ref. 26: pp. 113-114]
With his time as Secretary of State waning, the older Seward
probably had no wish to approve or pursue a distant, not to mention
questionable, undertaking of which he had no hope of seeing concluded.
By the time he left office on March 4, 1869, he may have not even seen
his nephew's latest proposal.
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V. THE LQV-RQDGERS MISSION
It is also safe to assume William H. Seward's immediate successor,
Elihu Benjamin Washburne, never saw George Seward's Korea proposal,
either. Amid considerable political infighting and maneuvering within
the Grant Administration, as well as between the Administration and
Congress, Secretary Washburne held the office for only five days.
A. KEY PERSONNEL
1. Hamilton Fish
When Hamilton Fish became U.S. Secretary of State on March 11,
1869, he found a full agenda of unfinished business left over from the
previous administration. The Santo Domingo annexation which William
Seward had so frantically pursued before departing was still being hotly
debated in Congress. There also remained some serious potential
complications with Great Britain as a result of its ties and assistance
to the Confederacy during the Civil War. Furthermore, there was an
insurrection raging in Cuba with consequent injuries to American
interests there. [Ref. 27: pp. 128-131]
In Asia, Sino-Western relations were at an all time low.
Domestic turmoil there was rampant and causing a pronounced threat to
American lives and property, particularly missionaries. Chinese piracy
was becoming an intolerable threat to all foreign shipping. On the
other hand, Japan was in the midst of the Meiji restoration, setting
itself the primary task of developing its awn military and economic
power as a means by which to achieve relative equality with the Western
powers and, thus, avoid the subjugation that befell China. [Ref. 23]
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Within a year, the new U.S. Secretary of State would also
witness the breakout of the Franco-German War and extreme European
instability. Facing all this and more, Hamilton Fish was at a distinct
disadvantage. Not only had he been out of public oiiice ior twelve
years, but he also had no prior experience in either foreign policy or
any other form of diplomatic affairs. CRef. 27: p. 125] Given these
circumstances, it is no surprise ODening Korea held top priority with
neither Mr. Fish nor President Grant.
But after that first year, Fish appeared to be coming to grips
with the office and its problems. In Asia he was able to focus on China
and even had an appreciation of how the Franco-German War might spill
over into the Far East. There were also some new key American
personalities in the Far East. Two of them, Frederick F. Low, the new
U.S. Minister to China, and Rear Admiral John Rodgers, the new Commander
of the Asiatic Squadron, were destined to plan, organize and accompany
the American expedition to Korea in 1871.
2. Frederick F. Low
Frederick Low was keenly interested in the Far East long before
President Grant appointed him U.S. Minister to China, succeeding J. Ross
Browne, in December 1869. His first experience with the Far East came
at the age of fifteen when he worked for the East India firm, Russell,
Sturgis, and Company of Boston. Somewhat of a "self-educated" man, Low
eventually made his way to California where he founded and ran several
businesses and later became a successful capitalist and investor.
Low entered politics in 1861. By 1862 he had won a congres-
sional seat, and in 1863 accepted President Lincoln's appointment as the
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collector of the port of San Francisco. Elected governor of California
before the year was finished, Low was only 45 years old.
It was during his tenure as governor that he became more attuned
to the Chinese. Modest and unassuming in character, he was an
exceptionally honest man with a strong sense of duty and moral courage.
In an age of racial bigotry nowhere was this more obvious than in Low's
defense of Chinese immigrants, as well as other minorities, in
California. He energetically pushed for developing a California
irrigation system that would permit the introduction of rice culture and
help employ the state's Asian population. He was also a great advocate
of commerce with China and Japan and considered China a great potential
market for California products. No doubt Low looked upon his
appointment as Minister to China as a great challenge and opportunity.
[Ref. 29]
He was not disappointed. Minister Low had been in Peking for a
very short time before Secretary of State Fish tasked him to help
coordinate a combined naval action with the British and Germans to deal
with the pirates in Chinese waters. By June that same year, he found
himself reporting on the Tientsin Massacre* and its tumultuous
aftermath. During the course of his investigations into the root causes
of the Tientsin Massacre and some possible suggestions for minimizing
5The Tientsin Massacre occurred on June 21, 1870, as a result
of mob violence that killed the French consul and 20 other foreigners,
mainly French, including ten nuns. Catholic establishments in Tientsin
were also destroyed. Outraged and fearful foreign powers mobilized
gunboats off Tientsin, and Sino-Vestern relations reached an new low.
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future damage to American concerns in China, Low was deeply affected by
what he found.
Of particular note was a continuing dialogue between Low and the
Chinese foreign minister, Wan-tsiang. Van-tsiang was expressing his
outrage throughout the foreign diplomatic community about the offensive
behavior of some Christian missionaries. Specifically, he cited those
missionaries and their converts who were using their religion as a
shield behind which they defrauded and offended the Chinese people. [Ref.
30: pp. 110-111] Low's reply to Wan-tsiang* s indignation revealed much
about the U.S. Minister, his dedication to his office and mutual
understanding between the two countries, and his sense of justice.
To assure peace in the future, the people must be better informed of
the purposes of foreigners. They must be taught that merchants are
engaged in trade which cannot but be beneficial to both native and
foreigner, and that missionaries seek only the welfare of the people,
and are engaged in no political plots or intrigues against the
government. Whenever cases occur in which the missionaries overstep
the bounds of decorum, or interfere in matters with which they have
no proper concern, let each case be reported promptly to the minister
of the country to which it belongs. Such isolated instances should
not produce prejudice or engender hatred against those who observe
their obligations, nor should sweeping complaints be made against all
on this account. .
.
If the danger is as great as the contents of your communication
would appear to indicate, and that, owing to the ignorance of the
common people, all will be likely to suffer, irrespective of
nationality or religious belief, then it certainly is a matter of
great concern to all foreign governments, which should lead them to
consult and seek means to prevent, if passible, such a catastrophe,
and also adopt measures for defining their rights under the several
treaties.
If I have failed to comprehend fully the difficulties and dangers
which surround the situation which you have endeavored to point out,
or if I have omitted noticing any point of importance, I am quite
ready and willing to meet you and the other members of the Foreign
Office, and discuss these as well as other questions of difference
between your country and foreign nations, in a spirit of forbearance,
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with an earnest desire to so arrange and settle all questions that
peace and mutual confidence may long continue. [Ref. 30: p. 110]
Frederick Low was definite l*.r a niar. of substance.
3. Admiral John Rodgers, Jr.
In contrast to Low's initial lack of diplomatic experience,
Admiral Rodgers was a seasoned Civil War veteran, who had proved himself
in both battle and command, From 1861 to 1865, the admiral had amassed
an impressive record and reputation for gallantry and chivalric courage,
and his whole career had been an example of unimpeded progression. At
the age of fifty-eight, he had already seen action in the Seminole and
Mexican wars, conducted the first scientific exploration of the Bering
Strait, and during the Civil War had been a skilled and gallant
commander of Union ironclad monitors. The admiral also had prior
experience in the Far East. In the mid-1850' s, as second in command of
the North Pacific Exploring and Surveying Expedition, he had helped
chart the China Sea and the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, in view of what
was about to happen in Korea, it is interesting to note he had taken
part in a landing of forces on the Liuchiu (Ryukyu) Islands (to secure
the natives' observance of their treaty obligations to the United
States) and was quite familiar with Perry's tactics in opening Japan.
[Ref. 31: p. 21] He was also considered a highly educated officer. His
professionalism was further accentuated by a reputation for good
judgment, as well as a knack for knowing the exact moment when diplomacy
must yield to force. [Ref. 32: p. 743
Together, these men were destined to plan and sail on a mission lor
which circumstance and the unknown had already decided the outcome.
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B. THE EXPEDITION'S PURPOSE AND PLANNING
Regardless of true intent and stated purpose, the Low-Rodgers
Expedition was doomed to failure and misinterpretation from the very
beginning. Its size, composition, and timing invited rumors, mistruths,
or Korean suspicions. For one thing, more than half of the entire
Asiatic Squadron's fleet of just nine ships was committed to the
endeavor. All five vessels — the Colorado, the Monocacy, the
Palos
y
the Alaska, and the Benicla — were heavily armed.
CRef. 20: p. 212] In fact, the flagship Colorado was one of the
largest ships in the U.S. Navy. It had a draft of 23 feet, was able to
carry its own assault force, and had heavy artillery for bombardment
from sea [Ref. 33:p. 3443. There were also over 1,200 seamen and
marines on the expedition, and all of the other ships' captains were
seasoned combat veterans [Ref. 18: p. 2341.
Then there was the poor timing. The "Hermit Kingdom" had been known
for its refusal to have intercourse with the outside world for
centuries. Granted, as the world's commerce pressed ever forward, it
made sense for the Western countries to seek to draw Korea into their
game. After all, Korea's central location amidst the trade routes of
the East appeared to present but yet another profitable commercial
opportunity.
But Western strategies failed to consider Korea's long history of
outside invasions and the foreign policy traditions that history
spawned. Korea's traumatic recent history profoundly reinforced those
traditions among the governing elites. In just the five years
immediately preceding the Low-Rodgers Expedition, Korea was beseiged on
all sides. There was the Russians' trading ultimatum (1866), the
aggravation of the General Sherman (1866), two French punitive
expeditions (1866), Japanese warships reconnoitering and plundering its
coasts, and two U.S. warships surveying its waters in direct reaction to
the General Sherman (1867, 1868), were just a few examples. The
Koreans must have felt very uncomfortable knowing this latest armed
expedition was approaching. They were quite aware of the turmoil the
Westerners were causing in China and Japan.
The Koreans may have also been a little overconfident. Throughout
all the foreign ultimatums and interventions over the previous half
decade, Korea considered itself the victor in each confrontation. Had
not the French, Americans, Japanese and Russians all departed Korean
waters without their intended result? Korea had never given in before;
why should it be any different with the Low-Rodgers Expedition?
Many historians have labeled the Low-Rodgers Expedition a revenge
mission. Rumors about its purpose were rampant for the better part of a
year before the expedition set sail. Even the American press called the
Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871 "Our Little War with the Heathen." [Ref.
23:p. 11]
But if the Low-Rodgers Expedition was not premeditated revenge for
the General Sherman, then what was its purpose? Where did the
idea come from, and who planned it?
The actual planning for the expedition took more than a year. On
April 20, 1870, U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish commissioned
Frederick F. Low directly, authorizing him to open negotiations with
Korean authorities "tor the purpose of securing a treaty for the
87
protection of shipwrecked mariners...." [Ref. 25:p. 3343 That was the
official primary purpose of the mission from the very beginning. The
mission's secondary purpose was some sort of commercial arrangement, not
further defined, with the Korean government. It must be emphasized that
Minister Low was supposed to pursue such arrangements only if an obvious
opportunity presented itself, and Fish took pains to ensure Low
understood that President Grant's principal aim for the mission was only
"to secure protection and good treatment to such seamen of the United
States as may unhappily be wrecked upon those shores." [Ref. 25: p. 3343
There was absolutely no hint of any revenge for the loss of the
General Sherman
t
and, from the outset, the intentions of the
United States towards Korea were purely peaceful.
Some important details for the expedition were worked out and
dictated by Washington from the beginning. The Department of State had
already coordinated with the Department of the Navy to ensure Admiral
John Rodgers accomodate Low on the mission and spelled out both men's
roles. While Low would be responsible for the mission's planning and
conduct overall, he was also advised he must take full advantage of
Admiral Rodgers experience and counsel, even if that meant at times
deferring to Rodgers' superior knowledge in naval matters. Low was also
counselled to heed the advice of former consul George F. Seward, who at
the time was in the United States. In fact, Low was told to be patient
and deliberate in his planning to ensure Seward had time to return to
China and discuss arrangements with Low prior to the mission. In his
instructions, Fish even included George Seward's past dispatches from
which came the original idea for a U. S. -sanctioned mission to open Korea
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[Ref. 25:d. 334], No doubt these instructions were the direct result at
Seward's extensive lobbying for the mission during his Washington, D.C.,
soiurn. Financial arrangements for the mission were also attended to by
Washington. Low was told to draw any necessary expenses from Messrs.
Baring Brothers & Company of London [Ref. 25:p. 335]. In effect, Low
was given a blank check. All Fish required was that Low kee : account rf
his expenses.
As for the possible use of force during the mission, that was to be
avoided unless if to do so dishonored the United States. The Secretary
of State still displayed considerable faith in Minister Low. All
actions, all judgments, all lines drawn were to be solely at Low's
discretion. [Ref. 25: p. 335]
Of course, the man with the original proposal was George Seward, and
it is obvious that, while in the United States, Seward had approached
Fish about his proposal of a mission to Korea face-to-face. However,
there is no reason to suppose Low' s enthusiasm for the mission was
dampened because it was another man's idea. On the contrary, Low had
already taken to heart Hamilton Fish's previous instructions regarding
China, issued on December 3, 1869, which told him to "be unyielding in
demanding the extreme protection to American citizens, commerce, and
property which is conceded by the [earlier] treaties." [Ref. 17: p. 154]
But apparently Low also wished to carry Fish's policies beyond
China. With American trade in the region continually increasing, he
agreed some sort of treaty with Korea to protect our shipwrecked seamen
was essential to U.S. interests. Furthermore, "he also regarded [Korea]
as situated at the crossroads of eniDire in the northern Pacific." [Ref.
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18: p. 234] Thus, he concluded it would be smart to attempt a trading
arrangement at the same time. Low believed that:
the commerce with China, Japan, and Russian Manchuria required
vessels to skirt the coast of Korea and thus brought prominently into
view the undesirability of allowing a country directly in the track
of a great commerce bounded on two sides by the sea, to remain with
its coasts, outlying islands and dangerous passages, totally
unexplored. CRef. 18: p. 2333
Hence, Secretary of State Fish and Low were in total agreement. It
is also extremely important to note that references to the General
Sherman never entered into their communications about the upcoming
expedition. Throughout the Fish-Low correspondence nothing ever
suggested that the 1871 expedition was to be any sort of revenge for the
General Sherman. On the contrary, instead of dwelling on the
General Sherman' s past misfortune, the men and their planning
concentrated solely on the potential benefits to be derived from future
Korean-American relations.
After receiving Fish's initial instructions, Low immediately started
making all the necessary travel and support arrangements with Admiral
Rodgers. But any discussions they had were strictly preliminary.
Ostensibly, Low preferred to delay any definitive plans until George
Seward returned to Peking so he could take advantage of Seward'
s
thoughts and previous experience. However, given Low's calculating,
shrewd background in business and politics, it is more likely he wished
to use the delay to gather information about Korea to make some of his
own assessments. One of the first things he did was approach the
Chinese government for information and assistance. After meeting with
the Chinese, Low reported:
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The Chinese government will, I doubt not, lend its good offices in
aid of our efforts in that direction [the mission to Korea], but it
is questionable whether they will prove of much practical utility.
[Ref. 25: p. 362]
Knowing Korea was substantially a nation independent of China, with
little intercourse between the two except an annual tribute delegation
and some private trade, Low felt obligated to be as candidly pessimistic
about the expedition as he was supportive.
The object aimed at, in connection with the proposed expedition, is
well worth the effort, and I shall use all available means to make
the negotiations a success; although candor compels me to say I am
not sanguine. I shall be glad to avail myself of Mr. Seward's
experience and assistance in this matter; hence no preparations will
be made for the expedition until next year, when he will be able to
accompany me. [Ref: 25: pp. 362-363]
But, Low did not idly wait for Seward's return. In fact, he kept
quite alert to any developments throughout the Western diplomatic
community in Peking which might have some potential bearing on the
upcoming expedition to Korea. One such incident was a Japanese-assisted
mission by the North German Union that took place in June 1870. Baron
de Rehfues, the German minister in Peking, was kind enough to share a
letter about the experience from M. Von Brandt, the North German Union's
minister in Japan, with Low. The purpose of the German mission was the
same as the upcoming Low-Rodgers Expedition: a treaty regarding the
treatment of shipwrecked mariners.
However, German motivations behind sharing their experience with the
Americans were unclear. They may have simply wished to provide whatever
assistance passible. Then again, because their encounter with the
Koreans was an unqualified failure, they may have intended to dissuade
the Americans from a similar attempt. Whatever the case, the German
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account of their Korean mission did nothing to encourage Low. The
Koreans not only refused to even talk with the Germans, but they also
chastised the Japanese who had accompanied the Germans for daring to
come to Korea on board a foreign vessel. They told the Japanese that
Korean-Japanese relations, which in themselves amounted to little, would
be broken off entirely until the Japanese who had come to Korea on board
the German vessel left the country. [Ref. 30: pp. 74-75]
George F. Seward finally returned to Peking in November 1870, where
he spoke with Low and Admiral Rodgers regarding the opening of Korea.
The results of their discussions consisted of several basic guidelines
and considerations by which the expedition would be conducted. All were
quite practical. First, the expedition was to set sail and visit the
coast of Korea during a favorable season. This was obviously a safety
consideration no doubt induced by the record of wrecked ships on the
Korean coast. The Americans already suspected they would have their
hands full enough with the Koreans just trying to initiate a dialogue;
they wished to mitigate the probable necessity of also coping with
severe weather and possible loss of life and vessel. Second, the
expedition would be scheduled in such a way that it minimally
interferred with the Asiatic Squadron's other naval missions. [Ref:
34: pp. 73-741 This seemed quite reasonable considering the potential
for incidents in the aftermath of the Franco-German War. Also, the
pirate issue along the Chinese coast was not yet fully dealt with, and
the memory of the Tientsin Massacre was still fresh in everyone's mind.
The anti-foreign feeling in China also remained quite high. If naval
assistance became necessary, some assets al the Sauadron hac. to remain.
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The discussants also set tentative departure points and aates. As
for when the mission would commence, they agreed the expedition should
leave from either Shanghai or Chefoo sometime between the 1st and 15th
of May, 1671 [Ref. 30:p. 74]. Chefoo was the preferred departure and
temporary basing point due to its closer proximity to Korea and how that
would facilitate any necessary resupply and communication with the
outside world. But the experienced Rodgers no doubt anticipated some
possible unknown circumstances might arise, and thus opted for a backup
position. Finally, Low wisely made it clear that, due to the
unpredictable temperment of the Koreans, no pre-established diplomatic
procedure would be used once the expedition arrived in Korea.
Apparently, Low decided to use the discretionary judgment Fish
encouraged and reserved for himself the flexibility necessary to make
the expedition a diplomatic success.
At this paint it appeared unlikely Seward would be accompanying the
expedition. As it turned out, his return to Peking to confer with Low
and Rodgers was nothing more than a convenient stopover on his way to
visit India. Seward could not promise he would be back in time for the
expedition's May departure. In relating this to Secretary of State
Fish, Low's tone suggests he was displeased with either Seward or the
situation. There may have been some friction between the two men.
However, whether Seward accompanied the expedition or not was
already relatively immaterial to Low. Taking advantage of the
information provided him by the Germans, Low requested Fish send him a
formal commission authorizing Low to negotiate and sign treaties an
behalf of the United States. Law was quick to point out that "it
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appears that the Coreans are disposed to seize upon any subterfuge to
oppose the entrance of foreigners into their domains." [Ref. 30: p. 74]
He also committed himself to obtaining further information about Korea
and the Koreans from the Chinese and the soon to be visiting Korean
tribute officers.
Was Minister Low now trying to ensure his success or was he
attempting to guard against blame in the event of failure in Korea? Did
his personal encounter with Seward during the planning session motivate
him concerning the expedition, or did Seward's scheme now impress him as
merely one man's diplomatic fantasy without substance? Where was a
diplomat to draw the line between honest and practical assessment and
outright pessimism? Was Low simply demonstrating a negative reaction to
being tasked with carrying out someone else's risky idea? Whatever the
case, Low, the ever-dedicated public servant, again found himself
questioning the likelihood of success.
As stated in a former dispatch, I am not sanguine of favorable
results; at the same time the abject aimed at is worthy of the trial,
and no effort on my part shall be wanting to accomplish it. [Ref.
30:p. 74]
Low systematically continued gathering information and making his
own diplomatic preparations for the expedition. Among other things, Low
kept the Chinese Foreign Office fully informed of his plans.
Reminiscent of the French and Chinese correspondence following the
Korean murders of the French priests and immediately prior to the French
retaliatory expeditions of 1866, Low asked the Chinese for assistance
regarding the Koreans. However, because his mission was much mare
amicable in nature, the tone of the correspondence was markedly less
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hostile and defensive than that of the French. He merely requested the
Chinese provide him information about Korea and that they forward an
official letter from Low to the Korean authorities. Adhering to strict
traditional diplomatic protocol between the two countries, China went to
considerable lengths to deliver Low's letter. Chinese Foreign Office
representatives travelled to Korea, presented a memorial to the Board of
Rites and requested the memorial be sent on to the King of Korea.
Eventually the throne was memorialized and an answer proffered.
But the answer surprised even the Chinese. The Koreans only
acknowledged receipt of the letter, stated to do so was a precedent and
that they would never receipt for or otherwise entertain similar
communications in the future. Thus, although the Chinese did go
somewhat out of their way to accomodate Low, the result was basically
the same. No headway was made with the Koreans, and the Chinese simply
gave their standard explanation — Korea was an independent nation over
which the Chinese had no influence. ERef. 30: p. 112]
While Low was gathering information and exploring diplomatic
channels, Admiral Rodgers was preparing the squadron. Shanghai was
later picked over Chefoo as the point of departure for the expedition,
apparently due to some fleet business unrelated to the expedition
requiring the admiral's presence. Of course, the presence of the
minister and admiral made the flagship Colorado a given. Also
accompanying them were the Monocacy and the Palos. The Benicia
and Alaska, on duty around Japan, were to be called upon to
rendevous at Nagasaki. Such a plan would not take all the fleet's
95
resources away from either China or Japan, and the mix of vessels would
ensure adequate men and fire-power necessary to cope with any likely
contingency.
The plan finally adopted called for the Colorado, Konocacy and
Palos to leave Shanghai for Nagasaki on May 5th. At Nagasaki they would be
joined by the Benicia and Alaska, delay several days for
resupply and mission coordination, then head for Korea. Once in Korea,
the admiral and his farces would be at the service of Minister Low.
Upon completion of the mission, all five ships would return to Chefoo.
With his extensive combat experience, as well as his prior duty in the
Far East and his personal knowledge of the success of Perry' s gunboat
diplomacy in Japan, Admiral Rodgers no doubt felt confident his naval
formula for the expedition was the right one.
C. THE VOYAGE TO KOREA
From their moorings in the port of Yokohama, the Benicia and
Alaska were ordered the last week of April to assemble at Nagasaki
in the latter part of May, 1871. The Benicia was commanded by
Commander L.A. Kimberly and the Alaska by Commander Homer C.
Blake. The vessels were sister ships, both relatively new steam sloops
with the same displacement, weight of battery, size of spars and sails,
and number of crew. They sailed by both steam and sail. Usually the
boilers were used to maneuver or take them out to open sea. Once there,
the bailers would be reduced to idling and the sails took over as the
primary means of propulsion. Both commanders and crews had a solid
reputation for maintaining themselves at peak efficiency and readiness.
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Sailing for Nagasaki the same day, they had to travel several hundred
miles against the strength of the great Japan Current. Although the
passage was rough, all went well, and the ships arrived at Nagasaki on
April 30th, where they awaited the arrival of the rest of the
expedition. CRef. 32: p. 77]
Interestingly, despite naval planning that had been in progress for
months, Admiral Rodgers apparently never found it necessary to share the
expedition's purpose with its participants. Consequently, orders going
out to the squadron's elements bred rampant rumors about what was
transpiring. For sailors and soldiers throughout the American fleet
this was great for morale. The crews had been training hard for some
time, and, with their daily competitive drills with spars, sails,
batteries, boats and battalions, rumors only fed their enthusiasm.
Lieutenant Commander Schley, the Executive Officer on board the
Benicia, astutely kept track of all the rumors.
It was during this winter [1870-71] in Japan. that rumors reached the
Benicia that the affair in Korea relating to the American schooner
General Sherman was to be inquired into by our Government. .
.
Before sailing from the United States there were vague rumors that
this matter was to be settled by the [Asiatic] squadron then being
prepared for Rear Admiral Rodgers. Their [the rumors] recurrence at
Yokohama. . . led to the belief that there was to be more active
service before the year ended. [Ref. 32: pp. 76-78]
The rumors expanded from widespread speculation about even the most
minute details.
Korea was, after all, the objective point. This belief gained
strength from the fact that a retrospective glance over the
squadron's general orders showed preference for battalion and
artillery drills. The prevalent unrest of the Chinese at that time,
together with occasional outbreaks, were sufficient to account for
these preparations, and, while things did not justify this activity.
it may be said that they did serve to mask the real oumose at the
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admiral. No American squadron was ever better prepared to maintain
or to vindicate the honor of our country or to protect the interests
of its citizens in the Far East. [Ref. 32: p. 79]
These rumors about the purpose of the impending expedition, in turn,
encouraged many other rumors. Among them: Korea routinely murdered or
cast into prison to die of neglect any poor seamen arriving on her
shores; Korea was peopled with warlike tribes of formidable stature and
ferocious instincts; in Korean forts were Krupp cannon (the latest in
German armament technology); needle-guns were in the hands of all the
troops; the Korean people were ferocious giants; Korea abounded in
wealth; the strength of the Korean giants was herculean; their ferocity
was inferior only to that of tigers; their guns were of the latest type;
their marksmanship was unparalleled; their courage was comparable only
to that of ancient heroes. [Ref. 32: pp. 80-82]
Of course, no one seemed inclined to explain the basis for these
lines of thought, nor did anyone think it necessary to explain how the
latest technology could reach Korea without foreigners having access to
the "Hermit Kingdom" or the world knowing it. Then again, at this
point, it was obvious the love of fabrication far exceeded any desire or
necessity to be factual.
This prevailing fear of the unknown, coupled with an enthusiastic
belief that Admiral Rodgers was coming to lead them to Korea to exact
revenge for the murder of the General Sherman's crew was at fever's
pitch by the time the Colorado, Falos, and Monocacy
finally arrived in Nagasaki. However, as Schley recorded, the
flagship's arrival was somewhat disappointing. The presence onboard of
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Minister Low, his two secretaries, and two Chinese interpreters forced
the more thoughtful members of the crew to accept the fact there was to
be only a parley after all. CRef. 32: pp. 78-79] However, the rumors
never really went away.
Fortunately, Low reported to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish on
what transpired during the expedition via official diplomatic
correspondence. It is obvious from reading this correspondence that
Frederick Low made every possible attempt to provide Fish with ongoing
objective appraisals of developments. But there were also thoughts
going through Low's mind during the expedition that were more private in
nature. While such thoughts did not always get reported, many of them
did get recorded. These he kept in meticulous detail in his personal
diary of the expedition. * From the very first day he recorded init
everything from ship passings and weather conditions to battle body
counts and his personal feelings. Most important of all, his diary
revealed the mission's true intentions, specifics of the American-Korean
encounters, and his personal perspectives on where things went awry.
Until arriving in Korea, the voyage was fairly uneventful. The
Colorado, Palos and Nonocacy actually left Shanghai on May
8, 1871, after a three day delay during which the admiral found it
necessary to arrange the repairs for another vessel in his fleet — the
sThe Low Diary is a rare volume of the Buckley Collection at
the Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Both
a copy of the original in Low's handwriting and an easier to read
transliterated version are included here as appendices. Much of this
thesis concerning the Low-Rodgers Expedition draws from this diary.
Previously undiscovered, Low's Diary provides new insight into the 1871
expedition.
Ashuelat. As one might expect, Law spent the four days enroute to
Nagasaki performing routine diplomatic chores — writing dispatches,
letters, and noting the crew's activities. By the time the
Colorado anchored in the harbor of Nagasaki at 6:55 a.m., May
12th, the other four ships of the expedition were already there. The
purpose of their rendezvous and delay at Nagasaki was to resupply and
conduct mission briefings, after which they would continue on to Korea
as planned. Once in Korea, Low hoped to establish contact with some
local authority who might help him contact the king or someone else
sufficiently high up to discuss treaty particulars. Accompanying him
were Messrs. Drew and Cowles, his secretaries, and two Chinese
interpreters, one of whom was a Russian-Korean to assist in Low's
communications with the Koreans.
Low wasted no time reporting to Fish on the expedition's progress.
Vithin a day of anchoring in Nagasaki, Low sent a dispatch to Fish via
the American Consul there. Its content and tone must have been
perplexing to Fish considering it was sent so early into an expedition
which had been so long in the planning. In it, Low was simultaneously
optimistic and pessimistic. His optimism was clear from the fact all to
date was going smoothly. All the vessels and crew had rendezvoused
without incident; the admiral had gathered all possible geographic
information, maps and charts about Korea; and Low expressed his
confidence in the close cooperation of all involved to make it a
successful expedition.
But there was also an undeniably pessimismistic tone present in that
lirst message. He expressed an unmistakable conviction that the Korean
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authorities would attempt to undermine the mission's success, and he
flatly stated that any insults or injuries by the Koreans had to be
redressed by force. He was also bothered by the fact he was unable to
obtain the desired information about Korea, and alluded to Admiral
Rodgers' anxiety about the mission's chances of success. [Ref. 30: p.
115] Receipt of such correspondence from his minister before contact
had even been made with Korean authorities must have caused Fish
concern. The fact Low did not expand on the root cause of Admiral
Rodgers' "anxiety" must have also been unsettling.
But Low and Rodgers both had their reasons. Accompanying the
Americans on board the Colorado were five Koreans. Apparently in
need of assistance, these Koreans had been picked up at sea by the U.S.
schooner Spray, and then were eventually taken to Shanghai where
they were brought to the admiral's attention. As an act of goodwill, he
decided to return the Koreans to their country by way of the flagship.
However, the Koreans* reaction to this otherwise benevolent act
disturbed both Rodgers and Low. The Koreans were alarmed at the
prospect of being returned to their country in a foreign ship and were
convinced to do so would result in their harsh punishment by Korean
authorities. In fact, they were so alarmed, they could not eat. After
a soul-searching walk and talk with Low in the hills around Nagasaki,
Admiral Rodgers decided, in the best interests of the Koreans and the
expedition, that thev be discharged in Nagasaki to the care of Japanese
officials. [Ref. 34: May 14]
Their stay in Nagasaki (12-16 May) presented Low and Admiral Rodgers
with vet another unexpected development which was quite annoying ana,
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along with the many rumors already rampant, may have had the greatest
influence on later mistruths about the expedition. On the 15th, Admiral
Rodgers had engaged a photographic artist to accompany the expedition
and record it for posterity. That act, along with the many rumors about
the expedition's intent, brought a tide of American newspaper
correspondents clamoring to also win berths on the expedition. However,
the admiral and Low refused to allow any newspaper correspondents to
go. "One, a correspondent of the New York Herald, protested in a
letter to the Admiral at our decision, in terms more forcible than
polite." [Ref. 34: May 15] Could the reporters' indignation at having
been excluded from the expedition, along with the rumors already
rampant, have contributed to the expedition being branded "punitive?"
Did the snubbed reporters automatically assume their exclusion from the
trip equated to an intent to conduct hostile military operations? That
is now impossible to know. But the Sew York Herald did cynically
report on this "diplomatic" mission as "Our Little War with the
Heathen." [Ref. 23: p. 11] In any case, the expedition sailed from
Nagasaki on May 16th without any reporters.
As it sailed from Nagasaki, the fleet was an impressive sight. The
Colorado led the group, flanked behind on the starboard quarter by
the Benicla and astern by the Alaska. They, in turn, were
followed and flanked by the Monocacy and Pa las, forming a
double echelon. The weather and sea were perfect. [Ref. 34: May 16]
But an air of secrecy still surrounded the expedition. On the day
of departure from Nagasaki, the only crewmembers who actually knew the
final destination were the ship captains, whom Rodgers briefed the day
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before. CHef. 34: May 15] Operations security was very tight; all the
other officers on the expedition were uncertain where they were headed.
However, that uncertainty vanished once the fleet passed the island of
Quelpart (modern day Cheju Island), lying south of the Korean peninsula,
then headed northwesterly up the coast. At that point the only thing
that remained obscure was the exact place they would anchor. [Ref. 32: p.
80]
The voyage up the Korean coast was not as smooth as the leg between
Shanghai and Nagasaki. After the first day of good weather and smooth
seas, things got quite rough. Dense fogs, squalls, considerable seas,
difficult channels and problem tidal currents all made for slow
sailing. In addition to the common bad weather problem of seasickness,
the admiral suffered from food poisoning, and the Monocacy lost 20
feet of her guardrailing, as well as one boat stove, and had to proceed
ahead to the established rendezvous point near Ferrieres Islands in
order to effect repairs. Low and his staff busied themselves
identifying documents that might be useful in negotiations with the
Koreans and translating them into Chinese. [Ref. 34: May 17-19]
By May 20th, the fleet was starting to appreciate the limitations of
its maps and charts. Made by vessels venturing near this unknown coast,
in some cases years past, the charts accompanying the expedition were
almost useless. Other maps, provided by Admiral Roze, the French
commander during their 1866 incursions, were not much better. For one
thing, the French maps were nothing more than hasty surveys made under
near combat conditions. Furthermore, all the placenames and
geographical features bore Frencn names. It did not take Admiral
103
Rodgers long to realize these navigational aids were unreliable. [Kef,
32: p. 81] Consequently, he summoned the commanders of all the ships for
new instructions.
For reasons of fleet safety, from this point on the order of sailing
was to be reversed, with the smaller ships preceding the larger ones.
First would come the Falos, followed in turn by the Monocacy,
Benicia, Alaska, and the flagship. The treacherous fog and
uncharted waters they were now entering required continual soundings and
signals between the ships indicating water depth. The strategy worked
for almost a day. But the sailing was extremely slow. Eventually the
admiral ordered the fleet temporarily anchored while the Palos and
four small launches set out to ascertain definitely the channel-way and
the locations of any dangers lying in it. Hopefully the fleet would be
able to avoid any unnecessary misfortune in the uncharted waters. CSef.
34: May 20-23]
In addition to his naval instructions from Admiral Rodgers, the
commanding officer of the surveying vessels, Captain Homer C. Blake,
received very specific written diplomatic instructions from Minister
Low. In fact, Low had obviously carefully thought about all
contingencies. He provided Blake a sealed letter, written in Chinese
and addressed to the King of Korea. Low also sent John P. Cowles, Jr.
,
assistant Secretary of the Legation, as interpreter. These measures
were just in case Blake's party encountered some Korean officials.
Blake was to present the letter to them and request it be forwarded to
the Korean King. Of course, that request had to be proffered in just
the right way. To do that, he would simultaneously otter to deliver it
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to the King personally "if that was more convenient." This tactic was
thought to diplomatically provide the Koreans a choice of options.
Furthermore, to subtly ensure the letter was delivered to the court,
Blake was instructed to get the Koreans' acknowledgement, in writing, oi
their delivery promise and, if possible, get them to name the time and
place of delivery. [Ref. 30: p. 1181 However, what was to be done if the
Koreans questioned or otherwise challenged the Americans presence? Low
had also thought about that.
In conversations with officials, and in reply to the inquiries they
will probably make, you are at liberty to say that I am sent by the
President of the United States to arrange important matters with the
government of Corea, the particulars of which will be fully and
frankly made known when a person of suitable rank and station is duly
appointed to meet and confer with me. [Ref. 30: p. 118]
Naturally, Low anticipated that the presence of the warships might
introduce an element of distrust about the Americans' peaceful
purposes. He also had a answer if that came up.
If they ask why so many ships of war have come on a professedly
peaceful errand, you can reply that a minister of my rank does not
travel except in a dignified manner befitting his mission, with force
sufficient to repel attacks, and chastise all who may molest or
insult either the minister or the flag of the country he represents.
[Ref. 30:p. 1181
Not only was Low trying to leave very little to chance, he was also
making copies of all these instructions for later forwarding to
Washington. Was this just part of a cautious character or was he trying
to avert being blamed for a failure he suspected was coming?
By now the Koreans knew of the expedition's presence and were
discreetly monitoring its activities. In their Unofficial History, the
Koreans detailed considerable internal communications about the American
fleet. [Ref. 19: p. 751
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VI. THE LQV-RQDGERS EXPEDITION ARRIVES IN KOREA
While Captain Blake's "mosquito fleet" was out surveying, on May
26th Admiral Rodgers, Minister Low, Captain Nichols and Mr. Pickings
landed on Eugenie Island and spent several hours there. Other than some
pleasant landscape and flora, the only other thing found worthy of note
was a piece of a tobacco pipe, which was of obvious foreign
manufacture. Low assumed it had been dropped there by some French
officers who had been there on a survey mission in 1867.
Curiously, this landing party encountered no native Koreans, despite
the fact there was some evidence Koreans had recently been in the area.
Knowing the fleet had been watched and fallowed by some native observers
ever since land was first sighted, Low postulated two reasons to account
for their lack of face-to-face contact thus far. First, the locals
might could have an innate fear of punishment by the government if
caught dealing with foreigners. This would be totally consistent with
the behavior he observed by the five Koreans on board the Colorado
on the way to Nagasaki. From what Low had learned thus far about Korea,
this was the hypothesis he probably favored. Secondly, it was possible
the Koreans equated the visiting Americans and their heavily armed
vessels with the French and their hostile actions of 1866. Whatever the
reasons, Low was convinced contact and communication in Korea was going
to be very difficult. [Ref. 34: May 241
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A. INITIAL UNOFFICAL CONTACTS
Still, Low was hardly deterred. During the next few days, while the
mosquito fleet continued its surveying, he decided to personally attempt
some contact with the local population. The first day of overtures met
with little success. Taking along Mr. Drew, Lieutenant Commander
Wheeler, and the Russian-Korean to do the translating, Low started out
in one of the remaining steam launches for a sail near some Korean
junks. When the Russian-Korean attempted to hail the Koreans on board
the junks, he met with no answer. The second day, however, was more
promising. The same group headed for a hamlet on one of the nearby
small islands. There, through his Korean interpreter, Low managed to
hold a conversation with them on various matters. But they were
peasants and really could not provide him with the kind of information
he sought.
Just the same, Low considered the encounter worthwhile. For one
thing, the locals appeared to be letting their curiosity overcome their
fear of foreigners. Perhaps this provided the minister some
encouragement that there was indeed some chance for meaningful
discussions later. Just as important, he was happy to discover the
expedition's Korean interpreter had no trouble communicating with the
local Koreans. Prior to this encounter, that had apparently been of
some concern to Low. His Russian-Korean was originally from the
northeastern part of the kingdom, and no one had been quite sure if his
countrymen farther south spoke the same dialect.
Returning to the Colorado, Law met with more encouraging
news. Part of the survey party had returned, and the men reported tney
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had met considerable numbers of Koreans, most all of whom appeared
friendly. Several notes, written in Chinese, were given to the
surveyors, inquiring where they came from, what they were doing in
Korea, and when they were leaving. These notes were from the local
Prefect of Namyang, named Sin Ch' olgu, and constituted the first formal
communications between Minister Low and the Korean government. While
such pointed questions seemed natural enough from a people unaccustomed
to seeing foreign visitors, there was one encounter, however, with a
group of non-friendlies. They tried unsuccessfully to hit one of the
survey boats by rolling stones down a hillside. CRef. 34: May 25-26]
The American diplomat was encouraged by these contacts and did not
demonstrate much concern for the stoning incident. The next morning he
sent Mr. Drew and his Korean interpreter to the point where the Koreans
had given them the notes of inquiry. With them Low sent a memorandum,
in the Chinese language, consisting of what he considered a diplomatic
response to all the Koreans' questions. In it, Low stated the purpose
of the Americans' visit and requested he be permitted to see some Korean
officials equal to his own rank. The news Drew brought back after
delivering the note appeared even more encouraging, and started Low
wondering whether he was actually dealing with some lower officials
rather than simple peasants. On shore, Mr. Drew enjoyed a very cordial
conversation with the locals, a few of whom expressed a desire to come
aboard the flagship. CRef. 34: May 27] By now, Low's personal
intimations carried an entirely more optimistic tone from that
previously expressed in his diary and the diplomatic message from
Saga sail i.
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The next day the mosquito fleet returned again with precisely the
news Low and Admiral Rodgers were hoping for. The vessels had completed
their survey and found plenty of water near the Isle Boisee (the
name the French gave Kangwha Island) where the whole squadron could
anchor. [Ref. 34 .-May 28] Furthermore, Mr. John P. Cowles, whom Low
directed accompany Blake as interpreter, provided the minister an
extensive and informative report on everything he had seen. He told of
a sampan ferry between Isle Boisee and the mainland that made as
many as twelve trips a day; 200 Korean troops in colorful dress;
double-masted junks as large as 80 tons; being watched every step of the
way by both troops and curious villagers; the apparent poverty of the
people; and more. Curiously, he noted he saw no guns mounted on the
walls of the dilapidated fortifications, although it was simply assumed
the Koreans must have had gingalls (a large musket fired from a rest)
there. Perhaps most significant and encouraging were Cowles* overall
impressions of the Koreans' behavior he had seen.
. . . the surprised and excited, but soon pacified, conduct of the
islanders paints to no special influence or command from the court
authorities in this instance, but is rather the carrying out of the
traditional habit towards foreigners. It is therefore thought that
we shall meet the same surprised conduct in natives till we
eventually reach some place where special instructions have been, or
shall have been, sent down from court for our either peaceable or
hostile reception. [Ref. 30: p. 119]
After struggling for fourteen days against dense fogs, bad weather,
considerable seas, difficult channels, and problem tidal currents, they
arrived at what seemed a suitable base of operations. Their arrival






Photograph 1. The U.S.S. Colorado, the flagship of the Low-Rodgers
Expedition, at anchor off Kangwha Island, May 30-3 July, 1371.
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appearances downcoast and down river, and only served to confirm
Cowles' analysis of their behavior.
The squadron's arrival was viewed apparently with suspicion by the
fishermen. Whenever the steam launches came in the vicinity of these
fishing vessels while running their lines of soundings, the latter
fled precipitately to the shore. CRef. 32: p. 81]
But was their reaction actually one of suspicion? More likely it
was fear. The Taewon 1 gun's negative attitudes toward foreigners,
particularly Catholics, were well known throughout the kingdom. Perhaps
the people simply did not want to be seen with foreigners out of fear
they might be wrongly accused of cohorting with them by their own
officials. Whatever the case, the people watching the flotilla's
approach from a small island west of Kangwha Island acted similarly. "A
large number of people could be seen fleeing from the coast towards the
country taking many cattle with them." [Ref. 34: May 30]
Still, not everyone was afraid. Shortly after anchoring at
Boisee, a junk with four Koreans sailed out to the flagship. One
of the men on board the junk stood up waving a letter in his hand and
making motions for someone from the Colorado to come and get it.
Mr. Drew went off in a boat to meet the Koreans, boarded their junk, got
the note, and invited the Koreans on board the ship. In contrast to the
frightened peasantry, these Koreans appeared unafraid and did not
hesitate to accept Drew's offer. On board they talked at length with
Drew and Capt Nichols, saying three Korean officials, sent by the
government to inquire about the Americans' business in Korea, were
waiting at a place nearby. The Koreans bringing the note admitted they
were only messengers for the three officials. [Ref. 30: pp. 116-117]
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B. OFFICIAL CONTACT: MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING
The note they delivered confirmed their story. An obvious
acknowledgement of Low's earlier memorandum (May 27th), it purported to
be from three officials of the 3rd and 5th ranks who had been sent by
the King of Korea to meet and confer with Minister Low. CRef. 34 .-May
30] Its text set quite an amicable tone:
A day or two since, on the transmission of your honorable missive
from Namyang-bu, the Court for the first time recognized that your
honorable ships sent from America to enter our humble confines.
Whereupon the officers (who are the writers of this) were sent
forward to ask particulars (of your mission). Your vessels lie at
anchor out in the sea, and as ours are not used to going to and from
in the stormy waves, we remain temporarily on the seashore of
Inc'un'bu. We first make this announcement and wait for a few words
in reply. CRef. 19: p. 80]
Despite his earlier protocol decision to be flexible with this
relatively unknown culture and government, neither Low nor Admiral
Rodgers met with these first Korean visitors. Instead, Admiral Rodgers
had some of his officers show the messengers around the ship, regal them
with food, wine, and ale, and give them presents. The admiral even put
the photographer brought from Nagasaki to work photographing the
Koreans. CRef. 28: p. 22]
Were the Korean "messengers" sensitive to Minister Low's absence?
Although Minister Low no doubt thought he was adhering to proper
protocol, here was where he may have made his first of many mistakes in
Korea. Instead of readily accepting the opportunity to meet with these
first Koreans face-to-face, thereby possibly creating some initial trust
between the two sides, he may have instead unintentionally rebuffed
them. Said Low, " I returned a reply saying that my business would only
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be made known to a high official. Mr. Drew verbally sent an invitation
for the three officials to come." [Ref. 34:30 May]
If that initial rebuff did indeed disappoint the Koreans, they gave
the Americans no such indication. At 11:00 a.m. the next morning, May
31st, the three officials who sent the original note came alongside the
Colorado. However, unimpressed by their appearance and seeming
lack of credentials, Low declined to see them. Instead, he had Mr.
Drew, Mr. Cowles, and Lt Cmdr Wheeler meet with them. Mr. Drew, again
acting as Low's deputy, informed the Koreans that the Americans were
there on important business that would be made known only to a Korean
official of rank commensurate with that of the U.S. Minister.
Furthermore, Low had Drew express his wish that any high ranking
official coming before him have written authority from the King of Korea.
All told, the discussions with these first Korean officials were a
virtual replay of what transpired the day before. However, unlike their
"messengers," these three Korean officials were a bit more persistent in
gathering information. Whether they felt Law was intentionally snubbing
them is unclear. But there were signs the encounter was becoming a bit
strained. When they pressed Mr. Drew to see Minister Low and Admiral
Rodgers, Drew brought attention to their low rank and simply told them
an audience with Minister Low was impossible. When the Koreans pressed
on, stating they had seen the letter Low sent the King from Peking and
that the King desired no treaties, Drew dismissed their statements,
telling them propriety demanded such discussions wait tor a higher
official to broach them with Minister Low. [Ref. 34: May 31] After being
cordially shown around the snip, the Korean aiiiciais departed leaving
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the Americans with an uneasy feeling — especially Low. But he could
not quite put his finger on the reason for his uneasiness.
No one quite knew how to "read" the Koreans. They did not always
appear pleased with the Americans, such as when Low declined to speak
with them. But that is understandable. In effect, after inviting them
to come out to the ship, Low was now sending men sent by the King with
whom he purportedly wished to treat away without seeing them. It hardly
seems the right way to make a favorable impression on the Koreans.
Certainly the Koreans would think twice about accepting another American
invitation.
But the Americans had other important reasons to feel uneasy about
what had transpired. As might be expected, yesterday's Korean
messengers had already debriefed the officials on what transpired the
day before. Consequently, under normal circumstances, Low's latest
"snub" probably would have had only a minor affect on what was to
follow. But the damage of Low's "snub" was magnified by the Americans'
critical ignorance of Korean customs and behavior which eventually
helped doom the expedition to failure. At Low's direction, Drew
continued to inform the Korean officials that a surveying party would
soon be proceeding towards Kangwha. The Korean officials were asked to
send word up river [the Han] requesting no one molest the survey vessels
lest there be trouble.
Here Low made a critical mistake, although the Americans were not
prepared to recognize they were doing so. Vhat stood out was that the
Koreans never actually objected to anything the Americans said or
proposed. In his report to the Secretary of State, Low described the
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Koreans' lack of objections as "tacit assurances." [Ref. 30: p. 117]
Yet, intuitively, he obviously was uncomfortable with their silent
responses to what might potentially be points of contention. Quite
bluntly, Low admitted he placed little confidence in oriental
professions of friendliness. "Every effort will be made to avoid
trouble, unless forced upon us in a way that cannot be escaped without
dishonor." LRef. 30: p. 117] Low's words now seem more prophetic than
even Low might have imagined. From that point an, things deteriorated
rapidly.
But how might Low's accepting the Koreans' lack of objections as
"tacit assurances" be termed a critical mistake? From an American
perspective, Low and Rodgers' rationale for surveying upriver was quite
sound. This was apparently as far as the Colorado, Alaska, and
Benicla could safely proceed. Only the Honocacy and Palos
were thought small enough to go to Seoul without significant risk, but
even they would have to take advantage of the tides and accurate
surveying to do so. Furthermore, the Americans paid the Koreans the
courtesy of informing them of American intentions. Do need and
diplomatic courtesy constitue a mistake? Not really.
But thinking the Koreans' silent response constituted granting the
Americans' requests and accepting their assurances of peaceful intent
was presumptuous, if not pure cultural ignorance. A cultural feature of
Korean behavior and language that has often caused misunderstandings
between our two peoples is how Koreans agree and disagree with someone.
If they agree with you, they enthusiastically reply "yes." If they wish
tc acknowledge what you say while reserving tneir personal opinion and
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declining to agree, they will still answer with "yes," although it will
be noticeably lacking in enthusiasm. What Low and the others did not
know in 1871 was that if a Korean responds to a proposal with silence,
then he is politely telling you that your proposal is so unacceptable
that it does not even warrant a response.
The American's polite notification of the Koreans that armed survey
boats would be proceeding upriver is precisely the type of statement the
Koreans would respond to with disagreeing silence. Korean law expressly
forbid foreign vessels to progress beyond certain "water-gates." It was
not a negotiable point. The cultural misunderstanding that took place
as a result of that one American request and Korean lack of response
marked the beginning of irretrievable mistrust and a focusing on
divergent national interests.
That night there was another Korean response they had not seen to
date, and its potential significance was not lost on the expedition's
war-smart veterans. The Koreans set beacon-fires on every hilltop
visible from the anchorage. "It recalled the days of old when the
approach of the great Armada of Spain was announced from the hilltops by
beacon-fires to the people of old England...." [Ref. 32: p. 811
C. THE FIREFIGHT: MISUNDERSTANDING TURNS TO CONFLICT
The next day, June 1st, was to prove quite fateful. It began calm
and pleasant enough, with Admiral Rodgers organizing another survey
expedition to proceed up river beyond Kangwha. This was the survey Low
had Drew warn the three Korean officials about when they were an the
flag-shio the day before. This new grouo of survey vessels consisted of
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the Monocacy, under the command of Commander McCrea, the Palos,
under the command of Lieutenant Commander Rockwell, and the four
previous steam launches commanded by Lieutenant Commander Chester,
Lieutenants Meade and Totten, and Master Schroeder. The officer in
charge of the entire survey expedition was again Captain Blake who
commanded from the Palos.
As had been his habit from the beginning, Admiral Rodgers went to
great lengths to ensure his men understood their mission was a peaceful
one. From the day they left Nagasaki, he continually briefed this to
his officers. In organizing this latest survey mission, he clearly
instructed his men "to proceed in a peaceful manner, avoiding in all
ways of giving offense, and making no attack unless attacked by the
Coreans." [Ref. 34: June 1]
However, the battle-seasoned admiral was not about to let his men
become cannon fodder. If attacked without provocation, they were
ordered to return fire and destroy the place and people from whom the
attack originated. On the point that force should be met with force,
Admiral Rodgers and Minister Low were in full accord. Nevertheless,
they also agreed that any such response on the part of the Americans was
to be from the vessels only. No landing was to occur. Instead, after
responding to hostile fire, the vessels were to quietly continue their
survey. The survey's limits were established at a few miles up the Han
River toward Seoul, at which point the vessels were to return to the
anchorage. If approached by Korean officials, Captain Blake still had
the letter Minister Lew had given him far the first survey mission, and
Mr. Cowies went with Blake as interpreter. [Ret. 30: p. 121]
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Although the Korean officials the day before had provided Rodgers
and Low what the two men regarded "tacit assurances" the American
surveyors were in no danger, the admiral took nothing for granted. He
was well aware his French charts showed these vessels would be passing
the main Korean forts guarding the waterway to Seoul, and he had too
much combat experience to dismiss Captain Blake's opinion that "In ten
minutes we shall have a row." [Ref. 28: p. 23]
Departing the anchorage at noon, the survey went about its task
peaceably — at first. As might be expected, the smaller steam launches
proceeded in advance of the gunboats. The banks on either side were
high and thickly wooded, easily concealing anyone who might be watching
them. Here and there they passed an occasional village or rice field,
and numerous island forts. Eventually, they approached the lower end of
Kangwha Island. There a long line of earthworks and fluttering yellow
flags came into view, as well as large numbers of white-clad Korean
troops. Through a telescope, John Cowles, the interpreter, translated
the Chinese characters on the largest of the yellow banners as
indicating a Korean General officer was in command of the Korean forces.
CRef. 28:p. 23]
Unfortunately, two heavily-armed warships accompanied by
howitzer-equipped steam launches did not look like peaceful American
intentions to the Koreans. Remember, too, the Korean officials visiting
the Colorado the day before gave what they believed was their
unequivocal nonconcurrence concerning this survey. Since 1866 when the
French attacked Kangwha Island, these garrisons had had standing orders
to attack any iareign vessel proceeding beyond their stations.
121
Upon rounding a sharp bend on the river, a place the French called
Fort du Conde, eighty masked Korean batteries on both sides of the river
opened fire on the American vessels. There were some 200 discharges of
the Korean cannon, however, their timing was poor and their aim worse.
They fired long before the American vessels came into range. [Ref. 32: p.
85] But the Koreans' firing was totally ineffective. Their cannon were
of relatively small caliber, limited range and fixed to mounted
positions incapable of following a moving target. [Ref. 28: p. 233 They
used some heavy guns, but for the most part gingalls, large muskets
fired from a stabilizing mount. [Ref. 34: June 1] Immediately, the
Nonocacy and Falos returned fire, and quite effectively considering
the Monocacy's eight-inch shells. Three of the launches (one
lagged behind a mile due to a slight accident) joined in with their
howitzers. [Ref. 30: p. 124]
But the conditions mitigated the job the Americans wanted to do —
or so they thought at the time. The tide was at its peak, the current
swift, the dangers of the channels unknown, and the river too narrow.
It was not exactly the kind of situation the Americans wanted themselves
in. Suddenly, the Americans found themselves approaching a high bluff
on the river, upon which was some type of citadel fortification. Their
counter maneuvering before reaching the citadel was a testament to their
skills and presence of mind. They all dropped their anchors to swing
them around with the head of the vessels facing the incoming tide. [Ref.
32: p. 84J There they leisurely shelled the forts and nearby ravines,
where many of the Koreans had already fled. [Ref. 30: p. 124] It was not
apparent at the time, but it may have been during this swing-arouna
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maneuver that the Monocacy was damaged by striking the submerged
rock that knocked a hole in her bottom. [Ref. 34: June 1]
The vessels now got under way again and returned to the place where
the firefight had orginated. As soon as they were in range, they opened
up with heavy fire. [Ref. 32: p. 84] But on this second round, their
shells drew no response; the Koreans had already fled. As they drew
closer, the Americans noted the Korean cannon and guns. Mr. Cowles
described them "nearly as thick together as gun to gun, and gun behind
gun on the floor of an ordnance store." [Ref. 30: p. 124]
The whole engagement only lasted about ten minutes. Miraculously,
other than the Monocacy' s collision with the submerged rock, there
was practically no damage to the American vessels. Better yet, no
Americans were killed, and the only two wounded were slightly so — one
by the recoil of a gun on the Falos and the other by a piece of a
shell. [Ref. 34: June 1]
The Koreans, however, were not so lucky. In fact, for them the
firefight was disastrous. Korean prisoners captured during later
operations reported the preliminary fighting killed "not a few" of their
countrymen and wounded "many tens" more. The Korean troops were also
seen fleeing from their guns and abandoning the fortifications. [Ref.
32: p. 84-85]
Still, Captain McCrea judged the damage to the Monocacy too
great to continue on with the survey according to instructions. He
opted instead to return to the anchorage and report what had taken
place. The whole survey expedition returned safely by 5:30 p.m. [Ret.
34: June 1] Most of the men came back as disappointed as they were
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Droud. They would very much have liked to land at the Korean general's
deserted fort, "spike" the Korean guns, and bring back the general's
flag. CBef. 30: p. 124]
Meanwhile, reverberation of the firefight could be heard ail the way
back to the anchorage, and naturally caused a great deal of excitement
and anticipation. When Captain Blake returned and informed Admiral
Rodgers and Minister Low what had happened, the two men were totally
enraged. Admiral Rodgers called together all the men involved in the
survey expedition to discuss exactly what happened. At the same time,
debate raged among the senior staff concerning what the American
response to the Korean attack should be. Admiral Rodgers wanted
immediate retribution. So did Minister Low.
D. DIPLOMACY SOURS
Paradoxically, the man who so dutifully argued for and worked for a
year to make treaties with Korea was now incensed and advocated sweeping
retaliation for the Koreans' attack.
I gave it as my opinion that although the Navy gained a substantial
victory yesterday, it would not do to withdraw without seeking
retaliation, for if we did the Coreans would construe our victory as
a defeat which would be damaging to the prestige of our Government
both here and in China. I advised that, if the Admiral considered
his force adequate, that a sufficient number of men. . . would be
able. . . to land at the point where the vessels were attacked
yesterday, and effectually destroy the enemy's works, guns, etc.
After that was done the force should move on up taking and destroying
all the forts on both sides of the channel as far as the north end of
the Island of Kanghwa. [Ref. 34: June 21
The Admiral, no doubt calling an the calm his combat experience
provided him, subdued his immediate outrage and decided to carry out
only the first part of Law's suggestion. After that was accampi isned,
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then he would decide upon any further operations. Although he initially
opted for the strike to occur the following morning (June 2nd), Captain
Blake and Commander McCrea convinced him it was better to postpone the
attack until neap (high) tides in about six to eight days. For purely
tactical and safety reasons, they wanted their men to be able to take
advantage of more favorable tides. The deeper neap tides would allow
the landing craft to get closer to shore and help them avoid troublesome
rocks on the uncharted Korean shores.
Low had no problem with the delay. In fact, he quite agreed,
reasoning the delay would give the Korean government ample time to
reconsider its actions, disavow them and apologize for the attack. Low
felt that was perhaps the only hope successful negotiations now had.
CRef. 34 .-June 2]
However, Low's appreciation of the possible advantages of delaying
retaliation did not arrest his outrage or his pride. During the two
days fallowing the attack, he transmitted his sentiments to the
Secretary of State. No doubt conscious of his previously expressed
pessimism, Low appeared similarly interested in ensuring he or his lack
of enthusiasm could not be blamed for the Koreans' action.
That the [Korean] attack was unprovoked and wanton, and without the
slightest shadow of excuse, must be as apparent to you [Fish] as it
is to me; for all our operations hitherto have been conducted with
the greatest caution, in the hope that the assurances of our peaceful
intentions, which were sent to the court from Peking, supplemented by
similar protestations here, and coupled with an absence of all
ostentatious show of war, would so fully persuade the government of
our good faith that the result aimed at might be accomplished witnout
the use or even the display of force. [Ref. 30: p. 122]
At this point, it became obvious Low had abandoned any hope of
negotiating treaties or anything else with the Korean government.
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Perhaps now he felt it was time to stop dutifully pursuing another man's
groundless dreams and let practicality dictate his course. Whatever
Frederick Law's true motivations were, it is plain the previous day's
attack provided him ample opportunity to bare his true feelings.
The events of yesterday convince me that the government of Corea is
determined to resist all innovations and intercourse with all the
power at its command, without regard to nationality, or the nature of
the demands made; and that all overtures will be treated alike,
whether they look to the opening of the country and the residence and
the trade of foreigners, or whether they are confined, as I have
endeavored, to securing humane treatment for our unfortunate
countrymen who may be thrown by the perils of the sea upon these
shores, whose safety and welfare depend, under present circumstances,
upon the magnanimity of this semi-barbarous and hostile race. [Ref.
30: p. 122]
To Low's credit, he was able to look beyond the immediate effect of
the Korean attack and impending American response to see some possible
long-term consequences. Fully aware of the strains in Sino-European and
Sino-American relations, Low feared that America's failure to redress
the wrong it had been done yesterday might eventually encourage more
anti-foreigner sentiment and action back in China. At the same time, he
was painfully aware Admiral Rodgers did not possess a force sufficiently
large to compel the Koreans to enter into proper treaty arrangements.
Although he suggested to Secretary of State Fish that the Americans
could stay until they received additional instructions from President
Grant, it was clear Low no longer had any intention of taking the
initiative on Korean-American relations. [Ref. 30: pp. 122-123]
From the American perspective, all the above paints appear to be
well taken. Unfortunately Low's logic also reveals a terrible "tunnel
vision" which precluded him from understanding the Koreans' position in
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this whole affair. As someone who lived with and studied the Koreans
for decades, E.M. Cable summed up the Korean perspective nicely.
The presence of an alien armed force in the vicinity of a fortified
and prohibited zone of another country without its permission, and
with which the invading force had no treaty of any kind, was in
itself, a challenge to war. I maintain that the Koreans who fired
upon the American vessels were only doing their duty as soldiers
intrusted with the responsibility of guarding their nation's
gateway. They only did what soldiers of any civilized nation would
have done under similar conditions. CRef. 19: pp. 86-87]
In addition to executing their responsibilities, there is also some
evidence that the Korean soldiers never even received word that the
American ships were coming. Following the American ships' return to
anchorage after the skirmish, the Korean local authorities immediately
dispatched a message to the King by courier, reporting that:
Two sailing vessels with two masts have suddenly forced their way
into Sun-shih Passage. As this is a most important pass leading up
into the river, ever since the attack on our troops in 1866, we have
increased the guard, and done everything to make it secure: even our
own public and private vessels, if they have no river pass, are not
allowed to go through that way. How much less, then, can foreign
armed men-of-war, which have not yet apprised us of their intentions,
be allowed to go rushing about. . . The forces stationed in the Pass
accordingly opened their guns to prevent them going by. CRef. 35: p. 4]
But neither side appeared interested in understanding the root
causes of the altercation. All attention, American and Korean, was now
turned toward either preparing for or dealing with the retaliatory
attack. On June 3rd, Admiral Rodgers sent the Falos to Chefoo for
added provisions. He also sent a telegram to the Secretary of the Navy
detailing what had transpired thus far and formally asking for an
increase in force. [Ref. 34: June 3]
Curiously, at the same time Low also sent an interesting, if not
revealing, telegram to Secretary of State Fish. "My overtures at peace
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have been met by wanton attack upon surveying party. See admiral's
telegram to Secretary of Navy. Low." LRef. 30: p. 124] Despite its
brevity, the unnecessary longer routing (through Shanghai) and through
whom it was routed (George F. Seward) suggests Low wished to subtly
communicate much more than just what was in the text of the telegram.
Was this Low' s clever way of saying " I told you so?" Was Low already
looking around for people on whom he could conveniently blame the
expedition's failure?
The Koreans' "unprovoked" attack and the expedition's preparatory
delay introduced a whole new set of problems for the two sides. For one
thing, it took Admiral Rodgers and Minister Low's attentions away from
the real issue that brought the squadron to Korean waters — treaty
negotiations. Now, all their energies were being expended to
hypothesize, plan attacks, justify actions taken, and assess blame. All
the previous Korean-American contacts and any progress that may have
been made previously meant nothing now. Then there was the basic
problem of communicating. The Koreans could hardly approach the
Americans directly; they were at risk due to the Americans' superior
weaponry and outrage at the Korean attack.
The Americans were at similar risk if they tried to approach the
Koreans. Another Korean attack on American lives was almost a given.
Of course, the greatest damage had been done to the most basic element
of any cross-cultural contact — trust. Any misgivings or suspicions
the Americans already had about Korean sincerity were now exacerbated.
The Americans felt it was the Koreans' insincere "assurances" that
coaxed the survey party into a trap. Conversely, the Koreans leit tne
Americans irresponsibly sent their ships into the prohibited zone
despite Korean objections. What would it now take to make either side
believe the other's future assurances?
Only one of these complicated problems stood any chance of being
resolved — communication. Both sides commenced using what Low referred
to as the "post office." It was a stake placed on the beach at nearby
Guerriere Island, above the high water line. Each side would attach
correspondence to the stake, then leave so it could be retrieved by the
other side. The Americans used the stake during the day, the Koreans
during the night. While somewhat primitive, this method of communica-
tion was remarkably effective considering the hostile circumstances.
Use of this "post-attack post office" was initiated by the Koreans.
On June 3rd, the local general guardian of Foo-Ping prefecture sent the
Americans a note that Low considered "threatening in its character."
But perhaps it was not as threatening as it was philosophical and
revealing. By proudly recounting 4,000 years of Korean civilization and
emphasizing not only the distance between Korea and the United States,
but the two countries' cultural differences as well, the Prefect asked
the Americans why they simply could not go away and leave Korea alone.
Interestingly enough, he managed to integrate a vague allusion to the
General Sherman incident into his theme. Basically, he said
Commander Febiger had come asking questions about the incident, the
Koreans answered his questions, and Febiger went away. Now he was
asking these Americans to do the same. [Ref. 30: p. 130-1313
The prefect's allusion to the General Sherman was the first
time that tragedy had been mentioned during the expedition by either
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side. In the prefect's note there was a hint that the Koreans believed
retaliation, or at least more information gathering, for the General
Sherman was the whole reason the Americans had returned. Had not the
Koreans witnessed a similar French force come to retaliate in 1866?
Given the Korean mind's predilection for subtlety, the prefect may well
have been trying to tell Low something more than simply Korea prefers to
be left alone.
There is good reason to believe that this hint was lost on Low and
the other Americans. Granted, the prefect spoke of other things as
well. But in his reply to the Koreans, Low made no mention of, nor
allusion to, the General Sherman and gave no written assurances
that it had nothing to do with the Americans' return. Instead, in a
manner remarkably similar to the Commodore Perry precedent in Japan, he
replied with his own "threatening" note which boasted of American power
and perserverance, demanded a Korean apology for the attack on the
survey expedition, and set a deadline for a positive, if not
accomodating, Korean response. LRef. 30: p. 131]
From the American perspective, Low felt he was justified in his
handling of the affair. He actually believed his firm reply left "a
wide door open for negociation C sic] . " [Ref. 34: June 4] However,
in fact, by telling the Koreans they only had "five or six days for
peaceful overtures to come, after which the Admiral and myself would
feel at liberty to do as we pleased," [Ref. 34: June 4] Low put the
Koreans further on the defensive. Thus, the stage for a new battle was
set.
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Over the next few days, while the Koreans on Kangwha Island busily
prepared their fortifications, the Americans continually observed Korean
troop movements and reconnoitered the proposed attack area. The Koreans
were continuously drilling their troops, signalling each otner from the
hilltops at night, and they even made a makeshift attempt to cover the
road to Seoul. [Ref. 34: June 5] There appeared an almost continual
movement of Korean troops over the hills to the forts, causing the
Americans to surmise that the troops seen at different times belonged to
one and the same body of men whose movements were designed to create an
impression of great numbers of defenders. [Ref. 32: p. 87]
Interestingly, the Koreans paraded no field artillery. In fact, the
Americans could never spot more than three or four pieces of artillery.
[Ref. 34: June 53 Such observations lent little credence to the reports
heard in Nagasaki and Shanghai of the Koreans' splendid armaments.
Likewise, American preparations were also progressing at a rapid
pace. Admiral Rodgers devised a solid plan in which the battalions of
the different ships were combined into a formidable combat division
under the command of Captain H.C. Blake (see Appendix 3). Rodgers' plan
also wisely kept a sufficient force behind on each ship to defend
against a possible Korean attack while the main combat division was
absent
.
Nothing was left undone. The ships' mess facilities cooked rations
to last at least several days, and ammunition for all the weapons was
carefully packed for transportation on land. Boat assignments were made
for landing the division, and combat orders issued. [Ref. 32: p. 86]
Daily the men were assembled on the decks in martial uniform to go
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through various battalion drills. Low watched all this and could not
help but both admire and worry about the men he saw.
Battalion drill was gone through with which did great credit to bath
officers and men. Sailors are brave, the only drawback when they are
landed to take the part of soldiers being that it is hard to hold
them back and make them act together. Their bravery and recklessness
is the weakest spot in their characters. [Ref. 34: June 63
Perhaps seeing such enthusiasm on the part of naval personnel made
Low take some action on his own. ffoting a number of Koreans assembling
on the beach each day, he sent Mr. Drew and the Russian-Korean to talk
to these people. His intent was not to gather information, but rather
impress upon them that American intentions were not hostile. He wished
only to convince the commoners that Americans were quite peaceful if
treated civilly. Perhaps these people could then, in turn, talk to
their local government representatives and convince them. But that was
a fruitless effort. Most simply refused conversation with Drew and his
companion. Those who did talk with the Americans begged them to go
away, stating the Americans' presence stopped all fishing and labor and
hindered the poor from obtaining their daily food [Ref. 34: June 61.
Then on June 7th, the Koreans made direct contact with the fleet for
the first time since their attack on the survey party June 1st. At nine
that morning a junk appeared near the flagship. It was towed alongside,
and a messenger came on board with presents to Minister Low from Cheng,
the Guardian of Kangwha Prefecture and Ex Officio Governor and General.
The gifts consisted of some poultry and livestock (three bullocks, 50
chickens, and 1,000 eggs). The messenger also delivered to the
Americans two letters. [Ref. 34: June 7]
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One was a copy of a letter from the King of Korea to the Board of
Rites in Peking, referencing Low's letter of March 7th, sent to the King
through the board. Low had apparently left on this mission before it
could be delivered to him. Had Low read it before the expedition left
Shanghai, it is likely he would have cancelled the trip. For one thing,
it reiterated and expanded upon past communications about the General
Sherman, including how the vessel's crew had brought their misfortune
on themselves and how the Korean authorities and people had gone out of
their way to act civilly toward those who came inquirying (Shufelt and
Febiger)
.
The King also explicitly stated that two key policies of Korea made
Low's mission there useless. One of these concerned Korea's hardfast
policy to rescue and forward home shipwrecked crews. From the King's
perspective, this must have been an issue that counted heavily in his
argument. Korean regulations in regard to shipwrecked foreign vessels
were very generous. Any foreign vessel in distress was to be aided, and
assistance given in making repairs necessary for departure. It was also
formal government policy that shipwrecked crews were to be fed and
clothed and sent home. There was even a government office, called
Hong-che-won, specifically responsible to see to it that the relief of
shipwrecked mariners was properly conducted. The existence of this
policy was well supported by numerous examples of crewmen who had been
well taken care of and sent overland to China ior return to their own
countries ERef. 36:p. 66]. Because all this was provided for by
existing laws, it was unnecessary to make a iixed arrangement between
the two governments. The other policy was on the issue of trade. On
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this the King stated his policy in terms the Americans should have been
able to understand. Korea was tired of being repeatedly pestered with
applications for commercial trade. It was an issue Korea considered
"entirely out of the question." CRef. 30: pp. 133-135] Unfortunately,
too much had now occurred to base any action on the King's old
correspondence
.
At this point, any change of plan depended solely on how Low and
Rodgers might respond to the contents of the second letter, which was
from Cheng, the same high official who sent the presents. Cheng
obviously wished to bridge the schism between the two countries caused
by the attack on the survey vessels. However, he felt it equally
important that the Americans appreciate the Korean position.
The barriers of defense of a country are important places, within
which it is not allowable for foreign vessels to make their way
[without some previous understanding]. This is the fixed rule of all
nations. Hence it was the ascent [of the river] to the sea-gate by
your vessels the other day that brought on the engagement between us,
which, as you say that your intentions in coming [to this country]
are good, it is much to be regretted should have occurred. On the
arrival of your vessels, the court warned the civil and military
authorities along the coast to avoid most carefully anything which
should cause trouble or arouse ill-feeling, yet when your honorable
vessels, not considering the fixed regulation of another country,
penetrated its important pass, how could the officers, appointed to
guard [the closed portals of] the frontier, whose duty it is to take
measure of defense, calmly let it go by as of no consequence? Pray
do not then be offended at what occurred. [Ref. 30: p. 132]
The Ex Officio Governor and General went on to explain, as did the
King in his letter, that the non- intercourse of Korea with foreign
nations is a principle without exception, and one which has been adhered
to for more than five centuries. "We cannot dicuss and cannot settle
that which the honorable envoy desires to discuss and to settle,
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whatever it may be. Why do you then wait for a high official to meet
you?" CSef. 30: p. 132]
From the Korean perspective, Cheng was making a peace overture. He
sent his men out to the ships offering gifts of poultry and livestock.
In his letter, he apologetically explained it was immutable national
policy to fire on boats progressing too far up the Han River, just as it
was also established policy not to have intercourse, diplomatic,
commercial or otherwise, with foreigners. While he regretted the attack
occurred, he still wanted Low to understand why it occurred and why it
was unavoidable. Culturally speaking, this was what, in fact, amounted
to a Korean apology. Were it not so, then such a high official as
Cheng, an Ex Officio general and governor, would never have gotten
involved, and he certainly would not have gone to the trouble of
ferrying livestock out to the fleet, procuring a copy of royal
correspondence, and so diplomatically explaining the incongruities of
Korean policies and American intentions.
The American response revealed not only how divergent U.S. and
Korean positions on the issues were, but also just how bullheaded the
Americans could be. The Americans' emotional outrage that the attack
occurred was quite impervious to Korean explanations of deep-rooted duty
and unchangeable policies. Likewise, they knew too little about Koreans
and their behavior to recognize the face-saving subtleties of a Korean
apology. Consequently, "Rodgers angrily denounced the governor's
message as 'insulting.'" CRef. 31: p. 721 Low, too, chose to interpret
Cheng's statement as a formal government approval of the Korean attack
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and a warning that there will be a similar result if any other attempts
are made. [Ref. 30: p. 128]
By their subsequent refusal of Cheng's gifts and an ultimatum that
just three or four days yet remained to conduct peaceful negotiations,
Low and Rodgers did more than miss an opportunity to understand the
Koreans and avoid conflict. They insulted the Koreans and put an end to
the possibility of any peaceful resolution of the existing dilemma.
Jfot surprisingly, the remaining time before the American action on
Kangwha Island passed without any more communications between the two
sides. Preparations on board the ships were now frantic. Admiral
Rodgers was busy finalizing his plan of attack and anxiously awaiting
the return of the Falas from its supply run to Chefoo. It
returned the evening of June 8th with fresh provisions for the fleet, as
planned. [Ref. 34: June 8]
On June 9th, Admiral Rodgers' plan was set, and he issued the
appropriate orders. The abjective of the incursion was simple — to
take and destroy the forts which had fired on the American survey
vessels, and to hold them long enough to demonstrate the Americans'
ability to punish such Korean offenses "at pleasure." To accomplish
this, the attacking force was to consist of the corvettes Honocacy
and Falos, the four armed steam-launches, and 20 armed launches
and boats to convey the men. The landing force of 651 men were to be
conveyed to the combat area by the corvettes, then ferried to land by
the boats and armed launches. The landing force was arranged into ten
companies of infantry and seven pieces of artillery. Another 105 men
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would be standing by supporting them on the vessels involved, making the
total number of men taking part in the operation 759. [Ref. 19: p. 91]
Once at the selected anchorage point, the vessels were to shell the
forts thereby drawing out the Korean soldiers occupying them. After the
enemy was driven out of the fortifications, then the boats were to make
the landing, covered and supported by the armed launches. Rodgers
intended for the force to withdraw in approximately 22 hours. But his
own combat experience prevented him from indiscriminately restraining
his men to that timeframe. If they thought they could hold a given
position indefinitely or if holding it gave them some unanticipated
advantage, then he was prepared to allow them this discretion. All they
had to do was communicate their desires to him via steam launch. [Ref.
30: p. 135]
But there was a new problem on the eve of battle. The passion of
their original indignation at being attacked by the Koreans had to a
large extent subsided, and there were definite signs of discord among
the Americans. The fighting on June 1st was spontaneous. Danger was
upon them, and there was only time to react and be courageous. But
after a week or so, emotion was not so high. Sundry activities like
letter writing turned men's thoughts to such things as family and
purpose and doubt. Low also admitted having second thoughts.
As the time draws near to start [the attack] I observe a change in
tone and appearance of most of the officers. They are not as eager
to go as they were the day after the last fight. Time has been given
for reflection, and their passions have cooled. They have counted
the passible loss and gain, and I fancy the latter is not likely to
prove much in any event. . . They undoubtedly say to themselves and to
one another what are we risking our lives for? Is Corea worth a
single life? [Ref. 34: June 9]
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No doubt Admiral Rodgers, with his extensive war experience, had
seen this happen many times before. Apparently, he had also dealt with
it. He shared his professional commitment with his senior officers and
expected them to share same with their men.
The only object sought by the expedition to this country is to make
such a treaty as the minister has been instructed by the [U.S.]
Government to secure, if he may; and you will therefore take
advantage of any overtures which may be made toward peace, if they
shall seem to you to offer a reasonable opportunity of attaining the
ends which the Government has in view.... [Ref. 30: p. 135]
In this respect, the admiral and the minister were again in accord. In
his instructions to Mr. Drew to accompany Captain Blake as his
interpreter, Low told Drew:
As the abject of my visit to Carea is to open negotiations with a
view to making a treaty, this fact should be kept prominently in
view; and the admiral has so instructed Captain Blake. The naval





Saturday, June 10th, the day set far the landing, finally came.
Early that morning the boats were lowered from the ships and the
battlion equipped. After breakfast, at about 9:30 a.m., everyone took
their positions for the mission to begin. The Monocacy, the
Palos, and the four steam launches started out soon after 10:00
a.m. The late morning departure was designed to enable the landing
party to reach its destination soon after the tide began to ebb, and
thus facilitate a safe landing. CRef. 34: June 10] The Palos was
tawing twenty longboats packed with the landing party, weapons
(Remington breech- loading carbines and howitzers), and other
miscellaneous supplies. In addition to its normal armament, on the
Monocacy were also mounted two nine- inch guns from the
Colorado to increase the effect of its pre- landing bombardment of
the forts. [Ref. 28: p. 72]
Advance up the river was led by the Monocacy, which was
flanked by a steam-launch on each bow. The Palos followed with
its caravan in tow. Upon nearing Primanguet Island, the landing
expedition was approached and hailed by a Korean junk carrying a white
flag. One of the American officers in one of the steam-launches
received a letter from the junk and delivered it to Mr. Drew. It was
another letter from Cheng. As far as the landing expedition was
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Map 1. Kangwha Island, Korea, where the Low-Rodgers Expedition engaged
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Basically, It merely reiterated the issues Cheng had already spelled
out, and he rejected any blame for what had thus far transpired.
There was, however, one very interesting statement in his letter
that, though totally unrelated to the impending U.S. -Korean fighting,
was quite worthy of comment: "... the violent and lawless Ch' oe Nanhyon
(Rev. R. J. Thomas) who came in her [the General Sherman], himself
brought on the destruction that occurred. It was not our people who
maliciously commenced it." [Ref. 19: p. 92] This mention of Thomas was
the Koreans' first detailed information of the actual circumstances
surrounding the destruction of the General Sherman. Offered at
another time under other circumstances, the Americans may have been able
to insightfully pursue that information and reach some valuable
understanding of the Korean perspective. Unfortunately, passions were
too high; they were on their way to a battle and did not have time to
contemplate such things.
No sooner had the Monocacy rounded a point .and disappeared
from the flagship's view than she opened fire on the lower forts. [Ref.
34: June 10] The initial bombardment lasted for almost two hours. Most
of the Korean garrison quickly fled, and when the shelling finally
ceased around three o'clock, the landing party made a dash for the
beach. All went well except a portion of the battalion was landed on a
mud flat below the lower fort, impeding their progress considerably.
Their howitzers sunk in the mud to the hubs, and even the infantry found
it difficult to move. [Ref. 19: p. 93] The few Koreans remaining behind
after the bombardment initially took advantage of the Americans' who
were easy targets while they were Dogged down in knee deep mud.
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But the Monocacy did a superb job of protecting the marines by-
providing artillery cover. [Ref. 35: p. 11] Consequently, the Koreans
could not sustain their attack on the mud-bound marines for long.
Vatching the Americans continue to advance and eventually gain solid
ground, the Koreans hastily abandoned their stations and disappeared
into the surrounding woods. The Americans quickly took possession of
this lower fort, which the French had named Fort Du Conde, secured it,
and reconnoitered the surrounding area. [Ref. 32: pp. 89-90] Once the
fort was secured, they efficiently destroyed everything of military use,
rolling the guns into the river and destroying the Koreans' military
supplies. [Ref. 19: p. 93]
Meanwhile, the Monocacy continued upstream to bombard the
middle fort. In contrast to the action downstream, this time the
Koreans responded with their artillery. But their aim had not much
improved since their first clash with the Americans on June 1st. Damage
to the American vessels was minimal, and the Monocacy continued
pounding the fort until nightfall. The Palos, which had been
dutifully fallowing the Monocacy to provide it any necessary
support, suffered a fate similar to that of its sister ship on June 1st;
it ran aground on an unseen rock. Not until the following day did she
manage to free herself, gashing a whole in her hull and taking water in
the process. [Ref. 28: p. 72]
By nightfall, the battalion at the lower fort was already in
bivouac. Artillery had been posted in positions capable of sweeping all
possible approaches to the camp. The flanks were protected by the
Monocacy and Falos. By now the Americans knew better than
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to underestimate their foe. They were quite prepared to give a "warm
reception" to any Korean night attack. CRef. 32: p. 90]
While no attack ever came, around midnight there were some anxious
moments. Marine Captain Tilton, commanding Company I, reported that
shots were being exchanged, and that enemy troops were forming in the
woods opposite his front. Hundreds of Korean troops approached the camp
howling, beating drums, and firing some rounds. Thinking this may
indicate some sort of assault, the Marines answered the ruckus with some
artillery shells. This quieted them quite quickly. Apparently
convinced they had no chance of success, the Koreans did not return that
night. CRef. 28: p. 72 and Ref. 32: p. 90]
Kimberly, commander of the land farces, took advantage of the
episode to call a midnight council of war. A consensus was reached on a
number of points. First, any future battalion operations must be
swift. Any unnecessary delays might result in unnecessary losses.
Secondly, any subsequent lighting with the enemy should be to the
finish. Any advantages incurred should be pursued relentlessly, and no
rest was to be given to the enemy. The enemy's retreat was to be the
battalion's pursuit. CRef. 32: pp. 90-91] Commander Kimberly closed the
war council with these memorable words: "We will fight to a finish. It
is to be a war upon the foe after the most approved modern methods and
to spare nothing that can be reached by shot, shell, fire, or swara."
[Ref. 19: pp. 93-94] The doubts and questions plaguing the Americans the
previous night had vanished.
Meanwhile, back at the anchorage there was anxious concern. No word
of events on snore had come to the flagship. There were also same
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anxious moments. In the evening a Korean junk came alongside the
Colorado, Was it some sort of assault force or diversionary
tactic? Were the Koreans suing for peace? The Americans could not be
sure.
Cowles eventually went on board to investigate and found ten Koreans
who said they were Catholics looking for three French priests whom they
had been expecting. Hearing that a foreign fleet had arrived, they
presumed the priests took advantage of the opportunity and came along.
They came to determine whether any priests were on board, and, if so, to
put the junk at their service to take them anywhere they chose. After
some extensive questioning, Cowles was satisfied they were telling the
truth. He invited them on the ship where the Americans planned question
them further the next day. CRef. 34: June 103
The appearance of the Korean Catholics and the sincerity of their
story was somewhat of a morale boost for the Americans and renewed their
faith in the expedition's purpose. Viewed with suspicion when they
first arrived, quickly the Americans came to have great respect for
these Christians. Low, in particularly, was profoundly impressed with
the zeal and religious enthusiasm which had moved these peasants to run
such risks. Surely the fleet was being watched, and to be seen
approaching it in peace while their countrymen were locked in combat
with the American landing force would certainly result in death upon
their return. Low was equally impressed with the power the Roman church
was thus able to exercise over what he considered such an alien ana
ignorant people. [Ref. 30: pp. 124-125]
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Vhile the Korean Catholics quite openly talked with the Americans
about anything, the only reliable information they were able to provide
was what they had personally observed. In that regard, they gave the
Americans little help regarding the current lighting.
From a much larger perspective, however, Low deemed them
invaluable. First, he considered them a relatively accurate barometer
of the great discontent among the general populace which he blamed on
the "tyrannical conduct" of the government and local authorities. They
reinforced Low's suspicions that the only law in Korea was the will of
the officials, and told him summary executions were the universal
penalty for violating an official's will. Low concluded that perhaps a
majority of the Korean people desired overthrow of their government and
would join any movement foreign nations might make to accomplish it.
The Korean Catholics also provided the Americans valuable information
about the principal cities and their relative importance. [Ref. 30: pp.
124-125]
But Low felt the most important information the evening visitors
provided concerned the General Sherman. One of the Catholics
affirmed he lived near the scene of the incident and was perfectly
familiar with the whole episode. Low was convinced what the Korean
Catholic told him was true.
He says the people on board the schooner were enticed on shore by
fair promises of civil treatment and trade, were entertained and
treated to drugged spirit, during which they were fallen upon
suddenly, seized and bound and all massacred. Some were beheaded,
and the others were beaten to death with clubs. The cargo was taken
out, and the vessel burned to get the iron used in her construction.
They further say that the cannon found on board were taken out and
sen- to the capital, from which patterns were made and guns
manuiactured. This story was told in a plain straightforward manner
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without undue questioning. On the contrary, the interpreter
endeavored to obtain a voluntary statement of the General
Shermanaffair, in order to test the good faith and truthfulness of
these people. It corresponds so nearly with the account given by the
French priests at the time, that I consider it more entitled to
credence that the report of the officials made to the commander of
the Shenandoah or that to the Board of Rites, Peking. [Ref.
30:p. 125]
What made Low believe this story? The fact that it was told him in
a straight face? Had he not already found the Korean Catholics'
statements could not be relied upon unless they had firsthand knowledge
on the subject? Did residing near the General Sherman incident
mean the man saw it happen, or simply that someone else — perhaps a
French Priest — told him about it? That would certainly account for
the congruency of their stories. What might explain his change of
residence? Could the Korean Catholic's negative feelings toward the
anti-Catholic Taewon'gun and his anxiousness to escape the religious
persecution have motivated him to tell the Americans distorted version
of the General Sherman incident? Then again, did the immediate
circumstances and Low's personal attitude toward the Koreans at that
time impair him from objectively determining the credibility of the
Catholics' story about the General Sherman? Was it unreasonable
to assume the visitors would tell the foreigners anything they seemed
receptive to listen to? Vhy did Low not recognize the obvious
incongruencies between the Koreans' stated deceptive approach toward the
General Sherman and what he personally knew of their approach with
this fleet? Could the Koreans not have tried the same tactic? If they
had copied the General Sherman' s guns, why were the guns now
tiring on the Americans at Korea's most important water-gate so
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antiquated? More than a century after the fact, these questions are
impossible to resolve. Whatever the case, Low believed their story
because he had his own reasons to support its validity [Ref. 30: pp.
125] Between the visitors and the fighting, no doubt he retired for the
night with a great deal on his mind.
B. DAY TWO
On Sunday, June 11, the second day of the incursion, the Americans
met with great success. When the Konacacy resumed its shelling at
dawn, the sound of its great guns could be heard all the way back to the
Colorado, Meanwhile the battalion started marching down the road
in back of the fort. As a precautionary measure, a small detachment of
men were detailed into the bordering woods to guard the main farce's
left flank against surprise attack. The roads followed were narrow and
muddy. By 6:30 a.m., the battalion reached the second fort, which they
fondly named Fort Monocacy. It had already been shelled by its
namesake, and the enemy had already fled without firing a shot.
Apparently, the ship's bombardment caught the Koreans by complete
surprise; their morning breakfast was still boiling in the stew-pots.
[Ref. 32: p. 91] Their surprise was confirmed by what else the Americans
found left behind — sixty loaded cannons, all brass breechloaders with
two- inch bores. Kimberly detailed some men to dismount the guns and
roll them into the river. [Ref. 28: pp. 72-73]
The Americans also set fire to all the fort's buildings that they
judged might be used for military purposes. Regrettably, that lire
reread to and destroyed an entire village north of the fort [Ref. 32:p.
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91] . While this was an unintentional development, it certainly did not
facilitate the reconciliation Low hoped might come after the fighting.
Nor did it enhance the American image in subsequent Korean histories.
Their jab finished at the middle fort, Kimberly's men headed
straight for the main fort, Fort du Cande. The Americans nicknamed it
"the Citadel," and it was by far more formidable than the forts already
taken. It sat high above the river where the channel elbowed several
miles away, with 143 mounted guns. It was garrisoned by the elite of
the Korean army — the "Tiger Hunters," men whom were all sworn to fight
to the death. The huge yellow "General Commanding" banner flapped in
the wind. CRef. 28: p. 73]
The march to the Citadel was as formidable as anything the landing
force had yet faced. The undergrowth along the way was dense, and
several time they had to halt while the pioneering division cut down
bushes to widen the trail or perform other necessary work. They also
had to transverse steep hills, ravines, and wide marsh areas. The
weather was intensely hot, with a burning sun. Several fainted or
became ill from the heat and exhaustion. [Kef. 32: p. 91]
By the time Kimberly and his men neared the Citadel, the
Monocacy had already been shelling the fort for hours. Now, by
prearranged signals, the gunship was also in a position to provide other
cover and support for the battalion as it advanced. However, in order
to get those signals to the ship, Kimberly had to take a nearby hilltop
position on which the Koreans were already entrenched. It was no
problem. Lieutenant Commander Silas Casey and his force, after some
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skirmishing and the aid of some howitzer rounds, seized the hill
position. This proved as much a morale boost as it was a tactical coup.
From this position, which overlooked the entire field of operations,
the military advantages were evident at a glance. [The Koreans']
blunder was hailed as an indication that there was lack of strategy
among their officers. How much that encouraged the attacking
[American] column can be judged better from the advantage which was
taken in the movement made immediately against the upper forts along
the river, where the other half of the Korean army had been placed.
[Ref. 32:p. 92]
In other words, seizing this hill cut the Korean army in half. The
thousands of Korean troops who might have easily reinforced the "Tiger
Hunters" inside the Citadel now faced American howitzers should they
decide to reclaim the hill.
It was a blunder not lost on the Koreans. No sooner were the
American guns in place than the Koreans massed their forces and charged
the hill. But the American howitzers shattered the charging Koreans.
Realizing the howitzers made it impossible for them to mount any
effective attack, the Koreans withdrew and left a clear field.
Moving the rest of his men into this position, Kimberly ordered
Lieutenant Commander V. K. Wheeler to hold the hill at all costs.
Entrenchments were also erected on the hill, later proven a wise move
when Koreans attempted two assaults later in the day. With Wheeler's
men positioned to defend the hill, the remainder were free to assault
the Citadel. In preparation, Kimberly set up a temporary headquarters
on a prominent ridge between his divisions. From there he could easy
observe ail his forces' movements. Kimberly also had the forethought to
order Lieutenant Commander Winfield Scott Schley to bath lead the actual
assault and take Kimberly' s command if he became a casualty.
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By 12:35 p.m. the Americans were busy making final preparations.
Canteens and cartridge boxes were filled, bayonets fixed, and perhaps
some prayers said. The Artillery Division commander, Lieutenant
Commander Douglass Cassell quickly seized one last knoll commanding the
road into the Citadel, and all was ready. [Ref. 32: pp. 92-93]
Knowing the American assault was imminent, the Koreans withdrew
their men in the rifle pits in front of the fort into the interior. The
Citadel had also been joined by enemy retreating from the lower forts as
the Americans advanced. At this point, Commander McCrea on the
Manocacy opened a merciless cannonade that lasted for over an
hour. Eventually, the Korean cannons in the fort no longer returned
fire. Instead, the enemy chanted some sort of solemn battle song or
dirge.
Some of the [American] men to whom this battle was to be a sort of
baptism of fire were a little disturbed by the solemnity of the weird
song, but when reminded that 'barking dogs rarely bite,' took a new
determination for the fight which followed, desperate as it proved.
[Ref. 32:p. 93]
For Kimberly, the Koreans' song was the cue. As he signalled the
Monocacy to cease fire, Casey directed his men to line up for the
assault. At 12:40 p.m., Casey ordered "Charge at double quick!" The
battalion stormed the Citadel amid a storm of projectiles, musket fire,
and cannon. Fortunately, for the Americans, the cannon fire sailed
harmlessly over their heads; the Koreans were unable to move their fixed
cannon and, thus, take proper aim. [Ref. 28: p. 73]
Inside the Citadel, the fighting was fierce and intense, almost all
of it hand-to-hand. But the Korean swords and spears were simply no
match tor the Americans' carbine rifles and cutlasses. The defenders
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fought tenaciously, and it was only after their men had been piled up
after several bayonet charges and their quarters were on fire that the
survivors fled for the cliffs and the road leading down to the river.
Among those not killed in the American assault, many jumped to tnelr
deaths off cliffs above the river bank. Others were cut down by
Cassell's men overlooking the road or were shot or drowned when they
jumped into the river trying to escape. To avoid capture, some, like
the Korean general, slit their own throats or silently suffered living
cremation in the burning buildings. [Ref. 32: pp. 93-94]
By the time the battle was completely finished, five forts had been
taken and everything in them destroyed. All together, about 250 Koreans
had been killed in combat, 180 of whom died in the assault on the
Citadel alone. The Americans had captured fifty Korean flags, including
the huge yellow banner of the Koreans' commanding general. They also
held about twenty Korean prisoners, all wounded. Among the Korean
materials rumaged through for potential intelligence gain were numerous
books, manuscripts, orders and other miscellaneous documents which, in
addition to being interesting, enabled the Americans to better
understand the attitudes and actions of the Korean government. American
losses stood at just three killed and nine wounded. [Ref. 34: June 11]
The dead were Lieutenant Hugh McKee, the first man into the Citadel (the
Americans later renamed the Korean fort Fort McKee), S'eth Allen, a Navy
landsman from the Colorado, and Dennis Hamahan, a marine private
from the Benicia. Allen and Hamahan were buried somewhere on






Back at the anchorage, everyone was quite anxious about the success
of the mission. Low and Captain Nichols spent much of the day on board
the Benicia, from which they could see the Citadel from her main
deck. At noon they had received word via telegraph that American farces
had taken the lower fort. Within a couple of hours they saw the
billowing smoke coming from the assault on the Citadel and took great
pride is seeing the American flag replace that of the Korean general.
At that point, Admiral Rodgers and Minister Low's anxiety was
replaced by confidence and pride that their men were victorious. By
four o'clock, a boat from the Palos had returned to the anchorage
with valuable information about the incursion. Upon learning of the
degree of their success and the casualty assessment, Admiral Rodgers
concluded those results were good enough and ordered the whole
expedition return the next day. CRef. 34: June 11]
Kimberly and the landing force hardly rested on their laurels. In
the short time they had remaining at the Citadel, he and his men took
full advantage of the opportunity to learn from what had happened.
Carefully examining the dead Koreans, the division surgeon found most of
the fatal wounds were above the hips, forty of which were found in a
heap where they had fallen after being shot in the head as they looked
over the parapet — a credit to American marksmanship and their
Remington breech- loading rifles.
By contrast, examining captured Korean weaponry revealed ail the
rumors in Shanghai and Nagasaki were just that — rumors. The Koreans
did not oossess one modern gun among them. Their immobile brass cannon
were antiquated, and they had no reliable small arms. In fact, the only
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"small arms" they did have were "Jing-galis, " which took two men to
carry on their shoulders and was touched off by a match! [Ref. 35: p. 14]
On the other hand, the Koreans fought with desperate courage. Even
when their weapons failed them, they still resisted by every possible
means. They threw stones down from the parapets, met the Americans with
spear and sword, and, if they became disarmed, even tried to throw dust
in the opponents' eyes to blind them. Most heroically died at their
posts without fear. Those who left their posts did so only after they
were totally overwhelmed by superior force. One rumor later made the
rounds that one of the prisoners told the Americans the King threatened
that if the Citadel was lost, then every person on Kangwha would be
beheaded [Ref. 35: p. 123. Nevertheless, the Americans came away from
the Citadel with a healthy respect for their Korean foe. "The men of no
nation could have done more for home and country." [Ref. 32: p. 95]
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VIII. AFTER THE BATTLE
The morning of June 12, the incursionary force left the Citadel with
a profound sense of accomplishment and pride. Every Korean gun in the
forts had been dismounted, every storehouse destroyed, and every
magazine blown up. When the Koreans returned they would not be able to
forget the Americans had been there for a long, long time. Better yet,
as far as the men were concerned, the presumed Korean insult to the
American flag in their attack of June 1 had been fully avenged.
When the Konocacy and the Palos arrived at the anchorage about
noon, it must have been a sight to behold. All the returning officers
and men were aboard the two ships, with the other launches and boats
empty and in tow. Captured enemy flags and banners were everywhere.
Everyone aboard the Benicia, Alaska and Colorado were cheering the
returning conquering heroes. CRef. 34: June 12]
A. THE EFFECTS ON THE AMERICANS
That same day the Americans regrouped to consider the events of the
previous two days. They were quick to acknowledge their luck. All
agreed, it was the superiority of their small arms and artillery that
saved them from disaster. With modern arms and artillery the Koreans
could have stood up against equal numbers from any country. The
Americans were now estimating the total Korean dead at more than 300,
although the formally reported figures stood at the earlier repartee
figure of about 250. They stopped counting and did not even try to
estimate ail the wounded. No one belittled the Koreans' courage.
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They were, however, puzzled at the Korean rationale for not using
the thousands of Korean troops they knew to be in the immediate vicinity
to reinforce the Citadel forces. Granted, the Koreans were aware of the
superiority of the American weapons, but the fact they kept such a huge
force back while so many of their brave countrymen were being overrun
was somewhat interesting. Considering another problem their critique of
the landing revealed, it was also probably the greatest single stroke of
luck the Americans had.
That potentially disastrous problem concerned the fleet's
ammunition. Throughout the landing excursion it was reported that large
numbers of small arms cartridges in the field did not go off. Marine
Captain McLane Tilton reported this to Admiral Rodgers who, in turn,
ordered an examination of all the fleet's ammunition. Considering the
combat they'd just been through, the result of the board of inquiry was
frightening.
... we found on one ship that only eight out of a hundred
would go off, on another only fifty out of a hundred, and on another
only forty out of a hundred were good for anything! [Ref. 35: p. 16]
The problem was eventually traced to ammunition packed in paper
boxes vice the more traditional wooden boxes. A sizable portion of the
fleet's ammunition was packed that way. Captain Tilton found that those
copper shelled cartridges packed in paper, particularly those marked
"Frankford arsenal 1869," had a tendency to oxidate in the fuminate
cavity. In almost all samples, he found substantial amounts of what
looked like rust at the bottom of the shell cups, and in many cases, ne
discovered the tinned surface of the cup entirely gone. [Ret. 35: p. 21]
Had the thousands of Koreans massed beyond range an Kangwna island
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decided to come to the aid of their beseiged brethren inside the torts,
the result of the landing may have been disastrously different for the
Americans.
Another surprise development in the course of this evaluation
session was the appearance at the "post office" of an evening note from
the Prefect of Foo-Ping-Foo. In it was some colorful language which Low
dismissed as the pouting of someone whipped badly. [Kef. 34: June 12]
But Prefect Yi also revealed much of the Korean perspective of what had
transpired since the Americans arrived in Korea.
Looking at it now, we can know this much for certain: under outward
profession of friendship you cherish false and deceitful designs. To
come to your landing, and thoroughly displaying your force of
committing public buildings to the flames, burning cottages, stealing
property, sweeping up everything to the veriest trifle. These are
the actions of thieves and spies. CRef. 19: p. 102]
At this point, all the fighting was over. However, the same could
not be said of the expedition. Low felt it was his duty to at least
attempt to bring the Koreans to negotiate. Part of the strategy was a
show of humanity. The Americans went to great lengths to care for the
Korean wounded they brought back to the ships and decided to do
everything possible to get them back to their own people safely. Later
the wounded were transferred to a Korean junk without incident. Low
also tried to send another dispatch to the King. In it, he made it
clear he considered the Americans' insult of June 1 had been redressed
and the United States was now ready to reopen negotiations with the
Korean government. These overtures did nothing more than start several
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request his dispatches be forwarded to Seoul. The Koreans saw no reason
to do business with a diplomat prone to such high-handed tactics.
By June 20th, Low's personal and professional frustrations were
undeniable.
I am convinced that further delay will serve no useful purpose. I
have, however, little hope of bringing the King to any proper terms.
Everything goes to prove that the government from the first
determined to reject all peaceful overtures for negotiation or even
discussion; and that the recent demonstration [the incursion], which
would have produced a profound impression upon any other government,
has little or no effect, favorable or otherwise, upon this
[government]. The operations of the 10th and 11th were more
significant than those of the English and French in 1858, when the
capture of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho River, caused the
government of China to immediately send ministers and conclude
treaties at Tientsin, and yet this government shows no sign which
leads to the belief that there is any change in its attitude of
defiance to all other nations. [Ref. 30: p. 129]
Meanwhile, morale on the ships was declining rapidly. On June 19th,
there was a mass court martial for the trial of sundry offenses of the
petty officers and crews of the squadron. Furthermore, reports about
Korean activities on shore certainly did nothing to heighten American
spirits. It was obvious the Koreans had learned from their defeat and
that, if used again, the Americans' previous tactics would not be so
successful.
Low's morale was also badly shaken. After sending his June 20th
message to the Secretary of State, he was profoundly questioning his
mission's purpose, viability, benefit to both countries, and eventual
likelihood of success. He came to the conclusion that the only way
Korea could be brought to terms was to occupy the capital and capture or
drive off the King. Knowing Admiral Rodgers did not have tne farce to
do that. Low decided to £ive up trying and push for withdraw from
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Korea. Without telling anyone, he prepared a letter to be sent to
President Grant upon returning to China. In it, Low reported on the
Korean situation, as he saw it, and deferred any decisions about
Korea-related actions to Washington. [Ref. 34: June 16-21]
B. THE EFFECTS ON THE KOREANS
After all that had happened, the Koreans were not about to believe
the Americans' declaration of friendly intent. They also made it quite
clear, by their sacrifices on Kanghwa Island and the Prefect's no
nonsense verbage, they were resolved to resist further contacts no
matter what the price. The Koreans had already been observed making
repairs to the Citadel which appeared to lessen the chances of another
American rout should the two sides resume fighting.
Capt. Blake reported to me today that from his ship the Coreans could
be distinctly seen engaged in repairing the fort where they met great
defeat. Capt. Blake thinks they have learned a lesson which will be
of great advantage to them and damaging to any nation that undertakes
to conquer this country. Like the Chinese the people of this country
only prepared to defend one side. In the construction of their forts
the rear is universally left unprotected. Attacking the forts in the
rear with a land force evidently created surprise and disarranged
their plan of defence. If Capt. Blake is correct in his observations
they are constructing works in the rear of the fort, which if true
will render it much more formidable that it was before. [Ref. 34: June
19]
C. GOING HOME WITH HONOR
While Low finally realized the futility of his mission and its
"gunboat diplomacy" tactics, Admiral Rodgers was still making the fleet
available and had already brought over a resupply ship to ensure the
fleet's readiness. Low was anguishing over how to send the expedition
nome honorably. On June 23 he sent this message to the American
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Consul-General's office in Shanghai via the resupply ship for relay to
Washington:
Recent demonstration produced no effect on negotiations. Nothing can
be effected short of capital [referring to Seoul]. Force
insufficient to go there without great risk. If peaceful measures
fail shall withdraw and wait instructions. [Ref. 34: June 23]
But what Low really felt was not in his message to Washington.
I have now little hope and no expectation of being able to bring the
government to discuss any matter, much more to enter into any kind of
a treaty... So far as I know there [is] no officer of any prominence
in the fleet who thinks it prudent to undertake farther offensive
operations with the force now here. [Ref. 34: June 24]
Now the Americans just waited, partly to prepare to return to China
and partly hoping the Koreans might change their minds and make some
overture. While Low and Admiral Rodgers were busy writing summary
dispatches to the State and Navy Departments, morale continued to
decline. One of the expedition's officers wrote home:
... we are heartily sick of this place. . . Corea is as lonesome a
place as any we have been to during our cruise. . . . Our mission to
Corea has been a perfect failure; they won't have anything to do with
us [Ref. 35: p. 16]
Little else of note happened during this time. Then on June 30, a
German man-of-war, the Hertha, came near the squadron. The German
Lieutenant that came aboard informed Low and the Admiral that his vessel
had just come from China where rumors were already circulating that the
Koreans sunk three of the American ships and "the others were hemmed in
with little chance of escape." The commander of the Hertha
thought the story absurd but took it upon himself to render what help
might be necessary. Needless to say, this did little to improve
American morale. [Ref. 34: June 25-303
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Finally, on July 3, the entire squadron set sail to return to
China. An uneventful crossing, they made port at Chefoo on July 5th.
By July 10, rumors about the Low-Rodgers Expedition were running rampant
in Shanghai. Stories of Korean victory were everywhere. The Shanghai
newspapers criticized Admiral Rodgers and Minister Low for their
withdrawal from Korea before receiving instructions from Washington.
Low was quite sensitive to what he felt was all the undue criticism,
especially since he found himself faced with writing to Secretary of
State Fish to explain why the mission failed. It was only fitting that
his July 6th dispatch to Fish focused on three basic themes. First, the
Koreans never wanted intercourse with any of the foreign powers, and
they would do everything within their power to resist such intercourse.
Secondly, neither he, Admiral Rodgers, nor anyone else on the expedition
did anything to cause their mission to fail. Instead, Low believed the
Koreans laid a trap for the Americans which demanded a military
response. In his message, he emphasized that the fleet's ten day delay
provided the Koreans ample opportunity to admit their mistake and open
talks with the Americans. Finally, Low was concerned about the impact
the failure of America's Korea initiative might have on Western
relations throughout northeast Asia. In his thoughts are found a true
concern for overall U.S. national interests in that part of the world.
That Corea will not voluntarily make any arrangements by which these
rights can be secured is settled beyond a doubt. The question now
is, whether western nations will permit this unhappy condition of
things to continue, or whether active and efficient means will be
adopted to correct existing evils. In determining a policy for the
future, the influence which the attitude and action of Corea will
exert upon China and Japan should not be lost sight of . . . It is not
likely that ray statement of the actual facts [of what transpired in
Korea] will be received and accepted as correct by the imperial
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government of China; that while we failed to accomplish what we had a
right to hope for and expect in the matter of negotiations, we
suffered no defeat at the hands of the Corean armies, but that, on
the contrary, we inflicted great injury upon them for their
unprovoked assault. But even if successful in this, it will exercise
little influence upon the officials that are naturally inimical to
foreigners, or the people.
The Corean government will exult over the fact that it is able to
keep foreign nations from entering its territory, and prevent their
ministers from communicating with its high officers.
This will react upon China, and prevent further concessions being
made. It will also furnish additional arguments to the anti-foreign
party, who insist upon the right and duty of China to expel all
foreigners. .
.
As the case stands, foreign governments should decide either to
let Corea alone, and allow her to burn, pillage, destroy, and
massacre all that come within her reach without question or demand
for redress, or organize and send such a force as will be able to
insure success, without unnecessary risk, in breaking down the
barriers that stand in the way of intercourse. No further efforts at
conciliatory negotiation should be made, nor should mere
demonstrations of force be attempted in the expectation that
favorable results will follow.
They will serve no useful purpose, and be likely to end in harm.
Every fresh attempt and failure to accomplish practical results in
Corea only tend to render the situation in China more insecure. .
.
And every year that the Corean government is allowed to continue in
its exclusiveness, increases the peril to the lives and property of
foreign residents in China. If no adequate measures be taken to
avert the impending storm in the East, the result will, I fear, be
disastrous. CRef. 30: pp. 146-147]
Perhaps the most interesting revelation in Low's summation was his
linkage of the expedition's failure to Jenkins and the ill-affect
Jenkins and Oppert's irresponsible actions three years before had on
U.S. policy in the Far East.
I also feel bound to say that the consul-general's [George Seward]
informant [Jenkins] fabricated, for ulterior and base purposes, the
information embodied in the dispatches referred to [which eventually
resulted in the expedition] . There is no reason that it contained
the least shadow of truth; on the contrary, evidence is most
conclusive that there never was anv intention on the part of the
jovernment of Corea to offer an apology or alford the least
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reparation for what I am now convinced was a great outrage upon the
persons and property of citizens of the United States. All the
evidence obtainable goes to prove that the government of Corea was
and is determined to maintain its original status — non- intercourse
with any Western nation, and hostile resistance to all attempts of
foreign governments to establish relations for whatever purpose.
ERef. 30: pp. 143-144]
In Low's opinion, it was clear the expedition should never have
taken place. Although he would change his mind somewhat in the months
to come, his initial honest assessment was that it had accomplished
nothing except hardening Korean resolve and hurting the credibility of
the United States and other Western nations in the Far East.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Researching the people, events, and circumstances surrounding the
General Sherman and the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871 has
certainly been challenging, revealing, and enlightening. The challenge
is the same for most any research. Finding sufficient resources,
keeping them in perspective, properly interpreting the events and
motivations of the central characters, and discerning possible hidden
influential factors are never easy. This has been especially true in
the case of chronicling and understanding the General Sherman and
the Low-Rodgers Expedition. Here are two events, very different in
nature and separated in time and place, yet also intricately related.
Each is inseparable from the other.
In the past, resource materials on both events have been very thin,
especially for the General Sherman. Too often,, they have
apparently been inaccessible to those who have need of it, and far too
many have painted the wrong picture of both events. For example, the
General Sherman' s crew was neither helpless nor innocent, and
retaliation for the ship's destruction and the crew's murder played no
part in the Low-Rodgers Expedition. If anything, most accounts of the
General Sherman and the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871 have done
little more than prove Will Durant's observation that "most history is
guessing, and the rest is prejudice." [Ref. 37: p. 121
Some historians, like E.M. Cable, obviously did a better job of
accurately chronicling ana interpreting both events. Cable made
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extensive use of American diplomatic correspondence, especially
concerning the Low-Rodgers expedition. Thanks, too, in large part to
his superb command of the Korean language and knowledge of Korean
culture, he was able to present a reasonably unbiased version of the
Korean side of both events. But despite the fact that Cable's was by
far the most extensive account, there was still something missing. By
his own admission, there were disturbing gaps. "The fleet remained at
Boisee Island sixteen days after the return of the punitive
expedition from Kangwha Island. It would be interesting to know
exactly what transpired during these days." [Ref. 19: p. 102]
Vhile Cable looked at the General Sherman and the Low-Rodgers
Expedition extensively, he mistakenly neglected other events, people,
and circumstances that may have had a profound impact on both. Nowhere
did Cable or anyone else attempt to find some lessons from these two
events and how such lessons might illuminate some present problem or
provide guidance for today's judgments or policies.
This thesis has attempted to fill in some of those gaps and examine
some other peripheral yet influential events. If that effort has been
reasonably successful, what can be concluded?
In terms of their stated purposes, both missions were failures and
their actions at every stage left much to be desired. Likewise, given
the circumstances spawning them, it is not difficult to understand how
distortions grew up around both events. It now appears certain the
General Sherman was not always loyal to its trade mission, nor
was the 1871 expedition out for pure revenge. Both were doomed from
the start.
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A. THE GENERAL SHERMAN: SELF-ASSURED DESTRUCTION
All told, the destruction of the General Sherman and the
killing of its crew are easy to understand. In fact, it would have
been much more difficult to explain had the General Sherman
succeeded. From a historical perspective, there was never any-
reasonable chance for success.
The primary factor in the General Sherman's guaranteed
failure was Korea's traditional distaste for foreigners and its policy
of relative isolationism. Korea's profound aversion to foreigners was
well known throughout East Asia, and it was not simply the whimsical
policy of some past monarch. On the contrary, to Koreans it was the
pragmatic answer to the very real problems of national defense and
survival. For centuries, Korea had been known as the "Hermit Kingdom,"
and its history of frequent and savage invasions, as well as pirate
raids on its coasts, made such a policy quite attractive.
Strategically situated between China and Japan, Korea was also in a
unique position to observe the cultural damage caused by foreign
encroachments into both its neighbors. The appearance of foreign
warships and their demands, as well as the expansion of a foreign
religion — Catholicism — only reinforced Korea's disdain for things
foreign, providing the government a convenient scapegoat on which to
blame its domestic troubles. The year the General Sherman
arrived Korea was right in the middle of one of the worse Catholic
persecutions in its history. The fact that the Koreans' principle
contact on the General Sherman was a foreign missionary (Reverend
Thomas) wno aggressively chastised them for tneir persecution or
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Catholics, spoke poor Korean, and dealt with them deceitfully, just
added a few more negatives to the failure equation. But that was not
all.
Korea was still basically a Confucian society with a committed
Confucian, the Taewon'gun, heading the government. In a Confucian
society business and trading are endeavors of relatively low repute.
Selling its cargo for profit was the General Sherman's stated
purpose. Several other foreign trade missions had tried before and
failed; there was no precedent for such foreign intercourse in Korean
history. There was simply no reason to assume the government would be
receptive to the arrival of the General Sherman.
Furthermore, much of the General Sherman's crew — Chinese
and Malays — were the very kinds of men the Koreans associated with
the country's frequent coastal pirate raids. Such circumstances hardly
bred an atmosphere of trust or receptiveness.
Consider, too, the ship's formidable cannons and guns, its
audacious progression inland on the Taedong River — despite numerous
warnings of government policy forbidding foreign vessels inland — and,
finally, the crew's kidnapping and thievery. Is it any surprise the
people became enraged and resorted to mob violence?
But, since there were no survivors to provide a firsthand version,
are the Yi Dynasty Annals reliable as the primary account of what
happened to the General Sherman in Korea? In all fairness to the
Koreans, they are. First, the Korean historical account is very
detailed. Therein it gives considerable information that a contrived
account would be sure to omit. Examples aoound: the ineffectiveness 01
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local officials in dealing with the General Sherman problem; the
resignation of a government official out of embarrassment due to his
own government's seeming impotence in dealing with the foreigners; the
Seoul government's slow response to the locals' call for help; the
military's reluctance to take aggressive action; the success of a few
vigilantes after the Korean military failed to rescue the hostages; the
General Sherman crew's initial success in thwarting the Koreans'
attempts to destroy the vessel. When governments falsify records, they
tend to make themselves look better than this.
There is also other reasonable support of the account depicted in
the annals. The story about the General Sherman provided
Shufeldt by the Korean locals during the United States' first fact
finding mission in 1867 supported the official Korean version of the
event. Their story is even more credible when you consider Shufeldt
was asking his questions of the common people at a considerable
distance from where the destruction and killings took place, and that
Korean officials refused to discuss the matter with him. It is also
important to note that Shufeldt' s pre-mission fact finding efforts
helped him reach pretty much the same conclusion — that the General
Sherman crew was probably at fault — before he sailed for Korea.
On behalf of the General Sherman, there is no evidence that
its original intent was anything more than trade. Its weapons were tor
a cautious self-defense, not aggressive operations. More likely, its
crew was at first overzeaiously committed to doing business, then, out
of frustration and fear, lost control of the situation. It is quite
conceivable that the kidnapping of the Korean colonel may have been a
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spontaneous act that, once the deed was done, the Americans and
Europeans simply decided to try to use it to their advantage. If so,
as the outcome attests, it was a tragic decision.
In the final analysis, the General Sherman was simply an
entrepreneurial venture incapable of dealing with the certain risks and
probable outcomes that awaited it. Its tragedy comes not in the fact
that there were too many "unknowns," but that the "knowns" went
unheeded.
B. THE LOW-RODGERS EXPEDITION: GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY
Whereas the General Sherman mission was entrepreneurial in
nature, the purpose of the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871 was
essentially virtuous. Its primary task in Korea was to make a treaty
ensuring the protection and humane treatment of shipwrecked sailors.
Anything else, such as commercial intercourse, was deemed secondary and
nonessential.
There was also marked contrast between the two missions in the
areas of planning and makeup. Whereas the General Sherman was
shoddily planned from the beginning, the Low-Rodgers Expedition was in
the making for over a year. It also enjoyed many other benefits the
General Sherman did not: the experience of two previous U.S.
fact-finding missions to Korea (Shufeldt and Febiger); U.S. government
sponsorship; adequate linguistic support (the "Russian-Korean" and
Chinese translators); logistics support between the Korean anchorage
and Chefoo; the French maps and charts of the area from the incursion
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in 1866; and by every measure — numbers, weaponry, and command and
combat experience — superb military support.
The Low-Rodgers Expedition also enjoyed a sense of future vision
that the General Sherman did not. Minister Low firmly believed
that Korea's strategic location between China, Japan, and Russian
Manchuria made the opening of Korea an American imperative. At the
same time, Low tempered the mission with guarded pragmatism. He fully
appreciated the constraints under which the expedition would be
proceeding and openly shared his lack of optimism in its chances for
success with his superiors. Low also understood the Korean penchant
for procrastination and was quite prepared to wait for a response in
Korea for some time.
But if there was all that preparation, support, and commitment, why
did the Low-Rodgers Expedition fail? Vhy all the fighting? Cable
points out that, in terms of the fighting, the Low-Rodgers Expedition
was an unqualified success. He notes the American units swept and
destroyed everything before them, citing Admiral Rodgers' report that
five forts were captured, 50 Korean flags, 481 pieces of artillery were
taken and more than three hundred killed. [Ref. 19: p. 113] Cable is
also quick to attribute the expedition's failure to immediate causes.
. . . the efforts of the mission to negotiate the desired treaties with
Korea were frustrated by the unfortunate attack upon the vessels sent
out by Admiral Rodgers to survey the upper channel of the river and
the subsequent military reprisal of June 10th to the 11th. [Ref. 19:
p. 114]
To his credit, Cable appreciates the Korean rationale ana
perspective far the initial attack on the U.S. survey boats,
acknowledging that, regardless oi t:ie noDiiity at one's intentions,
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sending armed vessels into a kingdom's most fortified strategic zone may
be equated to an act provocative of war. He maintains that the Korean
soldiers in those forts were simply doing their job of protecting the
kingdom's capital from the approach of armed foreigners. Since there
was no progress following the initial attack and reprisal, Cable argues,
that is why the Low-Rodgers expedition failed. [Ref. 19: pp. 114-115].
Superficially, Cable is right. But if one delves a little deeper,
the initial Korean attack and U.S. reprisal were not the real causes of
the expedition's failure; they were merely symptomatic results of the
real causes: poor timing, hardened attitudes, misunderstanding, and
cultural ignorance.
As mentioned earlier, the Americans' timing could not have been
worse. Korea's aversion to foreigners, nurtured by a long history of
outside invasions and raids, was dramatically reinforced by its
traumatic recent history. Russian trading ultimatums, French punitive
expeditions, a foreign religion tearing at the very fabric of Korean
society, the General Sherman incident, and similar marauding
incursions all served to convince Koreans at every social strata that
foreigners and things foreign were bad for Korea.
Probably no one incident hardened Korean isolationist attitudes and
guaranteed the Low-Rodgers Expedition's failure more than the Oppert
conspiracy. What kind of reaction might one expect from a staunchly
anti-foreign, Confucian dictator when foreigners illegally enter his
country and attempt to steal from and deface the sacred graves of Korean
royalty, especially when no apology was forthcoming nor punishment
exacted once the culprits were caught? How mignt one expect the Korean
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military to react to heavily armed vessels anchoring in their bays and
surveying the waterways to their capital when just five years before a
foreign expedition of similar makeup laid waste to the entire island of
Kangwha? How was the negative affect of the Oppert conspiracy lost on
the very men who tried to bring him and Jenkins, his American cohort, to
justice? In such a context, how can history do anything but question
the timing of the Low-Rodgers Expedition?
Hardened attitudes on both sides were also at the mercy of
misunderstandings and cultural ignorances. When he had them informed
about the intended river survey on June 1st, Low completely misread the
Koreans' silence as a tacit approval. Had he or someone near him been
aware of common Korean behavior, he could have been warned before
proceeding with the survey. Perhaps the entire incident could have been
avoided, and the reprisal raid never contemplated.
Likewise, Low's preoccupation with western diplomatic protocol must
have had some negative affect on Korean attitudes toward the Americans.
The three Korean officials who were first invited aboard the
Colorado^ then snubbed by Low, surely did not provide their
superiors a favorable report on the Americans. Low's snubbing did
nothing to cultivate trust from a people steeped in an anti-foreign
tradition. The Americans also did nothing to encourage a conciliatory
attitude on the part of the Koreans by razing five of their forts
without trying to appreciate the Korean perspective for the incident of
June 1st. How much more progress might they have made if, tram tne very
beginning, they patiently spelled out their trip's intent in the context
oi the developing situation in East Asia?
175
Low also made no attempt to solicit the support of the lower
officials who visited the anchorage. He never broached the subject of
Korea's Dotential long term benefits from relations between the two
countries. And regarding the Korean's initial firing on the U.S. survey
boats, it is particular perplexing to think that the Americans never
entertained the thought that the Koreans in the forts might not have
received word of the survey missions coming up river. Instead, the
Americans preferred to think that destroying five Korean forts, killing
hundreds, and inadvertently setting a civilian village on fire would
make for effective diplomacy.
The Koreans, however, were not void of responsibility for what
transpired. Their own cultural ignorance and biases failed to grasp or
overlook the Americans' straightforwardness and penchant for immediate
results and paper treaties. Although they did try to share some of
their isolationist rationale, it was too subtle and disguised for the
Americans to perceive what the Koreans actually meant.
The Koreans were also pitifully blind to the changes that were going
on all around them. They pridefully clinged to their traditional
isolationist policies while modern vessels and weapons left them at the
Vest's mercy whenever they confronted each other.
The results for both sides were disastrous. Hundreds were killed;
hundreds more were wounded; attitudes on both sides were hardened to the
point of irrationality. And for what? For national pride? To avenge a
relatively harmless attack brought about by misunderstanding and mutual
ignorance of each side's intentions and national interests? The state
lias our instincts and. shortcomings without our restraints.
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C. THE LOW-RODGERS EXPEDITION'S LEGACY
In terms of its stated objective to initiate relations with Korea,
was the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871 a complete failure? At the time,
the U.S. State Department, the foreign community in China, and certainly
the Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese, would all have answered "yes."
Despite the diplomatic flexibility it gave Low before the expedition,
afterwards the U.S. State Department questioned Low's judgment on
several points, and forced him to spend considerable time and effort
justifying almost everything he did in Korea. Low never denied that
mistakes had been made in Korea.
That mistakes were possible, and even probable, I never for a moment
doubted; and it is a source of gratification to me that, according to
my present lights, so few were committed. And while I feel confident
that all was done that could be, under the circumstances, it is a
source of sincere regret and disappointment that the result was not
all the Department [of State] hoped for and perhaps expected. CRef.
22: p. 1293
Since then, even serious Western historical commentators have tended
to downplay, if not dismiss, the role the Low-Rodgers Expedition played
in laying the foundations of U.S. policy in Korea. Low himself,
however, sincerely perceived positive results coming from his excursion
to Korea.
The chastisement which the attack upon our vessels by the Coreans
rendered necessary, judging from all I can see and hear, has done
good; it has convinced the Chinese as well as their vassals that
insults and injuries will not be allowed to go unredressed, which has
increased the respect of this government for us as a nation. A
lesson has at the same time been taught the Corean government which
will prove useful; it will, I feel certain, tend to guarantee humane
treatment of shipwrecked people, who may be unfortunately thrown upon
the mercy oi that nation, more certainly that all the voluntary
promises of the Kind heretofore made through the Peking government.
[Ret. 22: dd. 129-130]
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With these words, was Frederick Low simply placating an ego bruised
when the expedition returned to China without a treaty with Korea?
Perhaps. But the Low-Rodgers Expedition did leave its mark an Korea and
the foundations of American policy there. Almost three years after the
expedition, a Roman Catholic bishop, whose diocese comprised part of
Manchuria and the region adjacent to Korea, brought the Americans in
Peking some important information. On March 30, 1974, S. Wells Williams
reported to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish that there had been:
... an entire change in the government of Corea within the last three
months, and the removal of the ruler t the Taewon'gun] who has usurped
the chief authority during the past fifteen years. . .
.
The result of the visits of American men-of-war, in consequence
of the destruction of the General Sherman, and especially the
United States expedition of 1871, were all regarded as a great
triumph, by this usurper, who had, as he supposed, delivered the
kingdom from subjugation by foreigners, and asserted the prowess of
his army. But after the American flag had retired from his coasts,
and there was time to review the whole affair, the more sensible part
of the rulers began to see it in a different light. The members of
the annual embassy had also had an opportunity to confer with the
Chinese rulers at Peking, and learn from them all the real nature of
Mr. Low's attempt to open amicable relations with their sovereign.
At any rate we know that some of the Careans in this city last year
purchased many copies of all the books about foreign countries,
including the monthly magazine published in this city, to carry back
with them.
The conclusion now reported is, that the legitimate kind and his
adopted mother [the Queen Dowager] in conjunction with the ruling
nobles of Corea, have compelled the usurper Ti [Taewon'gun] to
retire, and have assumed control. The change has been brought about
without bloodshed, and the bishop. . . looks forward to a peaceable
state of their missions, seeing that the new authorities are
favorably disposed toward foreigners and Christianity.
He reports that the disastrous and bloody result to the Careans
of our attack an Fort McKee was used as a strong argument with Ti, ot
the uselessness of his resisting foreign nations, whose weapons and
tactic were so superior to theirs, and their resources so great. On
all these points there is much, no doubt, to be learned, but there
seem to be full grounds for believing the report of an entire change
of government in that kingdom. [Ret. 38: pp. 253-254J
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Although the Low-Rodgers Expedition's original good intentions
obviously went awry at the time, its impact was still profound. From
both within and outside, the idea of opening Korea to the outside world
was planted beyond suppression. Eventually, more enlightened members or
the Korean government prevailed over the isolationists and opened the
way for other Western nations to initiate relations with Korea. By the
time Commodore Robert V. Shufeldt returned to Korea in 1882,
Korean-American relations had became a reality.
All considered, the Low-Rodgers Expedition of 1871 and everything
that led up to it let us see some of the fundamental issues of the times
and the national character of the participants. They gave us excellent
examples of America's craving for commercial expansion and Korea's
stubborn commitment to isolationism. In the murder of the General
Sherman's crew, we saw the tragic results of the actions of
irresponsible men. In the Oppert conspiracy and consequent Jenkins
trial, we saw how Western schemes and bungling bred mistrust in our
relations with those we wished to initiate a dialogue. In the fighting
at Kanghwa Island, we saw the futility of a government unjustly trying
to impose its will on a nation whose potential for hostile indignation
and determined resolve was grossly underestimated, if considered at
all. Finally, they all showed how the painful consequences of divergent
national interests and simple misunderstanding at the international and





AND THE LOW-RODGERS EXPEDITION TO KOREA
TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS
Sep 1865 The Reverend R. J. Thomas makes his first visit to
Korea.
Jan 1866 The Taewon'gun takes complete control of the Korean
government.
Reverend Thomas returns to China.
Russian warship sails into Wonsan and demands trade.
Feb 1866 The Russians leave without a treaty.
Mar 1866 Koreans killed two French Roman Catholic bishops and
nine missionaries, three of which escaped. One of
them was Father Rydell, who later helped informed the
the Americans about the fate of the General Sherman.
The Taewon'gun launched a new nation-wide persecution
against all Catholics.
Jun 1866 French warships go to Korea to investigate the status of
French priests there. They bring back word of the kill-
ings in Korea.
13 Jul 1866 The French protested the massacres in Korea to the Chinese
government.
29 Jul 1866 The General Sherman departed Tientsin for Chefoo on
its way to Korea.
5 Aug 1866 Two French warships are sent to the west coast of Korea to
reconnoiter in preparation of a French punitive strike for
the earlier killings of the French priests.
9 Aug 1866 The General Sherman sailed out of Chefoo, China, for
Korea.
15 Aug 1866 The General Sherman arrived off the coast of north-
western coast of Korea.
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18 Aug 1S66 Korean officials boarded the General Sherman.
The General Sherman ignored their warnings and
progressed up the Taedong River.
22 Aug 1866 Alarmed Korean officials again boarded the General
Sherman, warning it not to proceed.
31 Aug 1866 General Sherman crewmen kidnapped three Koreans, one
of whom was a high ranking official.
Korean soldiers attempted a rescue of the Korean officials
being held on board the General Sherman. It was un-
successful. 13 Koreans were killed.
1 Sep 1866 The General Sherman ignored Korean warnings and
continued to sail up the Taedong River toward Pyongyang.
The General Sherman tried to discourage any further
Korean rescue attempts by firing its cannon and other
guns. The local citizenry became violently excited.
Korean vigilantes managed to rescue the surviving Korean
hostage on board the General Sherman.
2 Sep 1866 The General Sherman ran aground on a sand bar and
began raiding nearby shipping for supplies, eventually
seven Koreans were killed.
In Seoul, Korean Ministers of State began debating how to
handle the General Sherman situation.
3 Sep 1866 Korean attempts to destroy the General Sherman were
thwarted.
By the end of the day the General Sherman's crew was
out of ammunition and still unable to free the ship from
the sandbar.
4 Sep 1866 Koreans finally succeeded in destroying the General
Sherman with fire-rafts. The crewmen who jumped ship
to escape the flames were immediately apprehended, beaten,
and killed by an enraged civilian mob.
b Sep 1866 Orders to destroy the General Sherman finally
arrived from the Korean Ministers of State in Seoul.
.7 Sep 1866 Seoul sent Peking a full accounting of what happened with
the General Sherman.
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30 Sep 1866 While an a fact finding mission related to Catholic
persecution in Korea, the French fleet discovered the
fate of the General Sherman from Father Ridel,
a French Catholic priest running from Korean persecution.
5 Oct 1866 American authorities in China learned of the fate of the
General Sherman and its crew from the French.
16 Oct 1866 The French fleet conducted a series of punitive actions
against Korea on the island of Kangwha. This action
lasted until 27 October 1866.
27 Nov 1866 U.S. Minister Burlingame suggested to Admiral Bell
that the American Asiatic Squadron send a warship to
Korea to inquire about the circumstances surrounding
the deaths of the General Sherman's crew.
21 Jan 1867 Commander Shufeldt and the Vachusett sailed for
Korea to inquire about possible General Sherman
survivors.
5 Feb 1867 Commander Shufeldt and the Vachusett returned to
China without survivors but with an unofficial confirma-
tion that the General Sherman's crew had been
killed by an enraged local mob.
3 Mar 1868 Reports of American prisoners seen in Korea, possibly
survivors of the General Sherman, reached American
authorities in Peking.
18 Mar 1868 Commander Febiger and the U.S.S. Shenandoah left for
Korea to investigate new rumors of General Sherman
survivors.
24 Apr 1868 Frederick Jenkins informed American authorities in
Shanghai that he had been approached by representatives
of the Korean government about opening relations with the
Vest. He gained the U.S. Consulate General's implied
authorization to pursue the matter under the guise of
inquiring about the General Sherman affair. This
prompted the Consulate General to propose Washington send
U.S. warships to Korea to formally open negotiations.
30 Apr 1868 Jenkins, in partnership with Ernest Oppert, left
Shanghai on board the steamer China. Its purpose
was to go to Korea to rob the royal tombs and hold the
bones for ransom.
25 May 1868 Commander Febiger and the U.S.S. Shenandoah returned
from Korea with an official Korean government confirmation
of the fate of the General Sherman and its crew.
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25 May 1869 Jenkins returned from from Shanghai at about the same
time as Febiger. Learning the real nature of the Jenkins-
Oppert mission, American authorities started an investiga-
tion on Jenkins.
8 Jul 1368 Jenkins' trial commenced; the charge was "conspiracy."
11 Jul 1868 Jenkins acquitted of conspiracy charges.
14 Oct 1868 George F. Seward resurrected his proposal for gunboat
diplomacy to open Korea.
Dec 1869 President Grant appointed Frederick F. Low as the new
U.S. Minister to China.
20 Apr 1870 U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish tasked Low to
open negotiations with Korea. His mission was to
effect an agreement on the protection of shipwrecked
sailors and, if passible, trade.
8 May 1871 Three American warships departed Shanghai, China, bound
for Nagasaki, Japan. This was the start of the Low-
Rodgers Expedition.
12 May 1871 The American flotilla was joined in Nagasaki by two more
warships. All the American ships resupplied in Nagasaki
and prepared for their upcoming voyage to Korea. American
newspaper reporters were refused a request to accompany
the expedition to Korea, starting false rumors about the
expeditions true intentions towards Korea.
30 May 1871 The American expedition arrived off the coast of Korea,
near Kanghwa Island. Vhen Koreans approached inquiring
about its purpose, they were rebuked. Low demanded to
discuss American intentions only with the Korean king or
other sufficiently high official.
1 Jun 1871 Korean batteries fired an an armed American survey party,
which included two of the flotilla's warships, progressing
up the Han River. The Americans returned fire.
10 Jun 1871 Americans began two days of attacks on Korean fortifica-
tions on Kanghwa Island.
12 Jun 1871 American forces returned to the flotilla's anchorage.
3 Jul 1871 The American Expedition departed Korea with three combat
dead, nine wounded, and no treaties.
5 Jul 1871 The American Expedition arrived at Chefoo, China.
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hail Minister Law departed China and returned to the U.S,
Mar 1874 Reliable reports received in from Korea indicated that
the Taewon'gun had been removed from power and that the
Low-Rodgers Expedition played a key role in Korea's




THE LQV-RQBGERS EXPEDITION OF 1871
THE LANDING PARTY OF JUNE 10-11, 1871
The total force organized for the assault against the Korean forts on
June 11, 1871, was 618 officers and men. The total force to operate on
the river against the water-front on board the Hanocacy and
Palos was 190 officers and men, plus Mr. Edward B. Drew. The
following are the officers CRef. 32: p. 86-871:
Commanding Expedition Captain H. C. Blake, USN
Commanding Land Farces Commander L. A. Kimberly, USN
Adjutant Land Farces Lt Cmdr W. S. Schley, USN
Signal Officer Land Forces Ensign N. T. Houston, USN
Aid to Commander Land Forces Mate A. K. Baylor, USN
Commanding Right Wing Lt Cmdr Silas Casey, USN
Commanding Left Wing Lt Cmdr W. K. Wheeler, USN
Commanding Company A Lt Cmdr 0. F. Heyerman, USN
lLt Company A Ensign C. A. Clark, USN
Commanding Company B Master F.J. Drake, USN
Commanding Company C Lt G. M. Totten, USN
Commanding Company D Lt Hugh W. McKee, USN *
lLt Company D Master C. W. Chipp, USN
Commanding Company E Lt Bloomf ield Mcllvaine, USN
Commanding Company F Master J.E. Pillsbury, USN
Commanding Company G Master T. C. McLean, USN
Commanding Company H Master R. M. G. Brown, USN
lLt Company H Mate Collender, USN
Commanding Company I Capt McLane Tilton, USMC
lLt Company I 2Lt W. J . McDonald, USMC
Commanding Company K lLt J . B. Breese, USMC
lLt Company K ILt F. M. Mullany, USMC
Official Interpreter Mr. Edward B. Drew
DIVISION OF ARTILLERY
Commanding Division Lt Cmdr Douglass Cassell, USN
Commanding Right Battery Lt A. S. Snow, USN
Commanding Left Battery Lt W. W. Mead, USN
Chief Right Section Ensign Seaton Scnroeder, USN
Chief Right Center Section Ensign F.S. Bassett, USN
Chief Left Section Mate N. Greenway, USN
Chief Lett Center Section Master A. V. waahams. (JSIS
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PIONEER DIVISION
Commanding Pioneers Mate Quinn, USN
HOSPITAL CORPS
n Charge Corps. P. A. Surgeon, C.J.S. Wells, USN
Asst. Surgeon, Latta, USN
Asst. Surgeon, V.A. Corwin, USN
Capt's Clerk, D. Holland, USN
Chief Engineer, A. Henderson, USN
STEAM LAUNCH DIVISION
Commanding Lt Cmdr H. F. Picking, USN
2d Asst. Engr. H.L. Slosson, USN
Commanding Veeha wken Mate L. P. Gallagher, USN
Commanding Benicia Launch Mate S. Gee, USN
2d Asst. Engr. G.H.
Commanding Alaska Launch Master N. Roosevelt, USN
2d Asst. Engr. F.L.
USNKearney
Cooper, USN
OFFICERS OF THE MONOCACY: OFFICERS OF THE PAWS:
Commander E.P. McCrea, USN
Lt Cmdr D.E. Mullan, USN
Lt J.T. Gardner, USN
Master J.B. Smith, USN
Master T.C. Force, USN
2d Asst. Engr. H.D. Potts, USN
2d Asst. Engr. L.R, Harmony, USN
Surgeon Somerset Robinson, USN
Paymaster, CD. Mansfield
Lt C.H. .Rockwell, USN
Lt J.E. Jones, USN
Ensign James Franklin, USN
Mate H.C. Fuller, USN
Mate J.C. Howard, USN
Mate T.M. Nelson, USN
Mate P.C. Van Buskirk, USN
Asst. Surgeon F.H. Harwell
1st Asst. Engr. John Lowe
* Lt Hugh W. McKee was killed June 11, 1871, during the assault oi the
Korean fort known as the Citadel, Kangwha Island, Korea. In his honor,
the expeditionary forces later named that place "Fort McKee."
186
APPENDIX C
THE DIARY OF FREDERICK FERDINAND LOW
MAY 8 - JULY 10. 1871
8 May 1871 (Monday)
Left Shanghai at 9 1/2 A.M. on the Steamer Footlee for
Voosung, accompanied by Mrs. Low, Flora, Mr. & Mrs. Warden, & Mr.
Dumaresq. The Secretaries, Messrs. Drew and Cowles also accompanied
me. Raining very hard. Reached the Colorado about 11 A.M. The
guests all came on board and dined with the Admiral, and left on their
return at 2 o'clock. While at dinner the Steamer New York passed
up the river with the American mails an board. Steamer Falos
ordered to proceed to Shanghai for my mails. Got underweigh at 2 P.M.,
and steamed down to the lower Bar and anchored.
The Monocacy came down in company and put to sea same
evening. The Falos arrived at our anchorage soon after dark. She
communicated with the ship and brought my mail.
Fresh breeze from N.N.W. in the evening.
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9 May 1871
Weather clear with fine iresh breeze from N.H.V. Falas went
to sea at daylight bound to Nagasaki. Colorado got underweigh at
2 P.M. and steamed down to the light ship. Set all sail and continued
under sail and steam until about 7 P.M. Stopped engines and continued
under sail alone until 5 A.M., 10th May. Nothing occurred today of
special interest.
Pilot left the ship about 4 P.M. Sent back an overcoat & bundle of
blankets & shawls by pilot to Mr. Warden, and letters to Mr. W. , Mrs.
Low & Mr. Seward.
10 May 1871
Weather clear & pleasant. Wind getting round ahead and dying away.
About noon took in all sail and continued under steam alone. Wrote
despatches and looked over the papers, and so whiled away the day. In
the evening thick fog on the water, but bright starlight overhead.
Steamer making about 7 knots under steam alone. Notwithstanding the
size of the Colorado do not think her as steady and comfortable in
a sea way as a merchant steamer of much less size. Distance run in the
last 24 hours 123 miles.
188
11 May 1871
Veather mild and cloudy. Sea smooth, no wind. Ship under steam
alone. At 2 P.M. sighted land islands named "Asses ears" 12 miles
distant. Howitzers on quarter deck practiced firing shells.
Distance run in the last 24 hours 155 miles. Wrote dispatches all
day.
12 May 1871
Arrived at Nagasaki and anchored at 6:55 A.M. Veather warm and
raining. Found in Port the U.S.S. Alaska, Benicia,
Monocacy and Palos. Also the British flagship -Ocean
and [ ] and the French gunboat Dupleix. Exchanged salutes with
the Ocean and Dupleix. The Consul called on the Admiral and
myself. Later all the Commanders of the U.S. vessels called. Their
visits I shall not return until my arrival on the coast of Corea.
Engaged in visiting all day. Did not go on shore. Baron Richthofen
called to see about accompanying the expedition as geologist. Promised
to see him on shore next day.
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13 May 1871
Weather in the morning drizzling and very disagreeable. In the
afternoon it cleared up for several hours and was quite pleasant.
P.M.S.S. Co.'s New York from Shanghai with the American mail
arrived at 6 A.M. and brought me letters from Mrs. Low and Flora. She
is to leave on Monday at 12 N. Am busy preparing my mail for the U.S.
During the day Dr. Brettschneider called. In the afternoon the Admiral
and I went on shore. Landed at Dezuna and walked through the Japanese
settlement. The streets, shops and houses, of the Japanese present a
striking contrast to those of the Chinese: the former being much
cleaner, better stocked and more commodious in every way. Called at the
German Consulate to see Baron Richthofen but failed to see him.
Returned on board at 6 P.M.
Note: Putting down the arrival of the Stmr New York and
everything connected therewith is an error. She arrived on Sunday
instead of Saturday.
[The above note is Minister Low's.]
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14 May 1871
Weather cloudy in the morning and clear and pleasant in the
afternoon. (All I said about the arrival of the Stmr Sew York in
yesterday's data should be inserted here). Attended church on board
ship. The example is good and benificial, but the sermon both in matter
and manner was not of the first order. In the afternoon the Admiral and
I landed on the opposite shore to Nagasaki and took a walk on the
hills. The five Coreans which were picked up at sea by the Schr
Spray and brought to Taku, and from there sent to Shanghai, from
which place the Admiral brought them on the flagship with the intention
of returning them to their own country, became so alarmed at the
prospect of being returned in a foreign ship, fearing punishment by
their own officials, that the Admiral, after consultation with me,
concluded to discharge them here and turn them over to the Japanese
officials, who promised to send them back in one of the junks trading
between Corea and Japan. These poor fellows became so much alarmed that




Weather clear, warm and pleasant. Said to be a exceptional day in
Nagasaki rain being the rule and pleasant weather the exception.
Finished my mail at 11 A.M. and went on board jfew York to call on
some of the passengers. In the afternoon went on shore and called on
Mrs. Mangum [?], the wife of the American Consul: — her husband having
left at noon on the Stmr for Yokohama.
All hands on board ship busy getting ready for sea. Admiral has
given orders for the fleet to sail tomorrow at 6 A.M. He had all the
Captains on board and gave them specific orders in regard to the voyage
and ordered them to rendezvous at Ferrieruz Island, near the coast of
Corea. Engaged a photographic artist to accompany the expedition. He
will take passage in the Monocacy. Refused to allow newspaper
correspondents to go. One, — a correspondent of the New York
Herald, protested in a letter to the Admiral at our decision, in
terms more forcible than polite.
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16 May 1871
Tuesday morning at 6 A.M. the iiag-shir> got unaerweigh ana steamed
down the Harbor followed by the Benicia, Alaska, Monocacy and
Palos. At the light house formed in "double echelon" (I believe
it is called) — the Alaska on starboard quarter and a little
astern with the Benicia on the port quarter in same position. The
Monocacy occupying a similar position with respect to the Alaska, and
the Palos the same to the Benicia. Weather warm and
pleasant and sea smooth. The fleet present a fine appearance. To one
unacquainted with men of war, the precision and order of their movements
and everything on board of them is very interesting. By noting this
peculiarity one is better enabled to understand the power of the navy
when acting in concert.
In the evening light breeze so that the fore-and-aft sails were set.
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17 May 1871
Weather warm, misty and sultry in the morning. All the vessels of
the fleet in sight and in position. Thick fog and mist in the
forenoon. About noon a fresh breeze sprung up and made considerable
sea. About 1 P.M. I noticed that all the top gallant masts and yards
were sent down on the Colorado, Alaska and Benicia, which
looked like "preparing for squalls." In the afternoon fresh breeze and
considerable sea. The smaller vessels of the fleet were making bad
weather of it. Several on board Colorado were sea-sick.
Fortunately I was not one of the number. The Admiral was attacked while
in Nagasaki with rheumatism in left breast and side. It has now worked
downward into his legs and feet, — the latter considerably swollen and
painful. Last night was quite sick. Cause, eating crawfish which, I
imagine, were not very fresh.
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18 May 1371
Weather clear and bright and temperature pleasantly warm. Ail tne
vessels in sight and in position. Monocacy signalled that she had
been roughly used by the sea yesterday, having lost 20 feet of her
guards and had one boat stove. Later, she asked permission to proceed
to the rendezvous as fast as she could in order to have time to repair
damages. Her request was granted.
The Admiral is better today, and I hope will be well by the time we
arrive. Mr. Drew and Mr. Cowles are busy translating into Chinese the
documents we will be likely to require in our intercourse with the
Coreans. I have entirely recovered from my recent overturn, with the
exception that I have a slight pain in my right breast. I must have
taken a slight cold in some way.
All the vessels running under easy steam and making slow progress.
The Admiral desires to economize coal in every way. About sunset a
light breeze sprung up. Set topsails topgallant sails and royals.
Monocacy disappeared at the NE about nightfall.
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19 Mav 1871
Splendid breeze tram the South. Weather clear and cool. Stopped
engine at 4 A.M. All sail set, steering due north with fair wind.
Benicia and Alaska in their positions and the Palos in
sight astern. Pleasantest motion I have ever experienced at sea. Ship
going about eight knots. First time I have ever been at sea under sail
alone with a fair wind. Changed course at 1 P.M. to E by N. At 3 P.M.
made Ferriere Islands. Considerable swell and strong tide 4 P.M.,
proceeding very slow under steam and sounding. Monocacy at anchor
under one of the islands and signalized that she had 10 fathoms of
water. Sounding since 1 P.M. gradually decreasing from 20 fathoms at 5
P.M. Admiral concluded that it would not be safe to attempt to get
round the islands today and ordered all vessels to anchor at 6 P.M.
Fresh breeze and heavy swell. Today one of the most enjoyable days I
ever spent at sea. The Admiral's rheumatism worse today. Doctor thinks




Weather warm and thick tog cannot make out any of the vessels of
the fleet although they are anchored near the flag-ship. Impossible to
proceed, greatly to the disappointment of all. By sounding ascertained
the rise and fall of the tide to be 24 feet. Current past the ship by
log 1 1/2 knots. Capt. Nichols and myself tried fishing. "Caught
nothing." Corean fish, like the inhabitants, evidently decline
intercourse with foreigners. Fog lifted about 1 P.M. when the
Palos and Monocacy got underweigh and anchored near the
flagship. Admiral ordered the commanders of all the ships to come on
board to give them specific instructions about proceeding when we start
again. From here the order of sailing will be reversed: the Palos
ahead, the Monocacy, Benicia, Alaska and the flag-ship
fallowing in the order in which they are named. I hope we will be able
to proceed to our point of destination tomorrow. Have occupied myself
in drafting such official communications to the Corean Government as
will be likely to be necessary.
197
21 May 1871
Fog lifted about 9 A.M. when the order was given for ail the vessels
to get underweigh. Proceeded slowly on E by N course, sounding all the
way. All the vessels sounding and making signals indicating depth of
water. Veather thick so that it was impossible to distinguish objects
more than one mile distant. Strang current running and sounding
increased from 10 fathoms in the morning to 25 fathoms at 2 P. M. Saw
some rocky islands on port quarter at 2 1/2 P.M. At 3 P.M. the fog
getting so thick and the region hereabouts so imperfectly surveyed the
Admiral concluded to anchor. Fired a signal of one gun tor all the
ships to come to anchor. Soon after anchoring the fog lifted a little
when we found Isle Fernande bearing S.E. Soundings indicated 25
fathoms. Current so strong (about 3 1/2 knots) that it is impossible to
get accurate soundings to determine the exact rise and fall of the
tide. Estimates to be from 25 to 30 feet. Towards [evening?] saw some
Corean junks not far off.
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22 May 1871
Am greatly disappointed this morning at finding a aense log,
shutting out of view everything 100 yards distant. Weather warm.
Impossible to proceed unless the fog lifts. At 12 N. fog lighted up a
little enabling us to see the islands near us and the other vessels of
the squadron. At 2 P.M. fog shut down as thick as before. About 1 P.M.
saw a Corean junk bound W.S.W. all sail set and crew rowing or
sculling. Too far off to see particularly either the vessel or the crew
but supposed her to be Corean. Made the draft of a letter to the King
of Corea announcing my arrival on the Coast and my readiness to meet a
high officer of equal rank with myself. Unless some one appears at the
anchorage of the flag-ship soon after our arrival I shall send Mr.
Cowles or Mr. Drew in one of the smaller vessels in the direction of
Kang-Hoa to endeavor to find an officer of rank who will undertake to
forward my letter to the King.
All is as yet doubt and uncertainty as to what kind of a reception
we will meet with. I naturally expect that every device will be used to
induce us to go away.
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23 May 1871
Weather clear and pleasant overhead with a low fog early in the
morning. Fog gradually cleared away as the sun got up. Squadron got
underweigh about 9 1/2 A.M. steering for the first regular anchorage in
a sheet of water almost surrounded by islands which the Admiral has
designated "Roze's Rhoades." In passing Isle Fernandez discovered
something of a village on the northerly side of the island. With
glasses discovered quite a number of Coreans on the hills watching our
movements. Several junks in sight moving about but none have as yet
displayed any inclination to come near the ships. Squadron came to
anchor at 12 1/2 P.M. This P.M. the Admiral ordered the Falos and
4 steam launches to start tomorrow morning at daylight and survey all
the passages north of where we now lie, with a view of moving the
flag-ship as near to the island of Kang Hao as possible. The whole
expedition to be under the command of Comdr. Blake of the Alaska,
who is to go in the Falos. I have given a general letter of
instructions to Capt. Blake telling what to say to the Corean officials
in case any come off to inquire his business, and have sent Mr. Cowles
with the expedition as interpreter.
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24 May 1871
Weather clear calm and pleasant. palos and steam launches
started at daylight, and four boats started at 9 A.M. to take soundings
in the region where we now lie, to return at night. This latter
operation will be kept up in this vicinity until the return of the
Falos and the mosquito fleet.
Today the Admiral, myself, Capt. Nichols and Mr. Pickings landed on
Isle Eugenie and spent several hours. Ve saw no inhabitants on the
island and there are evidently none residing there, although there are
evidences of its having been inhabited not long since. On the beach we
found innumerable small oysters clinging to the rocks: — too small,
however, for eating. Wild roses and some flowers were found everywhere
we went. On the beach I picked up the top of a merchaum pipe, evidently
foreign manufacture. It had been dropped probably by the French
officers when surveying here in 1867. Some of the boats that were out
sounding, when approaching the shore where there were congregated a
number of natives, the latter fled to the hills and got out of sight.
Whether it is an innate fear of their officials who prohibit intercourse
or a dread of what we may do to them caused by the hostile actions of
the French in 1866 it is impossible to say. I rather expect to find
difficulty in communicating with the natives.
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25 May 1871
Weather caol with a fresh breese. The four surveying boats started
out again this morning to take soundings. About 10 A.M. I started in
the Admiral's Barge accompanied by Mr. Drew, Mr. Wheeler of the
Admiral's staff, a native Corean sailor, and a full boat's crew, for a
sail near the coasts of the islands with the intention, if found to be
practicable, of sending the Corean on shore with Mr. Drew, to open some
sort of communication with the people. We skirted the coast of the
large island for some distance and found that the beach, in front of
what appeared to be a large farm-house, to be studded with rocks which
rendered it unsafe to land. We then proceeded up the bay where we saw
several junks under sail intending to communicate with them if they
showed any disposition so to do. In passing near one our Corean sailor
hailed the men on board but no answer being returned concluded not to
board her and thereby terrify the boatmen. It seemed the better plan to
pursue our surveys quietly and thus exhibit by our acts that no harm is
intended to the peaceful inhabitants. The officers in the surveying
boats report that the people near where they were sounding today came
down to the water's edge to watch their proceedings, and seem to be
gaining confidence as to our peaceful intentions.
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26 May 1871
Weather warm with light breeze. Fine weather for the surveying
operations that are going on: and it is hoped the mosquito fleet will
get through their explorations and return this evening. The four boats
started out this morning again. At 2 P.M. I started in the Admiral's
Barge accompanied by Lt. Comdr. Wheeler, Mr. Drew and the Russian
Corean. Made for a little hamlet upon one of the small islands: ran up
to the beach and the Corean interpreter called to the people, who were
not far off, and they came down to the beach. Held a conversation with
them on various matters but gathered no information worth recording.
The fear the people exhibited soon after our arrival seems to be
overcome by their curiositiy. The Corean which we have with us, who
came from the NE part of the kingdom understands the language here
perfectly; — providing that one language is universal thoughout the
country. The several surveying parties that were out today met
considerable numbers of natives, all of whom with one exception,
appeared friendly. Several notes written in Chinese were given to the
boats inquiring where we are from, what is our business and when we are




Weather clear with strong wind from S.S.W. Towards evening the wina
increased to a gale causing the ship to draw one anchor which was out,
and compelling another anchor to be let go to hold her. The mosquito
fleet did not return today as we expected. Probably the hard blow
detains them on the leeward side of the islands north of us.
This morning I sent Mr. Drew and the Admiral sent Capt. Nichols to
the point where the written communications came from yesterday. Prior
to going I had a memorandum written in Chinese which would serve as an
answer to the written questions which came from the Coreans yesterday.
My reply was: substantially, that the ships came from the United States
of America: that our business is with the highest officials: that it
is likely, we shall remain here some time in order to complete our
business, and that as soon as this is settled to our staisfaction the
ships will probably depart. Mr. Drew & Capt. Nichols landed and through
the Corean interpreter held a conversation with the people. The Coreans
professed the greatest friendship and said they were peasantry, although
I am inclined to think one or more were small officials. They said it
was their intention to come on board the flag ship when the [wind] went
down. They may, but I doubt it.
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28 Mav 1871
Wind this morning about same as yesterday. Too rough ior the
"Mosquito fleet" I think. As disappointed at this delay, as I had
hoped, and rather expected, the surveying fleet back either Friday or
Saturday with a report that there is water enough for the flag ship to
move up to Isle Boise. I am anxious to get the flag-ship as near the
Capital as possible so as to establisn firmly a base of operations. No
sign of people or junks in our vicinity today. Junks would hardly
venture out with this rough sea on. In the afternoon wind lulled
considerably. Towards night began to look anxiously for the mosquito
fleet to make its appearance. At 8 P.M. went below, gave up all hope of
seeing it tonight. Half an hour later officer came down and reported
Palos in sight. She arrived with the four steam-launches in tow
and came to anchor about 9 P.M. Capt. Blake and Mr. Cowles came on
board and reported that their trip had been successful. Found plenty of
water for the whole squadron as far as Isle Boise. They had no
communication with people on shore. Saw a large crowd at a town near
Isle Boise who seemed very much alarmed at the appearance of our
vessels. Orders were immediately sent to the other ships to get
underweigh at 9 1/2 A.M. tomorrow.
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29 May 1871
Morning foggy and disagreeable. After the sun got up the fog began
to clear up so that the order to get underway, given last night, was not
countermanded. The ships did not however get ready to start until 10
1/4 A.M. Steamed along northward without trouble and without finding
any scarcity of water for the largest vessels. Many officers on board
taking "angles" to assist in correcting the charts, and all the vessels
making exact soundings. Great attention is being paid to surveys and
sounding by which charts will be made and corrected, which will prove of
great advantage to navigators who have occasion to visit this coast. It
is to be hoped that our expeditions may not be entirely fruitless, and
that its results may prove a lasting benefit to the Coreans and the
civilized world.
At 2 P.M. thick fog shut in so we could not see the vessels ahead of
the flag-ship, and the Admiral ordered a gun to be fired — a signal for
the squadron to come to anchor. Our expectation of reaching Isle Boise
and establishing a "base of operations" today is defeated, much to my
disappointment and that of every one on board.
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30 Mav 1871
Thick fog again this morning but I am hoping that wnen the sun gets
higher it will burn off. One P.M. is the hour designated to get
underway. Soon after that hour the fag began to clear away and the
signal was made to the other ships "up anchor." All got underway and
steamed northward toward Isle Boise which we reached safely about 4 P.M.
and anchored in plenty of water a little to the northward of Isle
Boise. Something of a town on an island west of Boise has a straggling
wall around it built many years ago and now much dilapidated. The
people on the western island seemed to be much alarmed at the approach
of the vessels. A large number of people could be seen fleeing from the
coast towards the country taking many cattle with them. Soon after
anchoring a native boat made its appearance near the flag-ship; one of
the persons in the boat standing up holding a letter in his hand and
making motions for someone to come off and get it. Mr. Drew went off,
got the note, and invited the people on board, which invitation they
accepted. The note purported to be from three officials on shore near
here who had been sent by the King to meet and confer with me. I
returned a reply saying that my business would only be made known to a
high official. Mr. Drew verbally sent an invitation for the three to
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31 May 1871
Weather clear and pleasant. In the morning early a white ilag stuck
upon a pole on the beach near Gurreire Island, and on examining it
through a glass a large paper covered apparently with Chinese
characters, was appended to the same pole. I sent Mr. Drew on shore to
examine it, and if found to be a communication respectful and friendly
in tone to bring it on board, otherwise to disfigure and leave it. It
was found to be a communication from the Chefoo of the district asking
the usual questions, as to where we are from, what is our business,
etc. , etc.
About 11 A.M. the three officials, who wrote the note that came
yesterday, came along side. They came on board and had a conversation
with Mr. Drew, Mr. Cowles and Lt. Comdr. Wheeler. They said the King
had sent them to inquire into our business, etc. They were informed
that the business was important and could only be made known to an
official of high rank equal to our Minister and that the official must
come with some written authority from the King. They were anxious to
see the Admiral & myself and evidently wanted to say that the King did
not desire to make a treaty for trade. Mr. Drew informed them that he
was not authorized to discuss any points of negociation: that the three
officials were not high enough for the Minister to meet and that all
matters must rest until a higher person was sent who could communicate
with our Minister. They were also told that a surveying expedition
would start today for Kang Hoa or beyond.
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1 June 1871
Today has been ratner an eventful one.
This morning the weather was clear, calm and pieasant. A snower
came up about 10 A.M. but cleared off again by 11 A.M. The Admiral
organized an expedition to proceed to or beyond Kang Hoa to survey and
sound the channel. The fleet consisted of the Monocacy,
Palos and the four steam-launches. It started at 10 1/2 A.M.
under the general command of Capt. Blake. His instructions from the
Admiral to proceed in a peaceful manner, avoiding in all ways giving
offense, and making no attack unless attacked by the Coreans. If
attacked without provocation to return the fire and destroy the place
and people that fired upon his vessels. All was peaceable until the
fleet reached a sharp angle in the river put down on the French charts
as Fort du Covde, when masked batteries, composed of some heavy
guns but mostly of gingalls opened a very sharp fire upon the vessels
and launches from both sides of the river. The vessels and launches
returned the fire and silenced the batteries and passed on a short
distance beyond. In the turn of the river it was found difficult to
steer the vessels owing to the rapid and varying current, and the
Monocacy struck a rock knocking a hole in her bottom. Capt. McRea
thinking it imprudent to proceed on in the condition his vessel then
was, the whole expedition returned safely and anchored near the flag
ship at 5 1/2 P.M. The vessels and launches were not injured by the
shots of the enemy, none were killed and only two were wounded: one
by the recoil of a gun on the Palos and one by a piece oi a shell.
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2 June 1871
Weather foggy in the morning but cleared up pleasantly about 10
A. M. Yesterday afternoon after the damage to the Monocacy had
been examined it was decided that could be repaired so as to fit for
action service again without beaching. I gave it as my opinion that
although the Navy gained a substantial victory yesterday, it would not
do to withdraw without seeking retaliation, for if we did the Coreans
would construe our victory as a defeat which would be damaging to the
prestige of our Government both here and in China. I advised that, if
the Admiral considered his force adequate, that a sufficient number of
men, who would be able, by the aid of the smaller vessels and launches,
to land at the point where the vessels were attacked yesterday, and
effectually destroy the enemy's works, guns, etc. After that was done
the force should move on up taking and destroying all the forts on both
sides of the channel as far as the north end of the Island of Kanghoa.
The Admiral decided to carry out the first part of the programme and
after that was accomplished, to then decide upon future operations. He
fixed upon this morning as the time when the expedition was to move.
Later in the evening upon consultation with Capt. Blake and Commander
McCrea it was deemed advisable to postpone the attack until neap tides
which will be in about 6 or 8 days. I quite agreed to the arrangement
as the delay will give ample time for the [Korean] Government to disavow
and apologise for the attack and open negociations.
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3 June 1871
Weather clear and temperature quite warm. It has been the warmest
day we have experienced since leaving Shanghai. Have been busy writing
despatches and letters all day and so has everybody else. The
Palos leaves tomorrow morning for Chefoo to take the mail. Capt.
Boswell goes over in her and will proceed on to Shanghai with orders
from the Admiral to charter the Steamer Millet or some other one
of her class, load her with coal and return with dispatch to this
anchorage. The Palos will return from Chefoo with coal,
provisions, and the incoming mail. Orders also went over for coal and
provisions to be sent from Hong Kong to Chefoo. The Admiral sent a
telegram, in addition to his despatches, to the Secy of the Navy,
detailing the operations thus far and asking for an increase in force.
I sent a telegram to the Secy of State and also despatches Nos. 70 and
71. Mr. Cowles also went over in the Palos and will return in
her. As the Admiral thinks it may be advisable to divide the fleet in
future operations more interpreters may be required. At his request I
wrote to Augustine Heard & Co. for Mr. Pethick to come over if he was
willing and could be spared by the firm. The proposed attack will be
made by land force in conjunction with the vessels and launches. Capt.
Blake will, as before, have command of the forces afloat & Commander
Kimberly those on the land. Vrote letters to Mrs. Low, Dr. Williams,
Mr. G.F. Seward, Mr. Wilson & Mr. Howell, Chefoo, and Mr. Wade, Peking.
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4 June 1871
Weather in the morning foggy, but ciearea ait by 10 A.M.
Palos left far Chefoo at 2 1/2 A.M. Divine service on boat at 10
1/2 A.M. previous to which the whole of the officers and crew were
assembled on deck for inspection. As the inspection goes into the
detail of everything, — cleanliness, clothing, etc. , all the men
appeared in their best. It appears to be a settled rule in the Navy
that a general inspection must take place the first Sunday in each month
whether at sea or in port; the role is called in full and every man must
be present to answer to his name or some officer must answer for him:
for instance the Surgeon answers for those that are sick and wounded and
the Officer of the Deck answers for those necessarily on duty and the
prisoners. The afternoon was warm and pleasant. Prepared a note in
reply to one received yesterday from the Prefect. It will be sent in
the name of Mr. Drew. A stake on Guerriere Island is the Post Office
through which the correspondence of this official passes. His note was
rather threatening in its character: mine in reply was firm in tone at
the same time leaving a wide door open for negociation. I gave five or
six days for peaceful overtures to come, after which the Admiral and
myself would feel at liberty to do as we pleased. It may lead to some
good results but I doubt it.
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5 June 1871
Weather clear, bright and warm. The sun today made it uncomiortabie
when exposed to its full force. Mr. Drew and Confucius at work putting
my note of yesterday into Chinese which I hope to get ready to deposit
in the special "post office" this evening. Capt. Blake & Commander
Kimberly came on board today, to whom the Admiral explained his probable
future movements. Yesterday and the day before we could see by the aid
of glasses the people at work on the hills on the mainland just a few
miles below, evidently repairing old or building new fortifications.
Also saw considerable numbers of men on the hills which appeared to be
soldiers drilling. Officers of the ships report that lights are seen at
various times through the nights on the hills near here which appear to
be signals from one hill to the other. The Admiral ordered the two
steam launches to be ready so as to leave at 2 P.M. and run southward
and around Roze's Island so as to get a better view of the
fortifications which the Coreans appear to be at work upon. They made
the trip as instructed and reported the fortifications to be
insignificant, built evidently to cover the road leading to Seoul and
not to oppose an attack from the sea. Saw three or four pieces of




Weather clear and warm. Seems to feel like summer. Awnings spread
fore & aft. Nothing occurred today of special interest. Ail the force
designed to go to "Fort du Coude" assembled on deck arrayed in martial
uniform, which consisted of white canvas gaiters in addition to the
usual sailor dress. Battalion drill was gone through with which did
great credit to both officers and men. Sailors are brave, the only
drawback when they are landed to take the part of soldiers being that it
is hard to hold them back and make them act together. Their bravery and
recklessness is the weakest spot in their characters. In the afternoon
the Barge was sent to the beach where a number of Coreans daily assemble
at low water to gather clams. Mr. Drew and the Russian-Corean went
along to try and have a talk with these ignorant people, not expecting
to obtain any valuable information, but rather to disabuse their minds
as to our hostile intentions, so long as we were treated civilly. The
people whom they met sold them ail the clams they had but as soon as the
trade was completed walked away thus declining all conversation as far
as possible. In another place where the Barge landed some natives came
and had a talk with our people. They begged us to go away, as our
presence here stopped all fishing and labor, which hindered the poor
people from obtaining their daily food.
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7 June 1871
Clear, warm and beautiful. Thermometer about 70 degrees in the
shade. About 9 A. M. a junk appeared near the ship evidently desiring to
communicate with the squadron. The Alaska sent a boat & towed the
junk alongside the flag-ship. It brought 3 bullocks, 50 chickens & 1000
eggs as a present to me from the Guardian of Kang-Hoa Prefecture and
Ex-officio Governor and General. A letter from the same official,
enclosing copy of one from the King to the Board of Rites, Peking, in
reply to mine written at that place. The men in the Junk professed to
be merchants, although it is likely they were attaches of the high
official. The letter appeared to be written in a polite manner,
reitterating the same old story: that Corea is poor, has no trade, and
desires no intercourse with the outside world. Soon after this junk
came, a flag and letter was seen at the "post office" on Guerriere
Island. This proved to be a letter from the Guardian General of Poo
Ping Prefecture in reply to Mr. Drew's sent on shore on the 5th, saying
that he had sent to his official superior, which is the General &
Governor of Kang Hoa, Mr. D*s letter, as the matters referred to were of
too grave a nature for him to discuss. It would appear that our letter
of the 5th brought out this one from Kang Hoa. The firing upon the
vessels instead of being disavowed was tacitly approved, and intimated
that force would always be resorted to to prevent vessels going above
here. Mr. Drew returned a reply that three or four days yet remained in
which peaceful negociations are possible, after which the Admiral and
myself would feel at liberty to adopt any course we may see lit. I
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declined to receive the presents and sent them back. The men who
brought the letter said that several Coreans were killed and "many tens
wounded" in the engagement of the 1st.
8 June 1871
Weather warm & clear. Atmosphere unusually pure enabling one to see
farther and more distinctly than any day since our arrival. No letters
of messengers came today from the authorities or the people. By the aid
of a glass the fortifications on the top of the hill at the place where
our vessels were attacked could be distinctly made out, and also the
yellow flag which is supposed to be that of the Command General.
Farther North on a higher hill two large trees and a portion of a city
wall could be seen, supposed to be part of the wall around the city of
Kang-Hoa. Active preparations going on for the movement which will be
made soon after the Falos returns.
At 6 P.M. while at dinner a steamer reported as coming in from
seaward supposed to be the Palos from Chefoo, which proved to be
correct. She came to anchor about 7 1/2 P.M. Mr. Cowles returned in
her, with the mails, and fresh provisions for the fleet. I rec'd
letters from Mrs. Low and others but nothing from Washington or Peking.
I presume that the Department despatches must have been forwarded to the
Legation Peking by the Consul General. The Falos, when about 25
miles east of Shantung Promontory, picked a boat containing the captain
and part of the crew of a North German schooner wrecked and totally lost
on "Sir James Hall's" group of islands off the coast of Corea.
216
9 June 1371
Weather clear, and a little coaler than yesterday. In the afternoon
strong breeze with squalls of rain. Towards evening it cleared off ana
promises a good day tomorrow. All are busy preparing for tomorrow. As
the time draws near to start I observe a change in tone and appearance
of most of the officers. They are not as eager to go as they were the
day after the last fight. Time has been given for reflection, and their
passions have cooled. They have counted the possible loss and gain, and
I fancy the latter is not likely to prove much in any event. This is
but human and indicates no lack of courage. They undoubtedly say to
themselves and to one another what are we risking our lives for? Is
Corea worth a single life? I have no fear of the result of tomorrow's
operations, and I hope our forces will escape unharmed. I do not feel
confident of the final result however. If we are obliged to stop alter
taking this fort and most thoroughly destroying it, I doubt if this will
bring the [Korean] Government to terms but it may. It is certainly
worth the effort, looking at it from any point of view.
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10 June 1871
Early in the morning weather foggy. As the sun got up it cleared
off the fog making it bright, — clear and warm. At 9 1/2 o'clock A.M.
ail the men from the flag-ship and the two corvettes embarked in boats,
— about 600 altogether — to act as a landing party. The vessels and
steam-launches got underway soon after 10 A.M., it being the Admiral's
intention to have the landing party reach their point of destination
soon after the tide began to ebb. The Honocacy took the lead,
flanked by a steam-launch on each bow, the Falos and the other
steam-launches following with all the boats and launches in tow of the
Palos, Mr. Drew accompanied Capt. Blake as my representative and
to act as interpreter if necessity should require. Soon after rounding
the point which shut her out from view from our ship, the Monocacy
opened fire, which appeared to be kept up briskly for some time. The
hazy condition of the atmosphere prevented seeing a long distance, and
the report of the guns was much less distinct than on the former
occasion. The Admiral, Capt. Nichols, myself, and Mr. Cowles went on
board the Benicia hoping to see and hear better, but found little
difference. The firing ceased during the afternoon, but was resumed
again towards evening. No news received of success or reverse. I hope
for the farmer. In the evening a Corean junk came alongside.
Mr. Cowles went an board and found 10 Coreans who said they were
Catholics and were looking for 3 French priests who they expected were
on their way here. After interrogating them and satisfying himself of




Weather clear and warm. We can see smoke of powder ana shells
bursting, but awing to the peculiar state of the atmosphere can only
hear the report now and then of one of the heavy guns. Dense volumes of
smoke indicate that forts or villages are burning but beyond this
nothing is known. All are in a state of great anxiety about the success
of the expedition. About 12 N. Benicia telegraphed "our men in
lower fort." Capt. Nichols and I went up to the Benicia about one
P.M. From her deck the main fort could be seen: and we found when we
got there that the citadel of that fort had been taken and our flag had
taken the place of that of the Generalissimo. Shortly after, we could
see the first blazing in the fort fallowed by the explosion of the
magazine. Dense volumes of smoke are rising all over the point where
Fort du Coudestands and we conclude our men are making a "clean
sweep" of all combustible material within their reach.
About 4 P.M. a boat from the Palos arrived with a report from
Capt. Blake to the Admiral saying that our men took and destroyed the
lower forts yesterday. Today they shelled from the vessels and attacked
by land and stormed Fort du Coude, and that the victory is
complete; 180 dead had been found, the wounded could not be stated, and
a large number of prisoners had been taken. Capt. Blake reports 2 men
of his killed and 5 wounded, among the latter Lt. Comdr. McKee of the




Weather clear, warm and pleasant. All is expectation this morning,
looking for the return of the neroes of yesterday. The Monocacy &
Paioscame in sight round the point at 10 A.M. and the whole
arrived at the anchorage about noon. As the vessels came down filled
with people, with the empty boats in tow, the former covered with the
captured flags and banners of the enemy, presented a queer sight. As
the Monocacy neared the Benicia the latter cheered the
conquering heroes which was returned with a will. The cheering was then
taken up by the Alaska and followed by the Colorado. As
soon as a boat came off to us our joy at the glorious victory was
saddened at the news of poor McKee's death. His wounds proved to be
fatal and he died last evening a 5:45 o'clock. His remains are embalmed
and will be sent home. All accounts agree that the Coreans fought with
courage and a desperation rarely to be found in any nation. The
superiority of our small arms and artillery alone saved us from
disaster. Vith modern arms and artillery the Coreans will stand against
equal numbers of any country. As an instance of their desperate
fighting 108 dead bodies were counted in the citadel at the fort — a
place 75 feet in diameter. The best estimates place the number of
killed at not less than 300; the wounded could scarcely be estimated.
Only about 25 prisoners were brought away, some of whom are wounded. In
the evening a note from the Magistrate of Foo-Ping-foo was found. Its




Weather warm and beautiful. Exposure to the sun in the middle of
the day is uncomfortable although not unpleasant in the shade. The
nights are cool. All have been busy today cleaning up and putting
things to rights on board the ships. The wounded Coreans have all been
kindly cared for and as they appeared anxious to get among their own
people it was decided to send them on shore if their own people would
come and take them away. Mr. Cowles went on shore with a letter from
the wounded official. He took on shore with him one of the prisoners
who was slightly wounded to tell his story and assure his people of
their safety in case they would come in a junk for the wounded. Towards
evening a junk came off and took away all the wounded. The old man
expressed great gratitude for the kindness shown him and appeared to be
happily disappointed at finding such kindness and generosity exhibited
towards the people that fell into our hands. The letter of the
Magistrate received yesterday is written evidently in a high state of
excitement. He complains bitterly of the rough usage his people
received and evidently draws a wide distinction between whipping and
being whipped. I have prepared a letter for the King informing him of
my readiness to enter upon negociations. I intimate that our wrongs and
insults are redressed and a new point of departure has been reached. In
the evening the chief officers of the late expedition and Mr. Drew and
Mr. Cowles dined with the Admiral.
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14 June 1871
Weather clear in the morning but became cloudy and cool towards
evening. Last evening a paper stuck on a stake on Gurriere Island
informed Mr. Drew that the Prefect of Foo-Ping-foo desired an answer to
his last communication. I have prepared one in the same tone as the one
to the King to send by the first conveyance that comes. I shall send
the one for the King to the same Magistrate to forward unless the
Kang-Hoa magistrate should send down a messenger, in which case I shall
send it to him.
Mr. Cowles has been interviewing the Corean prisoners today but
their information is evidently very meagre even if they should tell the
truth.
Evidence if obtained from them is limited, and not to be relied upon
except corroborated by other testimony either direct or circumstantial.
From all I can see and learn the Corean peasants and common soldiers are
very low in the scale of intellect, and without any education whatever.
The autocratic power of the officials render the status of the people
serfs or slaves. No personal responsibility is assumed and of course
there is no freedom of individual action. As soldiers they are mere
automatons doing the bidding of their superiors. What we commonly call
courage is in them mere stolidity and indifference to death. Human life
is considered of little value, and soldiers, educated as they have been,
meet death with the same indifference as the Indians of North America do.
222
15 June 1871
Weather clear and warm in the morning: cloudy and sultry in the
afternoon. towards night squally and rainy. It nas tne appearance or a
S.E. storm coming on.
Got up at 5 1/2 A.M. and the Admiral and I took an early start lor a
walk on Boise Island. Ve landed and climbed to the top of the island
from which a good view is obtained in all directions. The island is
covered with a growth of pine trees, not thick but evidently of
considerable age. The wall or fortification seen from the ships is a
stone wall laid up in clay and coated originally with lime mortar on the
top. It has no appearance of age, and it is not improbable that it was
built about the time of the French expedition in 1866 or after they had
left. It is merely a breastwork behind which people can stand with
safety and fire gingalls southward.
Upon our return we saw a small junk near Guerriere Island with a
large number of people on board. Ve rowed over towards her when one of
the men began to make signs to us holding a letter up in his hand. We
concluded not to board her and while returning the the ship met one of
the boats with Mr. Cowles in her going off. He returned bringing a note
from the Prefect of Foo-Ping-foo to me saying that the Magistrate of
Kang-Hoa had been degraded for their defeat an the 11th and that my note
in regard to the prisoners had not been sent on tor that reason. We
said we could do as we choose with the prisoners.
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16 June 1871
Weather stormy with strong wind last night. Blew very heavy during
the early part of the night, but this morning it is clear. The weather,
however, does not look settled. The Millet is looked for with
considerable anxiety, for she is fully due, provided Capt. Boswell was
able to charter her upon his arrival in Shangai.
Early this morning the junk with the Corean Christians on board
returned. They report having been southward about 100 miles; of having
all been arrested by some official but by the aid of the money which the
Admiral gave them all were released except one. Having been in the
contrary direction to the scene of the late battle of course they heard
little news. Today I let Mr. Drew take in hand and question them, to
test the accuracy of the stories told to Mr. Cowles.
From all their evidence I am entirely satisfied that they are
Christians and semi-outlaws in their own country. Two of the number
were with the French Expedition in 1S66, and three were with Jenkins in
1868 when he came on the Resurrection expedition. They are
ignorant, and of course very little information can be gained from them
that can be counted reliable enough to base any action upon. Out of the




Weather clear, warm ana pleasant. While at breakfast steamer
reported in sight bound in. It proved to be the Millet which we
had expected for some days. She brought coal and provisions, together
with officers, guns and ammunition from the Ashuelot. By her I
rec'd a letter from Mrs. Low and one from Mr. Seward, The news of our
first engagement appeared to excite interest in Shanghai and the whole
affair was pretty fully reported in the newspapers.
In the forenoon a part of Coreans appeared on the shore of Guerriere
Island with a letter. Mr. Cowles was sent on shore to see the people
and get what they had. It proved to be a letter from the Prefect of
Foo-Ping-foo returning my letter directed to the King which I sent two
days ago to this Magistrate with the request that he would send it on to
the Capital. In his note received this morning he says that he is
placed near here charged with civil jurisdiction and to defend his
Prefecture from all who may give trouble whether within or without. He
says that it does not come within his province to send despatches to the
King and he dare not do it. He intimates very distinctly that further
correspondence will be useless, and that they are prepared "to fight it
out on this line." It now seems pretty clear that all attempts at
negociation will be frstrated, and that it is simply a question of force
if they are to be made to treat.
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18 June 1871
Weather hazv, warm and sultry, in the morning. Towards evening a
breeze sprung up which rendered the temperature more comfortable.
Attended church on board at 10 A. M. Yesterday I prepared a letter for
Mr. Drew to send in his own name to the Prefect, in which complaint is
made of his action in declining to send my despatch to the King. He is
asked to reconsider his determination and either send my despatch or
inform the King that it is my desire to communicate with him: and then
if he declines to receive my communication it will leave the Admiral and
myself free to pursue such course as we may deem proper to bring my
business to his notice, and also prove to the nations of Europe as well
as the United States that the Government of Corea persistently declines
to entertain any proposition which a Minister of a friendly power is
sent to make. Although I expect little or no good to result from this
yet it is my duty, I conceive, to exhaust all resources in the attempt
at peaceful negociation. All my information and experience goes to
prove that the Government had fully decided to reject all our overtures
for a treaty without reference to what might be asked. If we had
remained quietly here we would have been beguiled by "glittering
generalities" in regard to friendliness, etc. , etc. and which would
finally have ended in an absolute refusal to treat. The hostile
measures which were inaugurated by them only hastened the end which
would have been the same in any case.
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19 June 1871
Weather clear and pleasant. Fresh breeze from the N. V. renders the
temperature today much pleasanter than yesteraay. Nothing nas occurred
today of note. No communications either to or from the Coreans. A
Court-Martial assembled today on board the flag-ship for the trial of
sundry offences of the petty officers and crews of the squadron.
Capt. Blake reported to me today that from his ship the Coreans
could be distinctly seen engaged in repairing the fort where they met
great defeat. Capt. B. thinks they have learned a lesson which will be
of great advantage to them and damaging to any nation that undertakes to
conquer this country. Like the Chinese the people of this country only
prepared to defend one side. In the construction of their forts the
rear is universally left unprotected. Attacking the forts in the rear
with a land force evidently created surprise and disarranged their plan
of defence. If Capt. Blake is correct in his observations they are
constructing works in the rear of the fort, which if true will render it
much more formidable than it was before. I doubt however, if one
disaster will teach so valuable a lesson unless the Coreans are much
more prone to adopt and act upon new ideas than the Chinese; for the
latter have left the rear of the Taku farts undefended notwithstanding
their experience in 1860.
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20 June 1871
Weather coal and pleasant. In the forenoon messenger appeared on
Guerriere Island with white flag and letter from the Prefect of
Foo-Ping-foo in reply to my last one again requesting him to send on my
despatch to the King or inform him that I desired to communicate with
the Court. His answer is the same old story over again, that has been
repeated until it is entirely familiar to all who ever heard or have
read about China and the East. He says again that his duties are so
well and particularly defined that he would incur severe censure if not
punishment in case he should so far overstep the bounds of propriety as
to send a despatch from any person to the Court; and he ventures to
suggest that it is quite against the proprieties of the occasion for a
Minister to address His Majesty direct. He then goes on to repeat the
story about the loss of the Schooner General Sherman; that he
supposes my principal business is to be to inquire about this affair and
provide against a recurrence of such cases in the future, etc. , etc. He
says that there need not be any apprehension about the safety of sailors
cast away on these shores because they will be kindly treated and sent
home. It is not necessary he says to make treaties about this or any
other matter. Corea has adopted Jeff Davis' motto during the late
[Civil] war, "I want to be left alone."
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21 June 1S71
Ve hac. a drizzling rain last nignt but it cleared off warm tnis
morning.
The question I am debating in my own mind now is, whether or not
there remains any chance of accomplishing anything by remaining longer
here. I am fully convinced that all peaceful overtures will be
rejected, and also that no hostile demonstration will bring this country
to terms. Its rulers care nothing for the lives of its people and the
sacrifice of any number at the outposts will not cause the Court to
waver in its determination to hold out against all inovations. So long
as the Capital remains intact all offensive operations that may be taken
against the country will be of no avail. If this be true the Capital
must be taken and the King either captured or driven from it before any
favorable result can be expected. It is plainly apparent to me that the
force now here is unequal to the task, and in the opinion the Admiral
concurs. I am now inclined to think we shall be obliged to withdraw,
report the state of affairs to our Government and leave it to the
decision of the President whether forces will be furnished to put it
through. I have prepared a letter to send on shore whenever I conclude
to depart.
In the afternoon the Admiral, myself, Mr. Drew and Mr. Fisher went
on shore on Boise Island and took a walk.
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22 June 1871
Weather clear and warm. No signs of rain. The Admiral is getting
the coal out of the Millet preparatory to sending her back to
Shanghai. I see no probability of making her useful in the way of
offensive operations. It seems useless to undertake farther hostile
measures without seeing clearly beforehand that the main abject will be
accomplished. We now occupy a good position. The Coreans commenced an
unprovoked attack upon our vessels. That wrong has been fully redressed
with small cost to ourselves, and with great damage to the enemy. It
seems useless to hazard another encounter without seeing some permanent
good to come from it. If we send the vessels to survey the northern
passage to the Seoul River they would most likely meet with a hostile
reception from the forts in that vicinity; and if they were attacked
there we could not leave with safety or credit until after redress had
been sought and obtained. If we do not go there the Coreans will
naturally believe that this passage will be the one we will seek in any
future attempt, and will be likely to bend all their energies to
strengthen the defences on Salle river. If the vessels should go north
even though they did not approach near enough to bring on an attack,
they would be seen which would probably lead to strengthening the
defences on the north side of Kang-Hoa Island.
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23 June 1871
Weather clear, warm and pleasant. The Admiral has determined to
send the Millet to Shanghai tomorrow morning. I have today
written to Dr. Williams giving a full resume of events that have
transpired since last I wrote him on 2d inst. I have sent this letter
open to Mr. Seward for him to read and then send on to Peking. I also
sent a telegram for Secretary of State to Mr. Seward as follows:
"Recent demonstration produced no effect on negociations. Nothing can
be effected short of capital. Force insufficient to go there without
great risk. If peaceful measures fail shall withdraw and wait
instructions." I have now little hope and no expectation of being able
to bring the government to discuss any matter, much more to enter into
any kind of treaty. The officers of the fleet have got a general idea
that we will leave about the 1st of July. I see no purpose in waiting
longer unless something occurs between now and. then to change the aspect
of things. Beato, the photographic artist, goes away on the
Millet, Also the nine Christian Coreans. Beato came on board
yesterday and took my picture alone, and also a group composed of
myself, Drew and Cowles. He also took the Admiral alone, and several of
the officers, men, flags, etc. , etc. Wrote to Mrs. Low and Flora to
send by the Millet also a note to Mr. Seward.
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24 June 1871
Weather clear and warm. Millet left this morning for
Shanghai. Her departure with the arms which she brought from the
Ashuelot tended to convince all the officers and men in the fleet
in the opinion that further operations are not contemplated. So far as
I know there C is] no officer of any prominence in the fleet who thinks
it prudent to undertake farther offensive operations with the force now
here. The dangers of navigation are so great that any attempt to move
towards Seoul would involve the disabling if not the total loss of one
or more vessels of light draught of water, they are therefore the only
ones that can even go as far a Kanghoa Island by either the northern or
southern channel. The disabling or loss of either of these vessels
would defeat any offensive movement probably, which might involve the
lives of a great many people.
In the afternoon the junk left by the Christian Coreans was towed to
and beached on Boise island at high water and set on fire. This was
done at their special request so that her number could not be
ascertained. They feared, if the officials got the number of the junk,
that the ownership might be traced, which would cause the destruction of
their families and relatives.
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25 June 1871
It commenced raining last night. This morning it was rainy ana with
the exception of spells of lighting up has continued to rain during tne
day. Attended church on board at 10 A.M. The attendance at church is
not large. No complusion or even pursuasion is used to induce the men
or officers to attend. The Chaplain may be & probably is a good man.
He has however no force or dignity of character which inspires respect,
and therefore his influence amounts to little. Nothing new has occurred
today. Bfa sign of promise from the Coreans.
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26 June 1871
Weather rainy and blowing hard. I fear the Millet is having a
rough time of it on her passage over.
No change in the status of affairs. All the boats of the ship were
out this morning exercising by signal. It is quite surprising to
witness such precisian in evolutions, directed simply by hoisting flags
on the ship. The drill of the boats equalled the drill of soldiers in
the field. "Jack's" place is on board a vessel or in a boat. On shore,
as a soldier he is brave enough; — even reckless, but the difficulty is
it is hard to command him and keep a company together.
I have commenced to write my final despatches to the Department, and
my parting respects to the Coreans. I have now no idea that there will
be any change in the status of affairs and the more I think of it the
less inclination I feel to go farther without instructions from the
Government.
If I had the force adequate for the task, so that I would feel
reasonably sure of success, I should not hesitate to go to the Capital
and try what effect that would have upon negociations. No movement
short of that would produce the least effect.
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27 June 1871
Weather overcast with drizzling rain. Yesterday the steam launches
were hoisted in, which assures everybody that we will leave here oeiore
long. I have decided that if by the 1st of July no favorable symptoms
show themselves I shall not advise any farther delay. We are so cut off
from the world, that if anything should occur which would require my
presence or that of the Admiral in China, and our absence would endanger
the lives and property of our citizens, we would be culpable in
remaining here after all hope of accomplishing anything haa vanished.
This is an important consideration that cannot be overlooked. And,
beside, if the thing is abandoned and given up as a bad job before the
departure of the next American mail, the news will reach Washington in
season for arrangements to be made for active operations next spring if
the Government so decides. It is now clear that any expedition which
shall include a land force, sent against Corea, should reach the coast
as early as the 1st of May. This would give two months of pleasant and
dry weather. The rainy season here evidently corresponds with that of
the North of China. It commences the latter part of June and ends with




Early in the morning foggy and sultry. In the forenoon fog cleared
away and the sun came out bright ana hot. Thermometer reached a higner
point today than any time since our arrival: and still it was under 80
degrees in the shade on board ship. It would I think have marked 90
degrees in the shade on shore. In the afternoon I made official calls
on board the different ships. I was accompanied by Mr. Drew, Mr.
Cowles, and Lt. Comdr. Wheeler of the Admiral's staff. The Alaska
& Benicia each fired the regulation salute of 15 guns upon my
departure from the vessel. The Palos and Monocacy not being
of a size to constitute them saluting vessels according to Navy
Regulations, no salutes were fired from them when they were visited.
This visit I have delayed until the present time for public reasons.
After our arrival at this anchorage I did not deem it wise for the
vessels to salute as the Coreans would not understand it and might
construe this courtesy shown to me into a demonstration of offence
against them and thus embarrass friendly negotiations; and I postponed
an outward show of anything like a hostile attitude, except to redress
unprovoked wrongs, until it became evident that professions of amity and
good will utterly fail to produce any effect.
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29 June 1871
Weather rainy and sultry. From the slight indications in sight from
the vessels it seems clear that the arable land in Corea produces two
crops each year; on small pieces of land under cultivation on the
islands the grain crop is being harvested. As soon as the grain is cut
the land is immediately ploughed and plants set out — evidently a root
crop of some kind. Although the rainy season sets in about the same
time it does in the North of China — the latter part of June — and
probably continues about the same length of time, it is probable that
the situation of Corea, surrounded as it is on three sides by the sea —
there must be much more moisture in the air during the dry season than
in the North of China, but whether poorer or not cannot be determined
with our scanty means of information. I am inclined believe, however,
that the country is much better than generally supposed, and if it had a
decent government, which would afford any guarantee that the laborer
would receive the fruits of his toil an entire change would be wrought
and the country become flourishing. No incentive is now offered, for
the officials levy contributions and absorb all the surplus wealth.
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30 June 1371
Weather clear and hot. The Admiral started this morning on an
inspecting tour to the other ships. He visited the Monocacy in
the forenoon and the Alaska in the afternoon. About 2 1/2 P.M. a
steamer of some kind was reported in sight, supposed to be a
steam-launch. Everybody was anxious to learn what it was and what were
its purposes, and the speculations indulged in covered the whole field
of possibilities as well as probabilities. It proved to be the
steam-launch belong to the North German man-of-war Hertha anchored
in Rozes Rhaads.
The Lieutenant who came in command of the launch reported that the
Hertha left Chefoo on the 27th June: that the cause of her coming
was a rumor current in Chefoo said to have been brought from Newchwang
by a Chinese Junk, to the effect that three of our vessels had been sunk
by the Coreans and that the others were hemmed in with little chance of
escape. The story was too absurd for belief in its entirety, but the
Commander of the Hertha thought that he might possibly be able to
afford some assistance by taking away our wounded, etc. , etc. , and
started to find our fleet. He anchored his ship near Eugenie Island and
sent his steam-launch to find Admiral Rodgers with instructions to offer
any service he could render. He reports a large English and French
force in Chefoo. By this conveyance I received a letter from Mrs. Low.
This is my birthday. Away from home and my family, there are no
pleasant associations connected with this birthday.
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1 July 1871
Weather overcast, drizzly ana sultry. The launch from the
Hertha started at 6 A.M. to return to the ship. In addition to
the report mentioned yesterday, the pilot that came over in the
Hertha says, that he started in a small lorcha loaded with stores
and provisions about the middle of June to come over to the fleet on a
trading expedition. He reached the vicinity of Eugenie Island in four
days from Chefoo, when somewhere in that vicinity, the exact place he is
not quite certain about, several Corean junks came out and attacked the
boat, firing several shots at her which went through the boats' sails
but fortunately injured no one. They showed such determined hostility
that although within sight of the masts of our fleet the Captain
concluded it was dangerous to try and reach our anchorage at Boise
Island, and turned round and went back to Chefoo. From the action of
the junks those on board the lorcha concluded that it was not so much
the desire of the Coreans to drive the lorcha off as to capture her. It
is likely that the Coreans used no other weapons than gingalls &
matchlocks. So far as I know or can learn they have no war junks armed
with artillery although it would be easy to arm junks with the
breech- loading brass pieces such as were found in the forts.
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2 July 1871
Weather overcast in the morning, drizzling in the afternoon, and
hard rain in the evening. Attended church at 10 A.M. Chaplain preached
a sermon conerning the Devil which might have passed current fifty or
seventy-five years ago, but which hardly comes up to the enlightened
intelligence of the present day. It seems strange that preachers in
this our day will continue in the same old rut. Setting down as facts
what they cannot possibly be presumed to believe, and which no one else
does. The Episcopal Church it seems to me is anti-progressive: glorying
in its antiquity and holding fast to dogma, forms and customs that are
far behind the enlightenment of the age in which we live. I regret to
be compelled to say that in all the sermons it has been my fortune to
listen to in Episcopal churches there was a bushel of chaff to one grain
of wheat. In the afternoon the Captains of all the vessels were
assembled on board to receive directions. All the vessels will keep
company until we sight Shantung promontory, then if the weather is good
the Monocacy and Palos will go direct to Shanghai to repair
damages and the others will go to Chefoo. The remains of poor McKee
were transferred to the Monocacy in the afternoon for shipment to
his mother in Kentucky. Funeral services was read on board the
Colorado before the remains were removed. If clear weather we
shall start tomorrow morning at 6 o'clock.
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3 July 1371
Weather pleasant. Was awakened this morning about 4 o'clock by the
band playing "Shoo-fiy." This is the favorite tune that is played wnen
the crew is heaving up the anchor. From this I knew in advance that the
weather admitted of our departure, notwithstanding its threatening and
stormy condition last evening. Ve started at 6 A.M.: — the Palos
and Monocacy leading, followed by the Benicia & Alaska
with the Colorado bringing up the rear. Nothing occurred worthy
of notice until we reached Ferriere Islands.
After passing these islands and getting out to sea the squadron
forms in line of sailing: the Colorado ahead, the Monocacy
and Palos next, and the Benicia & Alaska astern. In
the afternoon the Palos signalled that she was steering badly on
account of the damage to her rudder, received while engaged in the
expedition of 10 & 11th June and requested permission to go on the
starboard quarter. She & the Monocacy changed positions & so did
the Benicia & Alaska. The Benicia was signalled to be
prepared to take the Palos in tow in case she became unmanageable
in steering. Weather warm and a little hazy. In the evening the full
moon shone, bright & beautiful. I hope we may reach Chefoo tomorrow,
241
4 July 1871
Weather clear, calm and beautiful. the sea as smooth as glass.
Scarcely a ripple on the water and no perceptible motion to the ship.
About noon sighted land supposed to be Shantung Promontory. This is the
anniversary of our National Independence which has been observed with
speeches & songs, acclamations of the people as a rule realize the
inestimable blessings conferred upon them by the action of those
patriotic and brave men on the 4th of July 1776; nor is the influence of
that act duly appreciated by the millions of people in foreign lands
whose political conditions have been ameliorated by the influence of the
example of the popular form of government established in the United
States. The quiet and loneliness of the day on shipboard suggested
these and kindred reflections. At 12 o'clock N precisely a salute of 21
guns were fired from the Colorado, Benicia and Alaska. Soon after
the Monocacy and Falos were signalled to come within hail,
when after ascertaining that they were all right and prepared for the
voyage, were ordered to part company and steer directly for Shanghai.
It is now certain that we shall not reach Chefoa until tomorrow morning.
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5 July 1871
Great was my disappointment en awakening this morning to find a
dense fog shutting out from view ail land, and therefore delaying our
arrival at Chefoo. Last night was bright moonlight, but the Admiral
concluded it was the part of prudence to delay entering a strange harbor
in the night with so large a vessel as the Colorado. We arrived
off the entrance of the harbor at 12 o'clock last night and anchored.
The Benicia & Alaska anchored near as their steam whistles
can be heard at intervals through the fog. Towards eight o'clock the
fog began to burn away and the order was given to weigh anchor. We got
underway about 9 o'clock and steamed slowly in, passing the British
flag-ship Ocean and her despatch steamer, the Salamis, and
came to anchor about 11 A.M. The other vessels of the squadron followed
and anchored near the Colorado. The British Admiral came on board
soon after we anchored to call upon Admiral Rodgers. I excused myself
as soon as possible and started ashore arriving at the hotel soon after
12 o'clock. I found Mrs. Low and Flora both in good health. They were
at breakfast when I got to the hotel. Spent the rest of the day at




Weather clear, bright and warm. There is however in Chefoo a
pleasant breeze which relieves the appresiveness of the heat. The
Kanchu is expected today from Tientsin and although a day or two
ahead of the time when steamers can reach Shanghai in season for the
outgoing mail, I am informed that this is the last chance of sending a
mail with a certainty of connecting. I accordingly went down to the
Consulate and finished my despatches for the Department. I send by this
mail nos. 72, 73, 74 & 75, all in reference to Corea. I found upon
arrival here several letters from Dr. Williams in which he says that all
is quiet in Peking. There is no news of any disturbance either real or
apprehended at the present moment. A curious fact connected with the
first attack upon our vessels in Corea is, the speed with which the news
of a Corean victory was sent on to China. The report reached Peking as
early as the 10th or 12th of June, and the courier must have come
through from Seoul to Peking in 9 or 10 days about half the time
usually occupied in the transmission of despatches between the two
capitals. As Mr. Williams does not mention having received a copy of
the despatch from the Govt, of Corea to the Board of Rites, I presume




Weather clear ana rather hot. The breeze being tram the South does
not cool the atmospnere the same as an easterly wind from the sea does.
The steamer from Shanghai is expected today with the American mail oi
June 1 from San Francisco. Mr. Holwill, Flora and myself went on board
the Colorado, Benicia and Alaska today and made calls.
Considerable excitement is created today by the news which the Chinese
bring from Corea. A junk containing 3 Europeans and 8 Chinese left here
about the 15th June to wreck the Schooner Chusan which was lost in
the early days of June on one of the Sir James Hall Group near the coast
of Corea. The wreck was sold at auction in Chefoo "for acct. of whom it
may concern." The parties purchasing (2 Englishmen & 1 Prussian)
started to see if any property could be recovered. The report is that
the foreigners and two or three of the Chinese were seized and the
others escaped in their junk. This comes from. the Chinese that
returned. The Gun-Boat Ringdove started this afternoon to look
after and endeavor to recover the men who were forcibly seized by the
Coreans. The British Consul goes on the Ringdove. It is not
improbable that through this affair the British and German Governments
will became involved in complications with Corea.
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8 July 1871
Weather clear and hot. The Shansee arrived last evening
bringing the American mail. Nothing particularly new in my letters or
despatches; nor is there anything of note in the newspapers except the
conclusion and ratification of the treaty with England which is
calculated to settle all disputes existing between the two countries.
The terrible scenes enacted in France recently and the re-capture of
Paris fill European papers. It is sickening to read the accounts of the
lawlessness and vandalism of the Socialists in Paris, and strengthens
the opinion of the World, that France is not capable of self-government.
In the afternoon the Admiral called: — the first time he has been
an shore. Flora and I went in his Barge with him to call upon Mrs.
Warden. After leaving them Flora returned in the Barge and I walked
back by the beach, stopping on the way at the new Hotel to pay Mr. Wade
a visit. I found Mrs. Wade very well. The weather today has been very
warm. The Ringdove sailed last evening and will most likely be
gone a week. I doubt very much whether her visit will benefit the poor
fellows who are in the hands of the Coreans. I shall look with interest
for her return to see if any new light is shed upon affairs there.
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9 July 1871
Sun very hot this morning. A southerly breeze still continues whicn
does not cool the atmosphere much. At 11 o'clock attenaea church in
company with Mrs. Low, Flora, Mr. Wheeler & Mr. Holwill. Revd. Mr.
Butcher of Shanghai preached a sermon on civilization: — the best
sermon I have listened to in China. Several people from the Hotel went
off to the Ocean in the afternoon to take lunch. Later in the day
the Captain of the Ocean called at our rooms. The steamers
Szechuan and Appiu arrived from Tientsin. I rec'd no
letters by either vessel. Dr. Specht from Peking called. He is on his
way to take his place in the Customs at Amoy. The Appiu sailed
again for Shanghai in the afternoon. The Szechuan will go
tomorrow at 12 o'clock.
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10 July 1871
Weather clear with a fresh easterly wind. The temperature is nmcn
more comfortable today. I find a great difference between a southerly
and an easterly wind in point of comfort; the former is hot and sultry
and the latter bracing and cool. Nothing of especial note occurred
today. The Steamer Shantung came in the afternoon bringing an
"official" from Mr. Seward in regard to the payment for telegrams but
nothing else. The Shanghai papers comment upon the withdrawal of the
fleet from Corea. In the opinion of the Shanghai newspapers the fleet
should have remained in Corea until the further determination of the
Govt, of the U.S. could be made known to me. It is unfortunate that all
diplomatic and naval matters in China could not be entrusted to the
Editors in Shanghai. Were this the case the newspapers would be better
suited whether the interests of foreign governments were or not.
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cLu—z)J& +-^CZ4*~> j^~~ *si^j£-o-r--t-*-^) £^ZL> /cu^« id^^L^t <-^__-t^ <>x^t^y
C4 ?***-< &t^*U^~7 J* C-<J1^<H-*1^~0 , £~ &/£.
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19 June 19 Monday [I70-IM] [8th Mnnih] 1871
L'ULaXtZ^) CUL*^> cl^O^ /lLul+ouulL . TS-Uisz/^, fa-CL^ud JLc/>-<_^-*S>
thxs t^h- l/u. <ix^*-etL^o Ctic> {jEuuu-feeuj jI/ZZaJo c^oLou^j Tm^-^-c^A^
V-^r^- csrjJc-^JO <3tLy H^jU^ 6$ClaXj q/i^J^. /pUJL^^L^
.
h CLris^a i<_ls*-s(/ t/lCja <2-o-^_^-t-JZZII , o/J/caj fi£Z& <2A-c-L<_i^a_c>
pZu /u^^a-^M- a^Mz^; Q^-<u^Z£L< 4~i*J^ Jy^L^*L^D> Ar Ua^j^J3
iPu., i.x.u^>^ c4 u*.*. ivU^t-jL^Jc, @j_t~J~ c^i^/L^-^-^Cri.^T^ij>
,
Uy. QjXlC.Ju^ tto» c^Z& m£ ttZ^ ti^,^ £^L ^—^
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1871 [m n«.i 20 Tuesday Mil I'M' June SO
O-Zja^i^^. f Ct^tsL A.^_^ &JLa-+^ '?--<y(_je_*_^3£> **-t-<-^<^ «X>
<v U^dZ^iJ^ V- a-*^+J*JU-jtx^j> /c~ aUu^ &**-£-*> 4>?*-es*_j Aj^*-jCb
7&~y/' t-Z-f-
iJU^U^^Jc^ fir W/Wi /k^> <jUyjt^/y
dfc- £^-7«__ -o-/
7
<!%<_, 0^4-^-^^-iA^ &7£^ULnL^j£, G>/jtl-£St^«.«*.f «'« *,
tsJt4i Aol~-L* r^t^Tb ^Uj^^^ Ok^ faJZc^^^, *J *ra^L 6 4^. &J. <Jo^l
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21 June [6th Month: 1871
-«-**-w C £ri^-4 T2Sp^lZZ^




o^ yo-t* ^ ^2tL QajLUzA nu^*^.
<J<pi
-t-* /\J<l < -C<-/y •
jfc C^r-i-*_«_ */
291
1071 [n Da«! 22 Thursday '173112: June 22
UT* *.ZL. V
aZ
C*-StA-£<j Qt^jlZ2Z~ Cis-c^tZ <a_ A^-^ZZA^ rtuL^£^CZZZ^^> t^x---—
.
Ja^£r <ry e^*-*/^-, &*^CtZ£, clJ-CD^ ^os/<-^ /<^*J*> 6-jl*^o
fiM-v-^^gz r &T^Lf-*^&->
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23 June 23 Friday 1871
fir Ui~ #/^~^ ^ -/-*-&..





1871 [."!»• Bar,] 24 Saturday ' I ;- I'.tO' June 24
9-jL— **_ qa^-~-4~- Q7s\~*>-^—>-f /KA-^-pUL'.-j
*Zi*. (Aa-^ c^y-^jO^^*. a-tn o ^-«-^ %JUa^^<^ ^cJ-jC^A. uy
<3-«-«-2> ff-l^^~ *-v~^. >C-e-~^-)Lj> . e/A-*.^ 6*J^a-*? <jLu>-^j^ **~Z~. i4Aum^~~>
Qs4- CTZ^< *i^c-t-.
—
^M— -»-/ £tz^* JLt^juUf-, , CtZ-aU-> EtZL





25 June 25 Sanday— 3 after Trinity '17B-I891 „„,«• 1S71
fc^TA <2. ^-i^u^. >-i^». i^t^. e^JS
0~r CLj^*(T*JL<T 9~f <2-^-"--^- Ct^L* 0**-l^-*U-^> ^t-^«^-t-^_t-* 1-X-e^_A_*y^—
,
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1871 ; w 26 Monday June 26





27 June 27 Taeaday -178-187 a] 1871
try-0-*^-/&L- /t_/_>^£-t-c^-0 (yyi^i Jl^<M*u^<-*-e.
/-^-t-^^e-t-*^ >-w ^5£-o Z^^—c^r *-y~ ^"L*.^yh-*^-£l &-V ^7-fc-t— C^6c^ ^^^Oer^
6-—
fir L*- <^*^-_ £
2TXi
A-0~2> ,




1871 28 Wednesday [ITU June 28
^-M. lr
-^I^^_, tf_^«J^<i<j) o-t-<_^._ o«_^_-oJ~.*Jb; A-<-<-^ «LCXO <_^_^




$\jlsla—> cu*-~<-$~ €CZL^* c^<-<-<-A-
/ *^<^A^
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29 June 29 Thursday :i80-I83! [6th Month; 1871
~r,tw
301
1871 .. t .. (•-„-.: 30 Friday '-i-ii.is4 June 30
c<
302
1 July 1 Saturday :iSM83' [7th Month] 1S71
ct y—rS /y*^^-^— &£->~£-<+-o
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3 July 3 Monday [18-K811 1871








1871 Mi I,:.,-" 4 Tuesday 'IS-Mso] July 4
/- Cfc^ <U-J<^>. CU>-v-r^L tx^o-v-^ 4_jufAjG-<t± £a-^<U^
<£*-<-£*-, 6-j^J< <-«_<>-<. ^o^C^c £>—-1 LC^-> frl*-^LL4~t***^ *J Au~*-/j~
C/A-*— Gtl/i^jlU^ Cl^^J^ £aj~l^-^J cau<aJ^ *~iL^CtL^. <zlcA^-f o-t-o
gJcJ^i U~v~CI^Sc> %2,-t-*. A C. LA-£a--Z> llA-t-^A-, OC-t^jT" /Ca^-*-&0*SZ>> <^-JUj-*~
4/' £lZs*-> C>(.A-*-j--eJ^fc j}- 6^ ^-LJa~ <Jla^* U^»^_, , w£A i^* <h^O~<-^ ^
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5 July 5 Wednesday [I3(i-l7u] [7th Mwuhl 1871
d f/T-*- a. ^d. trvO J-O^-dX^J- i^-v~*~Z> <a-*-^D <0-*_*_j» '/-<.
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6 Thursday [187-1781 July 6
rL\_ «-<--_c/-o«_ l* t^./^j. .ttXZ.U^ /i ^^__ J^-c-w-t-<-_ /<ut~*<_—c<_-c-_^j





7 July 7 Friday [188-177] [7th Moml.1 1871
cl/Lo-i-w^ £t^j, ^o-^Ztfci^ oi^*-i^ i^t^. c.^-o-^. 6ZZL. <xjEZZ^+-/C£^-U}
fitZ~ <2 O^^. CJ-9 £»-~^- -£-<U-^ <dj<_, *%~«-«_». i ^-C-o-u»_ ZtZ>* **-JL- ~- ,
<h.<U*^_ iy~A* S*~t~-^ ^-^V^JL/ iLc^,ZZ ^-y j£^>~ &s-t-*.~~^,
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1871 8 Saturday :is!)-irr,l July 8
MftcLMc^
Letter
O-O.^^ £^,/-^-x^. <-dj-<^o £&Z<^.<rljL-. 6L/UJL~ <£*->
/T-t^/C^.7) 6^ JK. *Jc 6-^ ifcz^
/stC 6^C4,~-J O^tr^-^t*.^ (^1_C<>-^V<h£/. /t" ^ <_Jx^ Ji^^
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9 July 9 Sunday—3 after Triniry tlDO-l"."/ 1871
c/JLcjl/- f~<— ^y<-^-r <^<^u^>. /<£^ ^
^Ztz:
311
1871 ;;i liur»i 10 Monday LIUl-ITH July 10
Cjff cuttU^. O^i>co CsY~tlJ£L -a ^-cx^L La^JZ^S^ c^-'-^-^cP
^lc<^i-t^O cu> <o &-c+ £tCt-<j£ ^_-<_-c_o> <^-c-_S <*_« <£,&_^/o£J&
/£:*~A &u-^<— <&ul/<-/j-K.* oCzzlcls ^c<ji2> <?i_4l-o~<m•£, ;^^/A
312
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Nam, Joo-Hang, "America's Commitment to South Korea," Korea &
World, Volume 10, No. 3, p. 553.
2. "Korea," Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed. , Volume 22, 1986, p. 513.
3. Korea - U.S.A. Centennial 1882-1982, p. 169, Yonhap News Agency.
4. Koo, Youngnok, and Suh, Dae-sook, eds. , Korea and the United States:
A Century of Cooperation, University of Hawaii Press, 1984.
5. Nelson, Melvin Frederick, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia,
Russell & Russell, 1967.
6. Johnson, Willis Fletcher, America's Foreign Relations, The Century
Company, 1921.
7. Park, Jae Kyu, and Kim, Jung Gun, eds. , The Politics of North Korea,
p. 243, The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 1979.
8. Fairbank, John K. , Reischauer, Edwin 0. , and Craig, Albert M. , East
Asia: Tradition <& Transformation, p. 398, Houghton Mifflin Company,
1978.
9. Davies, John Patton, "America and East Asia," Foreign Affairs,
p. 370, January 1977.
10. Neu, Charles E.
, The Troubled Encounter: The United States and
Japan, p. 8, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975.
11. Kim, C. I., and Kim, Han-kyo, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism
1876-1910, University of California Press, 1967.
12. Han, Woo-keun, The History of Korea, East-West Center Press, 1971.
13. Henthorn, William E.
, A History of Korea, The Free Press, 1971.
14. Paik, L. George, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea,
1832-1910, 3d ed. , Yonsei University Press, 1980.
15. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1867, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
,
1867.
16. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1866, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 1867.
17. Eemis, Samuel Flagg, and others, The American Secretaries ox State
and Their Diplomacy, volume 7, Pageant Book Company, 1958.
313
18. Drake, Frederick C. . The Empire of the Seas: A Biography of Rear
Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt. U.S.N., University of Hawaii Press,
1984.
19. Cable, E. M.
, United States Korean Relations, 1866-1371, K.R.A.S.
Publications, 1939.
20. Weems, Clarence Norwood, ed. , Hulbert' s History of Korea, volume II,
Hillary House Publishers, Ltd., 1962.
21. Buss, Claude A., The United States and Korea at the Beginning, paper
presented at the Smithsonian Institution, June 1982.
22. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1872, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1872.
23. Nahm, Andrew C. , ed. , The United States and Korea: American-Korean
Relations, 1866-1976, The Center for Korean Studies, 1979.
24. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1868, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1869.
25. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1870, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1870.
26. Temple, Henry W. , "William H. Seward," The American Secretaries of
State and Their Diplomacy, ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pageant Book
Company, 1958.
27. Fuller, Joseph V., "Hamilton Fish," The American Secretaries of
State and Their Diplomacy, ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pageant Book
Company, 1958.
28. Hane, Mikiso, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey, Westview Press,
1972.
29. Melendy, H. Brett, The Governors of California, Talisman Press,
1965.
30. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1871, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1871.
31. Castell, Albert, and Nahm, Andrew C. , "Our Little War with the
Heathen," American Heritage, volume XIX, April 1968.
32. Schley, Winfield Scott, Forty-Five Years Under the Flag,
D. Appleton and Company, 1904.
33. Potter, Elmer Belmont, ed.
,
The United States and World Sea Power,
Prentice Hall, Inc. , 1955.
314
34. Low. Frederick Ferdinand, Diary, Nay 8 - July 10, 1871.
35. Marine Amphibious Landing in Korea, series 2, number 3, Naval
Historical Foundation, January 1966.
36. Underwood, Korean Boats and Ships, Yonsei University Press, p. 66
1979.
37. Durant, Will, and Durant, Ariel, The Lessons of History, p. 12,
Simon and Schuster, 1968.
38. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1874, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1874.
315
3IBLI0GRAPHY
Bauer, K. Jack, "The Korean Expedition of 1871," yt s. Naval Institute
Proceedings, volume 74, number 2, February 1948.
Dennett, Tyler, Americans in Eastern Asia, Barnes and Noble, 1963.
Johnson, Robert E. , Rear Admiral John Rodgers, 1812-1832, Naval
Institute Press, 1967.
Jo, Yung-hwan, ed. , Korea's Response to the West, Korea Research and
Publications, Inc. , 1971.
"Korea," Collier's Encyclopedia, 1980.
Macdonald, Donald S.
,
"American Imperialism," Korea and World Affairs,
Volume 10, No. 3 (Fall 1986).
Major C. F. Runyan, USMC, "Captain McLane Tilton and the Korean Incident
of 1871," parts I ft II, Marine Corps Gazette, volume 42, number 3, March
1958.
Malone, Dumas, ed.
, Dictionary of American Biography, Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1935.
Mayo, Marlene J., "The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign
Policy," The Journal of Asian Studies, volume 31, number 4 (August
1972).
Palais, James B. , "Records and Record-keeping in Nineteenth Century
Korea," The Journal of Asian Studies, volume 30, number 3 (May 1971).
Paullin, C. 0. , Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers
1788-1883, (publisher unknown) 1912.
Rear Admiral John Rodgers, "Asiatic Station," volumes I ft II, The
National Archives, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Records (Record Group
127, entry 80, 1869-1874).
Spiller, Roger J., Dawson, Joseph G. , and Williams, T. Harry, eds.
,
Dictionary of American Military Biography, volume III (Q-Z), Greenwood
Press, 1984.
Strand, Wilson E. , "The Opening of the Hermit Kingdom, 1866-1882," The
East, volume XXIII, number 5, December 1987.
U.S. Department of the Navy. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy
on the Operations of the Department for the Year 1871, Government Print-
ing Office, 1871.
316
Vest, Richard Sedgewick. Jr.
. Admirals of American Empire, The




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
4. Capt Douglas E. George 3
HQ USFK/J-2 IP
APO San Francisco 96204
5. Dr. Claude A. Buss, Code 56BX 3
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
6. Dr. Edward A. Olsen, Code 560S 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
7. Dr. Frank M. Teti, Code 56Tt 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
8. Asian Seminar, Code 56 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
9. Academic Library 1
Defense Language Institute
Presidio of Monterey, California 93944-5006
10. Library 1
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840
318
11. Library 1
United States Air Force Academy
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80840
12. Dr. Bruce G. Cumings 1
Department of International Studies
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington 98195
13. Dr. James B. Palais 1
Department of History/ International Studies
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington 98195
14. Dr. Robert A. Scalapino 1
Director, Institute of East Asian Studies
University of California, Berkeley
2120 Oxford Street
Berkeley, California 94720
15. Dr. Byung C. Koh 1




16. Dr. C. I. Eugene Kim 1




17. Dr. Suh Dae-suk 1
Department of Political Science
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822
18. Dr. Lee Chong-Sik 1
Department of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
19. Dr. Donald S. Macdonald 1
Department of Political Science
Lafayette College
Easton, Pennsylvania 18042
20. Gregory Henderson 1
12 Rock Hill Street
West Medford, Massachusetts 02156
319
21. Dr. Iipyong J. Kim 1
Department of Political Science
University of Connecticut
Storrs, Connecticut 06268
22. Ambassador Pak Tong Jin 1
Korean Embassy
2320 Massachusetts Avenue, N. V.
Washington, D.C. 20008




24. Dr. Gary Ledyard 1
Department of History
Columbia University
New York, New York 10027
25. Dr. Han Sung Joo 1




26. Dr. Lee Hung Koo 1
Director, National Unification Board
Seoul, Korea
Seoul, Korea




28. John Yung Rhee 1
4093 Sunridge Road
Pebble Beach, California 93953
29. Major Robert Vento 1
AFIT/CISP
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433-6583
30. AFIT/NR 1
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433-6583
31. Colonel Anthony J. Pazik 1
4354 Redwood Road
Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland 20755
320
32. Steve Bradner
Special Advisor to the Commander- In-Chief
United Nations Command/U. S. Forces Korea
APO San Francisco 96301
33. Bruce Grant
Deputy Special Advisor to the Commander- In Chief
United Nations Command/U. S. Forces Korea
APO San Francisco 96301
34. Ambassador James Lilly
United States Embassy
Seoul, Korea
35. Ambassador John L. Walker
Department of Political Science
University of South Carolina
Columbia, South Carolina 29208
36. Ambassador Paul Cleveland
United States Embassy
Wellington, New Zealand
37. Ambassador Morton Abramowitz
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520




39. Dr. Kyong Soo Lho
350 Sharon Park Drive
Apt J -4
Menlo Park, California 94025
40. William Maurer









42. Dr. Nat White 1
1550 Mt. Eagle Place
Alexandria, Virginia 23302
43. Dr. Rin-sup Shin 1
American University/FAS
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N. V.
Washington, D.C. 20016




45. Ambassador William H. Gleysteen
Washington Center of Asian Studies
1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
46. Dr. Roy U. T. Kim








48. Edward W. Kloth, Jr.
Office for Korean Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
49. Dr. Kwak Tae Hwan
Department of Poltical Science
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, Kentucky 40475
50. Dr. and Mrs. John Y. Sohn
1043 Via Verde
Del Rey Oaks, California 93940
51. Dr. Ahn Byung-joon




52. Dr. Rhee Sang Woo 1
Department of Political Science
Sogang University
Seoul 121, Korea
53. Dr. Jae Kyu Park 1
Director, Institute for Far Eastern Studies
Kyungnam University
Seoul 110, Korea
54. Dr. Soon Sung Cho 1
Department of Political Science
University of Missouri
Columbia, Missouri 65201
55. Dr. Young Whan Kihl 1
Department of Political Science
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50010
56. The Institute of Korean Studies 1
C.P.O. Box 3410
Seoul 100, Korea
57. Guy M. Hicks 1
Senior Legislative Analyst for Defense and Foreign Affairs
Republican Research Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
58. Reverend Pharis Harvey 1
Director
North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea
110 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20036
59. Choi Sung II 1
1662 Valencia Way
Reston, Virginia 22090
60. The Asia Society 1
725 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10021
61. Office of the Secretary of Defense 1




62. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155
63. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Attn: Chief, Office of Air Force History
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330




65. Commandant of the Marine Corps
Attn: Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20380-0001
66. Office of the Secretary of the Army
Attn: Army Historical Program




United States Military Academy
West Point, New York 10996
68. Library
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland 21402
69. Major John Harkey
USDLO, Box 80
FPO San Francisco 96659-0002
70. Research Center for Peace and Reunification of Korea
C.P.O. Box 6545
Seoul 100, Korea
71. Major John K. Umberger
USDAO Dhaka
c/o U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
72. William C. Black
11650 Mayfield Avenue
Apt 3
Los Angeles, California 90049
324
73. Karle Defrenderick Pitts 1
PSC Box 453
APO New York 09283-5361
74. Ernest Woods 1
16302 S.W. 103 Place
Miami, Florida 33157
75. Homer George 1
3766 Township Road 115
Mt. Gilead, Ohio 43338
76. Melanie A. George 1
1875 Brimfield Road
Columbus, Ohio 43229
77. David L. George 1
3045 Bethel Road
Columbus, Ohio 43017
78. Capt Noyes Veltmer III 1
5750 Flag Flower Place
Columbia, Maryland 21045
79. Capt Craig Steinberg 1
PCS #1 Box 5943
APO New York 09633-5379
80. Capt Kevin Novak 1
106 Browne 11 Circle
Monterey, California 93940
81. Joseph W. Wesner 1
P.O. Box 54
St. Croix Falls, Wisconsin 54024
82. Reverend Abraham W. Lee 1
1075 Mescal Street
Seaside, California 93955




84. Captain Douglas H. Nelson 1
419-84-5563
Department of Physics
United States Military Academy











c.l The Low-Rodgers Expedi








tious a study in the
foundations of U.S.
policy in Korea.

